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WILLY E. RICE* 
ABSTRACT 
Spanning nearly forty years, the Supreme Court has issued multiple 
decisions and stated categorically that “judicial hostility to arbitration” 
was the sole impetus behind Congress’s decision to enact the Federal Arbi-
tration Act of 1925. In fact, before the FAA, systemic trade-specific problems 
and practices generated heated disputes and widespread litigation among 
merchants and trade organizations. Thus, to arrest those constituents’ con-
cerns, Congress enacted the FAA. Briefly, under the FAA section 2, arbi-
tration is mandatory if a contractual arbitration provision is valid and a 
controversy “arises out of the contract.” However, common-law rules of con-
tract formation are equally clear: Standing alone, standardized-preprinted 
application forms are not valid contracts; thus, they not enforceable. Yet, 
megacorporations, international holding companies, and international finan-
cial-services corporations are increasingly fashioning standardized applica-
tion forms—which contain mandatory arbitration clauses. Put simply, the 
consequences of such practices are severe: Before contracts are formed, ap-
plicants for goods, services and employment—ordinary consumers and work-
ers as well as small-business owners, start-up entrepreneurs and prospective 
franchisees—are forced to relinquish their rights to litigate common-law 
and statutory claims in state and federal courts. Even more unsettling, a 
judicial split has evolved: Most federal courts enforce arbitration clauses in 
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applications and a majority of state courts do not. Based on the compelling 
and unexpected legal, empirical and statistical findings surrounding the 
dispositions of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts, the 
Article encourages Congress to address the concerns raised here and 
enact the recently proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2014. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By several measures, Mitchill v. Lath1 and Lucy v. Zehmer2 are “classic 
contract” cases.3 For nearly sixty years, they have been prominent opinions in 
the overwhelming majority of contract-law casebooks.4 Quite simply, many 
law professors—who teach first-year students—rely heavily on Mitchill 
and Lucy to help explain several foundational principles of contract law. 
Among other reasons, Mitchill and Lucy are celebrated because the facts in 
both cases are remarkably familiar and captivating. In addition, those un-
complicated facts help budding jurists to understand arguably the more 
complex and less exciting principles of contract of law. 
First, consider the most prominent and intriguing facts in Lucy v. Zehmer. 
Welford Ordway Lucy (Lucy) and John C. Lucy were brothers, lumbermen 
and farmers.5 They resided in Dinwiddie County, Virginia.6 Adrian Hardy 
Zehmer (Zehmer) and Ida S. Zehmer—husband and wife—lived in McKen-
ney, Virginia—where they “operated a restaurant, filling station and motor 
court.”7 Additionally, the Zehmers owned the Ferguson Farm—approxi-
mately 472 acres of land in Dinwiddie County.8 
On a wintry evening in December 1952, Lucy and his employee visited 
Zehmer’s restaurant.9 “Lucy took a partly filled bottle of whiskey into the 
                                                                                                                         
1 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928). 
2 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954). 
3 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Toward a Prudential and Credibility-Centered Parol 
Evidence Rule, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 271 (2000) (employing “the classic case of Mitchill v. 
Lath to contrast ... Willistonian[’s] ... four corners [doctrine] ... with Corbin’s [prior-agree-
ments evidence rule to determine] whether [certain] evidence is admissible”); Jean Fleming 
Powers, Promissory Estoppel and Wagging the Dog, 59 ARK. L. REV. 841, 881 (2007) (“The 
parol evidence rule cases especially show how promissory estoppel can be used to undercut a 
longstanding rule. Consider the classic case of Mitchill v. Lath.”); Lawrence M. Solan, 
Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 381 (2007) (explaining that Lucy v. 
Zehmer is one of the “classic cases” used to demonstrate the “objective theory of contracts”). 
4 See Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright in Exile: Restoring the Original Parameters of 
Exclusive Reproduction, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 215, 242 n.117 (2006) (noting that Lucy 
v. Zehmer “is a fixture of many law school Contracts casebooks”); Douglas L. Leslie, 
How Not To Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course: Powerpoint, Laptops, and the Casefile 
Method, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1289, 1300 (2000) (commenting on the “frequency with which 
Lucy v. Zehmer” appears in contracts casebooks); Barak Richman & Dennis Schmelzer, 
When Money Grew On Trees: Lucy v. Zehmer and Contracting In A Boom Market, 61 DUKE 
L.J. 1511, 1515 (2012) (presenting evidence to support that assertion that Lucy v. Zehmer 
is a famous contract case that appears in first-year contract casebooks); see also WILLY E. 
RICE, CONTRACT LAW: PRACTICE, INTERPRETATION, AND ENFORCEMENT 87, 469 (2014). 
5 Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 517–18. 
6 Id. at 517. 
7 Id. at 518. 
8 Id. at 517. 
9 Id. at 518. 
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restaurant ... for the purpose of giving Zehmer a drink.”10 After Lucy and 
Zehmer consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, the following ex-
change occurred: 
Lucy: “I bet you wouldn’t take $50,000 for [Ferguson Farm].” 
Zehmer: “Yes, I would too; you wouldn’t give fifty.” 
Lucy: “[Yes. I] would. ... [W]rite up an agreement to that effect.”11 
Zehmer secured a restaurant check and wrote the following on the back: 
“We ... agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for $50,000, 
title satisfactory to buyer.”12 Both Zehmers signed the “memorandum” and 
gave it to Lucy.13 In response, Lucy offered $5 for the Zehmers’ signatures.14 
But Zehmer refused that offer and stated: “You don’t need to give me any 
money, you got the agreement there signed by both of us.”15 “Lucy left the 
premises insisting that he had purchased the farm.”16 The Zehmers dis-
agreed, and Lucy sued for specific performance.17 
In their answer, the Zehmers raised several defenses: (1) Lucy’s 
$50,000 offer “was made in jest”;18 (2) Zehmer “did not deliver the mem-
orandum to Lucy ... [who simply] picked it up [and] put it in his pocket”;19 
(3) Zehmer refused to accept Lucy’s $5 offer after realizing that Lucy was 
serious;20 (4) Zehmer “had no intention of selling the farm, [because] the 
whole matter was a joke”;21 (5) Zehmer claimed that he “was high as a 
Georgia pine” during the transaction;22 and, (6) Lucy and Zehmer were 
just “two doggoned drunks bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and 
say the most.”23 
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the Zehmers’ defenses—de-
claring that the simple memorandum of understanding was a binding con-
tractual agreement.24 Ultimately, the supreme court ordered the Zehmers 
                                                                                                                         
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 517–18. 




17 Id. at 517. 
18 Id. at 517–18. 
19 Id. at 518. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 520. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 522 (“[T]he writing signed by the defendants and ... by the complainants was the 
result of a serious offer by Lucy and a serious acceptance by the [Zehmers], or was a serious 
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to sell the farm to Lucy and his brother.25 The sale was ordered, even though 
only a few words appeared in a short, unsophisticated memorandum of under-
standing. Even more importantly, the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed 
several extremely important principles of contract law: (1) “An agreement 
or mutual assent is ... essential to a valid contract”;26 (2) “[t]he mental as-
sent of the parties is not requisite for the formation of a contract”;27 and, 
(3) “[an offeror may not assert] that he was merely jesting when his conduct 
and words would warrant a reasonable [offeree to believe that the offeror 
was presenting] a real agreement.”28 
Twenty-six years before the Virginia Supreme Court decided Lucy, the 
New York Court of Appeals decided Mitchill v. Lath.29 The controversy in 
Mitchill also concerned whether the specific performance was warranted 
under an allegedly bargained-for contract.30 Consider the simple facts in 
the case. Charles Lath and his business partner owned a farm and wanted to 
sell it.31 Lath also owned an icehouse.32 The latter sat on Lieutenant Governor 
Lunn’s land, which was directly across the road in front of Lath’s land.33 
Standing on Lath’s land, one could see the icehouse.34 
Catherine Mitchill approached Lath, looked at Lath’s farm and decided 
to make a purchase.35 But there was a condition precedent: she wanted Lath 
to remove the icehouse on the Governor’s land, because “the icehouse [was] 
objectionable.”36 Accepting the condition, Lath “orally promised” to remove 
the icehouse.37 Lath’s oral, stand-alone promise was given as consideration 
                                                                                                                         
offer by Lucy and an acceptance in secret jest by the [Zehmers] .... [I]n either event, it con-
stituted a binding contract of sale between the parties.”) The supreme court also outlined 
other reasons for rejecting the Zehmers’ defenses: (1) “Zehmer was not intoxicated to the 
extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument he 
executed”; (2) “Zehmer was not too drunk to make a valid contract”; (3) Lucy believed that 
Zehmer’s offer was “a serious business transaction” rather than “a joke”; (4) “Zehmer 
[never] indicated to Lucy by word or act that [Zehmer] was not in earnest about selling the 
farm”; and (5) “[t]here was no fraud, no misrepresentation, no sharp practice and no dealing 
between unequal parties.” Id. at 520–22. 
25 Id. at 522–23. 
26 Id. at 522. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 516; Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 646 (N.Y. 1928). 
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for Mitchill’s contractual promise to purchase Lath’s farm.38 Therefore, 
“[relying upon Lath’s oral promise, Mitchill executed] a written contract to 
buy the property for $8,400.”39 
As activities progressed, Mitchill received the deed and took posses-
sion of the farm, intending to use it as a summer residence.40 To help achieve 
the latter goal, Mitchill “spent considerable sums [of money to improve] the 
property.”41 However, one unexpected development prevented Catherine’s 
residential plan from coming to fruition: Lath breached the oral, stand-alone 
promise and refused to remove the icehouse.42 Catherine commenced an 
action for specific performance in a court of equity.43 
Before the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, Lath advanced the 
parol evidence rule as an affirmative defense.44 Simply stated, the parol evi-
dence rule places limitations on parties’ contractual obligations and/or pre-
vents parties from tampering with totally integrated, written contracts.45 
Justice Andrews wrote the opinion in Mitchill, and he reaffirmed a settled 
principle of contract: generally, oral testimony will not alter or contradict 
the terms of a written contract.46 Of course, there is an exception to the rule: if 
parties intentionally fashion one agreement wholly or partly as consideration 
for a second and simultaneous agreement, the two are “necessarily bound to-
gether.”47 Whether a bond between two agreements is sufficiently close, 
however, can become a major dispute—like the controversy in Mitchill. 
In the end, Justice Andrews declared that Mitchill and Lath’s written, 
real-estate contract was “a full and complete agreement, setting forth in detail 
the obligations of each party.”48 To reach that conclusion, Justice Andrews 
observed: if the parties had fashioned an “icehouse agreement,” it would 
most naturally appear in the real-estate contract.49 Yes. The oral “icehouse 
agreement” was “closely related to the subject ... in the written agreement.”50 








45 See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes. 
46 See Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646–47. 
47 See id. at 647 (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 637 (1920)). 
48 Id. at 647. 
49 Id. (“The presence of the icehouse, even the knowledge that Mrs. Mitchill thought it 
[was] objectionable, would not lead [one to believe] that a separate agreement existed with 
regard to it.”). 
50 Id. 
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However, the oral, stand-alone promise was a collateral agreement; there-
fore, Catherine could not introduce it as evidence of an enforceable con-
tractual obligation.51 
Each September, for nearly a quarter of a century, the author has wit-
nessed a remarkable phenomenon: Interesting cases like Lucy and Mitchill 
encourage first-year law students to fashion exceptionally intelligent, novel, 
thought-provoking and commonsensical questions. To illustrate, consider 
an alleged incident that nearly wrecked the life of a twenty-seven-year-old 
law student (“Jessica”).52 Six years before entering law school, Jessica 
applied for an apartment in an “upscale-50-plus-residential community.”53 
The two-page, standardized application form contained six paragraphs.54 
One paragraph was a mandatory-arbitration clause.55 The latter provision 
banned all trial-by-jury and trial-by-judge lawsuits—requiring tenants to 
arbitrate all constitutional rights, common law, and civil rights disputes 
before private arbitrators.56 Jessica allegedly “forgot to complete and sign 
the application.”57 Still, the associate-female manager told Jessica: “Don’t 
worry about it.”58 Ultimately, Jessica signed a one-year lease.59 The con-
tract, however, did not contain a mandatory-arbitration provision.60 
A few months after Jessica moved into her apartment, the senior male 
manager allegedly wanted “to spend time” with Jessica and her new baby.61 
Jessica, however, refused the manager’s “romantic and fatherly advances.”62 
In response, the senior manager allegedly harassed Jessica—“making [her] 
life hell on earth.”63 Later, the same manager forced Jessica to vacate the 
apartment, allegedly asserting: “You and your illegitimate child are tres-
passers. You are not 50-years-old. Leave!”64 
                                                                                                                         
51 Id. (“The collateral agreement was made with [Mrs. Mitchill]. The contract of sale was 
[made] with her husband .... [N]o assignment of it from him appears. Yet the deed was given 
to her. It is evident that ... a transaction in which she was the principal from beginning to 
end [occurred]. We must treat the contract ... as it was in fact, made by her.”). 
52 E-mail from Former First-year Law Student to Author (Nov. 3, 2009, 5:53 PM, CST) 
(on file with author). In oral conversations, the student revealed the material details—
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The then-twenty-one-year-old Jessica contacted an attorney, who con-
cluded that she had viable claims under several federal statutes: The Fair 
Housing Act of 1968,65 the Civil Rights Act of 1866—sections 198166 and 
1982,67 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1974.68 Furthermore, the attorney 
reported that Jessica probably had sound common law assault and breach 
of contract claims.69 On several occasions, Jessica considered filing a 
multi-action lawsuit against the senior-male manager and the residential 
community.70 In the end, however, she vacated her apartment and decided 
not to sue.71 
When the twenty-seven-year-old Jessica entered law school, she read 
Lucy and Mitchill. And, in the course of events, she raised three questions: 
(1) whether her former fifty-plus standardized apartment application was 
an enforceable memorandum of understanding—like the controversial 
memorandum in Lucy v. Zehmer; (2) whether her uncompleted and un-
signed lease application was a binding contract, (3) whether the mandatory-
arbitration clause in her defunct apartment application was enforceable, 
absent probative evidence of any bargained-for exchange consideration; 
and (4) whether—under the parol evidence rule—the provisions in her 
uncompleted and unsigned application could have altered or amended the 
terms in her signed lease agreement.72 
To be sure, during Jessica’s tenure in law school as well as today, state 
and federal courts are still grappling with each question. For example, 
preliminary agreements appear in many forms.73 Consequently, judicial 
                                                                                                                         
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012) (outlawing housing discrimination under Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws 
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
every kind, and to no other.”). 
67 Id. § 1982 (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property.”). 
68 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012) (“[N]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
69 E-mail from Former First-year Law Student, supra note 52. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 14. 
72 Id. 
73 RICE, supra note 4, at 76–77 (outlining some familiar preliminary agreements—
“memoranda of understanding,” “earnest money agreements,” “deposit receipts,” 
“temporary insurance binders,” “conditional binding receipts,” “letters of intent,” 
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splits continue to evolve over whether parties’ precontractual agreements are 
valid and enforceable contracts.74 Such conflicts persist even though a rich 
body of law has developed to answer the question: whether a memorandum 
of understanding is an enforceable contract.75 Moreover, even assuming that 
standardized application forms are not memoranda of understanding or pre-
liminary agreements, one is still left with a pressing question: whether a 
signed or an unsigned completed application is a valid and legally enforce-
able contract. 
The latter question continues to be timely and important for two reasons. 
First, like preliminary agreements, standardized application forms are ubiqui-
tous.76 Furthermore, there are many types: applications for goods, services, 
employment, membership, prizes, housing as well as applications for one’s 
gaining admission to a multitude of programs and institutions.77 Arguably, 
                                                                                                                         
“commitment letters,” and “agreements in principle”); see also Global Seafood Inc. v. 
Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing a less familiar 
preliminary agreement entitled “heads of agreement.”); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. 
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing letters of intent and 
commitment letters). 
74 See, e.g., Columbia Park Golf Course, Inc. v. City of Kennewick, 248 P.3d 1067, 
1080 (Wash. App. 2011) (Korsmo, J., dissenting) (“Courts across the country, and com-
mentators as well, are split on the enforceability of agreements that contemplate future 
agreements.”); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and 
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 662 (2007) (“For decades, there has 
been substantial uncertainty regarding when the law will impose precontractual liability .... 
Courts have divided ... over the question of liability when parties make reliance investments 
following a ‘preliminary agreement.’ A number of modern courts impose a duty to bar-
gain in good faith on the party wishing to exit such an agreement. Substantial uncertainty 
remains, however, regarding when this duty attaches and what the duty entails.”); cf. 
Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Parties to 
proposed commercial transactions often enter into preliminary agreements, which may 
provide for the execution of more formal agreements. When they do so and the parties 
fail to execute a more formal agreement, the issue arises as to whether the preliminary 
agreement is a binding contract or an unenforceable agreement to agree.”). 
75 See infra Part I.B and accompanying notes. 
76 Cf. Alison Doyle, How Many Applicants Are There for Each Job Opening (Aug. 18, 
2013), http://jobsearch.about.com/b/2013/08/18/the-number-of-job-applications-per-open 
ing.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/P7R5-9JPR (“Google, the 
company where just about everyone would love to work, gets over a million job applications 
each year and reportedly only hires .4 –.5% of applicants. Last year, Walmart reportedly re-
ceived 5 million applications. Depending on the time of the year, there are 15,000–50,000 
job openings at Walmart.”). 
77 See, e.g., Cathie A. Shattuck, The Tort of Negligent Hiring and the Use of Selection 
Devices: The Employee’s Right Of Privacy and the Employer’s Need to Know, 11 INDUS. 
REL. L.J. 2, 6 (1989) (reporting that “most companies use general application forms”); J. Craig 
Wallace, Mary G. Tye & Stephen J. Vodanovich, Applying for Jobs Online: Examining 
the Legality of Internet-Based Application Forms, 29 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 497, 500 
tbl.2 (2000). 
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absent the widespread use of standardized applications, face-to-face trans-
actions and interviews would increase dramatically. In turn, efficient opera-
tions of most small-to-large institutions, industries and professions would 
probably decrease substantially and business costs would increase.78 
Therefore, given the ubiquity and use of applications forms, disputes 
over whether such forms create legal rights or obligations are exceedingly 
common. But consider the pressing question in this Article: whether the 
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA)79 governs the enforceability of ar-
bitration clauses in standardized application forms? Without doubt, this 
question has generated serious splits between and among federal and state 
courts.80 Furthermore, as discussed later and more extensively in this Article, 
the Supreme Court has fashioned extremely liberal policies—those favoring 
the enforcement of mandatory-arbitration provisions in binding contracts 
as well as in non-binding instruments.81 
Even more disquieting, all too many inferior state courts as well as federal 
courts have embraced and applied the Supreme Court’s “liberal” arbitra-
tion policies—without seriously questioning the wisdom of such policies.82 
And in the wake, two adverse consequences have developed: (1) federal 
courts routinely ignore or refuse to weigh carefully and intelligently states’ 
settled principles of contract law when deciding whether to coerce appli-
cants into binding arbitration; and (2) the Supreme Courts’ admittedly and, 
arguably, excessively pro-arbitration bias has encouraged lower courts to 
marginalize or ignore consumer protection, antidiscrimination, and civil 
rights laws, when the latter tribunals are considering whether to enforce 
arbitration clauses in standardized application forms.83 
Unquestionably, a few commentators have sounded the alarm—ques-
tioning the wisdom of courts’ willingness to enforce mandatory-arbitration 
provisions in applications.84 Those discussions, however, have been fairly 
                                                                                                                         
78 But see James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 
1684 (1991) (“Law schools have you fill out lengthy application forms which require you 
not only to provide your GPA and your LSAT score, but also to describe your unique 
abilities and experiences, and the ways in which you might add to the rich fabric of the 
law school class. It takes you about eighty hours to fill out each of these forms .... When 
the law school receives your application, it banks your check, adds up your GPA and your 
LSAT, and throws the rest of the application away.”). 
79 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
80 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
81 See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
82 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
83 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
84 See Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues In Employment Arbitration, 44 
BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 444–45 (2006) (discussing a single case involving the enforceability 
of an arbitration clause in an employment application); Richard A. Bales and Sue Irion, How 
Congress Can Make A More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 
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brief—appearing essentially as statements or conclusion in the literature.85 
Certainly, the FAA covers enforceable contracts.86 But, completed and signed 
application forms generally are not contracts under state laws.87 Like many 
memoranda of understanding, applications are simply unenforceable writ-
ten representations or preliminary agreements. Moreover, the FAA’s “sav-
ings clause” instructs courts to weigh states’ contract laws and equitable 
principles extremely carefully before deciding to enforce arbitration clauses 
in contracts.88 
Without a doubt, the question—whether courts should enforce arbitration 
provisions in standardized applications—is timely and important. Yet, this 
question has received surprisingly little serious research and legal analysis. 
Therefore, the purpose of this Article is to present a comprehensive and an 
interdisciplinary—historical, legal, empirical and statistical—explanation 
of the pressing and general question: whether federal and state courts are 
equally more or less likely to apply section 2 of the FAA and enforce 
mandatory-arbitration clauses in standardized application forms? There is, 
of course, an equally important auxiliary question: whether state and fed-
eral courts allow legal as well as extralegal factors to influence decisions 
to enforce or not enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications? 
Part I begins the discussion by presenting an extremely brief review of 
several common law rules regarding the following: (1) the formation of a 
valid contract, (2) bargained-for consideration and the enforcement of a valid 
contract, (3) the enforceability of memoranda of understanding and other 
preliminary agreements, (4) the applicability of the parol evidence rule, and 
(5) the enforceability of applications for products, services, employment, 
residential and commercial tenancy, admissions, and membership in vari-
ous associations, organizations and institutions. 
Part II presents an even shorter review of disgruntled applicants’ federal 
and state statutory theories of recovery. Fairly often, in their underlying 
lawsuits, applicants allege that defendants violated one or a combination 
                                                                                                                         
1088–90 (2009) (citing three employee application forms cases and briefly proposing 
ways to make the FAA more equitable); Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and 
Fairness In The Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 114–15 
(2010) (briefly reporting four courts’ decisions in cases involving the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses in employee’s application forms); Linda M. Lasley, Keith Maurer & 
H. Wesley Sunu, Recent Developments In Alternative Dispute Resolution, 41 TORT TRIAL 
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 123, 133 (2006) (reporting—without providing an analysis—a single 
Sixth Circuit dispute over whether an arbitration clause in an employment application 
was enforceable). 
85 See articles cited supra note 84. 
86 See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
87 See infra Part I and accompanying notes. 
88 See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
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of federal and state consumer protection, civil rights and/or antidiscrimina-
tion laws.89 In those same underlying lawsuits, defendants file motions to 
compel the applicants/plaintiffs to arbitrate the disputed claims before a 
private arbitrator.90 On other occasions, defendants initiate declaratory judg-
ment actions in courts of equity and file motions to compel arbitration.91 
Still, in other instances, defendants file motions only after applicants have 
commenced underlying antidiscrimination, consumer protection or civil 
rights lawsuits in courts of law, and served copies of their complaints.92 
Briefly put, the discussion in Part II is a necessary prerequisite for under-
standing the more troublesome and prevalent judicial conflicts, which are 
discussed in Part IV of this Article. 
Part III discusses the debate surrounding the actual and purported pur-
poses of FAA section 2—the primary focus of this Article. That section has 
repeatedly fostered numerous motion to compel arbitration disputes involv-
ing the following questions: (1) whether an arbitration clause in a standard-
ized application form qualifies as a “written provision in a contract” under 
                                                                                                                         
89 See infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
90 See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 
(11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting district court’s ruling that denied defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration and stay judicial proceedings in an employment religious discrimination action); 
Maddox v. USA Healthcare-Adams, L.L.C., 350 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975 (M.D. Ala. 2004) 
(granting, without ruling on the merits of plaintiff’s claims, defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration and stay the proceedings in an employment age discrimination action). 
91 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Virgin Islands, 385 F.3d 801, 803–04 (3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting 
defendant’s petition for declaratory relief by declaring that the applicant for employment 
did not agree to resolve all disputes in an arbitral forum or forego substantive rights); 
Whittington v. Taco Bell of Am., Inc., No. 10-cv-01884-KMT-MEH, 2011 WL 1772401, 
at *6 (D. Colo. May 10, 2011) (“Although Defendants’ motion is styled as a motion to 
compel arbitration, Defendants’ reply suggests that what Defendants seek is in fact a 
declaratory judgment regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as it exists 
in Taco Bell job applications .... The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, ‘[in] a case 
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, ... any court of the United States ... may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).”); see 
also Gardner v. Ryan’s, No. 1:01CV00030, 2001 WL 1352113, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31, 
2001) (“The plaintiff, Charissa Gardner, brought this action alleging racial discrimination 
by her employer in violation of her rights secured by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001). Gardner also sought a 
declaratory judgment as to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement ... signed by the 
plaintiff as part of her employment application. The defendant, Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 
Inc. ... has moved to dismiss the action, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings and compel 
arbitration in accord with the [a]greement.”). 
92 See, e.g., Ives v. Ramsden, 174 P.3d 1231, 1238–39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (hold-
ing that a defendant waived his right to arbitration when he moved to stay the action to 
allow the parties to arbitrate only after three years and four months elapsed since filing of 
the complaint). 
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section 2 of the FAA; (2) whether applicants’ antidiscrimination, civil rights 
and harassment claims “arose out of” an enforceable arbitration clause in 
an employment contract, or “arose out of” an unenforceable employment-
application form; (3) whether an applicant’s consumer-protection claims 
“arose out of” an arbitration clause in a financial services contract or “arose 
out of” an unenforceable application for services; and (4) whether a party’s 
failure to prove sufficient and bargained-for exchange consideration pre-
cludes the enforcement of an arbitration clause in preprinted application 
form. These specific questions have generated judicial splits, which are dis-
cussed in Part IV. 
Once more, it is important to stress: many federal and some state courts 
routinely cite and apply FAA section 2 and enforce arbitration clauses in all 
sorts of applications for employment, services, goods, benefits and mem-
berships.93 Under the common law, however, standardized and stand-alone 
applications are not valid and enforceable contracts.94 Even more impor-
tantly, a large body of congressional and historical evidence exists to support 
two assertions: (1) Congress never intended for the FAA section 2 to mar-
ginalize or preempt state principles of contract law; and (2) Congress never 
envisioned for the FAA section 2 to govern the enforceability of arbitration 
clauses in standardized application forms.95 Part III presents the historical 
and congressional evidence. 
Finally, Part V presents a case study. The reported findings are based 
on an analysis of approximately one thousand federal and state court cases. 
More specifically, Part V outlines and discusses the substantive and proce-
dural dispositions of motion to compel arbitration disputes—those involving 
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in standardized application forms 
as well as in standardized and negotiated contracts. Quite simply, the statis-
tically significant findings reported in Part V reveal several unintended and 
troublesome consequences: (1) federal courts’ motion to compel arbitra-
tion rulings muddle markedly settled, common law principles of contract; 
(2) state and federal courts’ decisions undermine or marginalize consumer 
protection laws; and (3) federal courts’ section 2 rulings effectively preempt 
the application of antidiscrimination statutes, thereby precluding applicants-
litigants from securing remedies under those statutes. 
Certainly, Congress did not enact the FAA to undermine federal and 
state civil rights, antidiscrimination, and consumer protection statutes. There-
fore, the Article concludes by encouraging Congress to enact a previously 
proposed statute entitled, “The Arbitration Fairness Act.” The evidence in 
the study strongly suggests that some state courts and most federal courts 
                                                                                                                         
93 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
94 See infra Part I and accompanying notes. 
95 See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
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will continue to enforce arbitration provisions in all sorts of standardized 
applications and bar disgruntled applicants’ access to courts of law—unless 
Congress acts. 
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PERTINENT, COMMON LAW 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 
A. The Formation and Enforcement of Valid Contracts 
Put simply, “[a] contract is an agreement between two or more parties.”96 
Under the terms of an agreement, parties promise to do something for each 
other’s benefit.97 Or, one party promises to abstain from engaging in a certain 
activity for the benefit of the other party.98 In addition, contractual agree-
ments appear in many flavors: (1) express—oral and written, (2) implied-
in-fact, and (3) implied-in-law.99 
Settled law is clear: only “valid” contracts are enforceable in courts of 
law and equity. Therefore, to enforce an agreement, a party must establish 
a “valid” contract by presenting prima facie or probative evidence of the 
following: (1) each party’s intent to be mutually bound under the terms of 
the contract; (2) one party’s offer; (3) the other party’s acceptance of the 
offer; (4) the parties’ meeting of the minds regarding the “undertaking”; 
(5) each party’s consent to the terms of the contract; (6) the execution of 
the contract; and (7) the “delivery” of the contract.100 
                                                                                                                         
96 See, e.g., Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 336 (1978) (“A contract is an agreement 
between parties whereby one of them acquires a right to an act by the other; and the other 
assumes an obligation to perform that act.”); State v. Atwood, 301 P.3d 1255, 1258 
(Haw. 2013) (“A contract is an agreement between two or more persons which creates an 
obligation to do or not do something.”); McCraw v. Llewellyn, 123 S.E.2d 575, 578 
(N.C. 1962) (“A contract is an agreement between two or more persons upon sufficient 
consideration to do or to refrain from doing a particular act.”). 
97 See cases cited supra note 96. 
98 La Salle Nat’l Bank v. Vega, 520 N.E.2d 1129, 1131(Ill. App. 1988) (“[A] contract 
is an agreement between competent parties, upon consideration sufficient in law, to do or 
not to do a particular thing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 Legros v. Tarr, 540 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ohio 1989) (“[I]t is well-established that 
there are three classes of simple contracts: express, implied in fact, and implied in law. 
‘In express contracts the assent to its terms is actually expressed in offer and acceptance. 
In contract implied in fact the meeting of the minds, manifested in express contracts by 
offer and acceptance, is shown by the surrounding circumstances, which made it inferable 
that the contract exists as a matter of tacit understanding .... Contracts implied in law are not 
true contracts; the relationship springing therefrom is not in a strict sense contractual .... 
In truth contracts implied in law are often called quasi contracts or constructive contracts.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923, 925–26 (Ohio 1938); 
Columbus, Hocking Valley & Toledo Ry. Co. v. Gaffney, 61 N.E. 152, 153–54 (Ohio 1901). 
100 See Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. App. 1999). 
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Furthermore, even if a contract is “valid, courts will not enforce it unless 
sufficient consideration supports the agreement.101 Quite simply, a contract 
is “a promise enforceable against the promisor if the promisee gave some 
consideration for the promise.”102 The consideration doctrine requires some 
evidence of bargained-for exchange promises, which may be exchanged 
acts, forbearance, or “the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal 
relation” for another’s benefit.103 Moreover, bargained-for exchange con-
sideration does not have to be extremely valuable.104 In fact, the proverbial 
peppercorn may serve as sufficient consideration.105 
Of course, even if a promisee cannot establish bargained-for exchange 
consideration, it may be possible for a promisee to secure breach of contract 
damages under the theory of promissory estoppel.106 Under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, a promise is binding (1) if it is offered to induce a prom-
isee’s performance, (2) if it actually induces the promisee’s performance, 
and (3) if enforcing the promise prevents injustice.107 To establish promis-
sory estoppel consideration, a party must prove: (1) a promisor made a 
clear and definite promise, (2) the promisor’s intention was to induce the 
promisee’s reliance on the promise, (3) the promisee relied on the promise 
to his detriment or changed his position, and (4) an injustice would be 
avoided by enforcing the promisor’s promise.108 
                                                                                                                         
101 United States v. Prokos, 441 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“In evaluating 
the consideration supporting any agreement, [a] court is only permitted to determine 
whether sufficient consideration supports the contract, a court is not permitted to examine 
the adequacy or equities of the exchange between the parties unless there is mutual 
mistake or the deal is so unfair that justice prevents its enforcement.”). 
102 Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 800 A.2d 872, 878 (N.J. 2002). 
103 Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 383 (N.J. 1988). 
104 See, e.g., Traphagen’s Ex’r v. Vorhees, 12 A. 895, 901 (N.J. Eq. 1888) (“A very slight 
advantage to one party, or a trifling inconvenience to the other, is a sufficient consideration to 
support a contract, [absent mental incapacity] ... fraud, imposition, or mistake.”). 
105 See, e.g., Sfreddo v. Sfreddo, 720 S.E.2d 145, 152–53 (Va. Ct. App. 2012) (“[A] 
gift has been defined as a contract without a consideration. Indeed, ‘by definition, a deed 
of gift requires no consideration.’ Consideration represents ‘the price bargained for and 
paid for a promise.’ It may come in ‘a benefit to the party promising or a detriment to the 
party to whom the promise is made’ .... Virginia has long followed the ‘peppercorn’ theory of 
consideration, under which even a peppercorn suffices as consideration. A peppercorn has 
been equated with a cent.”) (citations omitted). 
106 In re Estate of Ross, No. A07-1249, 2008 WL 2168640, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
May 27, 2008). 
107 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992). 
108 Id. 
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B. The Enforceability of Purportedly Legal Rights in Written 
Preliminary Agreements 
Again, the definition is clear: “A contract is an agreement between two 
or more persons consisting of a set of promises that are legally enforce-
able.”109 But consider these facts: “Memoranda of understanding (MOU),” 
“earnest money agreements,” “real estate binders,” “deposit receipts,” “tem-
porary insurance binders,” “conditional binding receipts,” “letters of in-
tent,” “commitment letters,” and “agreements in principle” are familiar 
examples of preliminary agreements.110 Parties fashion such temporary 
agreements in order to outline their intentions, weigh their options, circum-
vent ambiguities, escape liabilities, and consider the consequences of an 
undertaking before binding themselves to a permanent enforceable con-
tract.111 In fact, letters of intent, insurance binders, and similar temporary 
instruments are often called “agreements with open terms” or “agreements 
to negotiate.”112 On the other hand, some preliminary agreements simply 
                                                                                                                         
109 Behrens v. Wedmore, 698 N.W.2d 555, 565 (S.D. 2005). 
110 See Global Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay Mussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 223 (2nd Cir. 
2011) (discussing “heads of agreement”—a less familiar preliminary agreement); Brown 
v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2005) (embracing the view that memoranda of 
understanding are preliminary agreements); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Tribune 
Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing letters of intent and commitment 
letters); Holman v. Musser, 212 P. 33, 35 (Cal. App. 1922) (finding that the deposit 
receipt was a preliminary agreement); Robinson v. Hein, No. CV92299893S, 2002 WL 
450719, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2002) (accepting that the real estate binder was a 
preliminary agreement and leaving the issue of its enforceability to a trier of fact); Kan. 
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Kutak, 44 P.3d 407, 410 (Kan. 2002) (accepting without deciding 
that the commitment letter was a preliminary agreement); Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’ns 
USA, Inc. v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. 06 CVS 17673, 2007 WL 2570180, at *3 n.4 (N.C. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 27, 2007) (reaffirming an “earnest money agreement” is a preliminary agreement); 
Sabetfard v. Smith, 760 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (App. Div. 2003) (finding that the real estate 
binder was an unenforceable preliminary agreement); Dixon v. Pickle, 327 S.W.2d 50, 53 
(Tenn. App. 1959) (reaffirming the proposition that a temporary insurance binder is a 
preliminary agreement); Vacek Grp., Inc. v. Clark, 95 S.W.3d 439, 441 (Tex. App. 2002) 
(“Clark drafted an ... agreement in principle, which was described in the document as a 
‘preliminary agreement.’”); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and 
Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 
250–51 (1987) (discussing various preliminary agreements). 
111 See Cochran v. Norkunas, 919 A.2d 700, 707–08 (Md. 2007) (“[In some pre-
liminary agreements the parties state emphatically] that they intend not to be bound until 
[a] formal writing is executed or [until] one of the parties has announced to the other such 
an intention .... [Other temporary agreements clearly state that the parties must embrace] 
one or more specific matters ... before [the] negotiations are concluded.”). 
112 See, e.g., Globalmart, Inc. v. Posec Hawaii, Inc., No. 28249, 2012 WL 1650697, at 
*7 (Haw. Ct. App. May 10, 2012) (“The ‘binding’ paragraphs of the MOU ... give Land 
Mark the ‘exclusive right to negotiate and enter into the Purchase Agreement’ .... [T]he 
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state that each party accepts all essential terms which appear in the written 
document.113 Still, other preliminary agreements are express contracts—out-
lining the parties’ intentions, forming a contractual relationship, and legally 
binding the parties to their ultimate goal or transaction.114 
Generally, state and federal courts recognize two types of preliminary 
agreements—“Type I” and “Type II.”115 The former is an enforceable bind-
ing contract. The latter is not. A written Type I preliminary agreement is a 
“complete” agreement—reflecting the parties’ meeting of minds on all im-
portant negotiated issues.116 Since a Type I preliminary agreement is a totally 
integrated agreement, it legally binds both parties to their ultimate contrac-
tual objective.117 Conversely, a written Type II preliminary agreement is gen-
erally not legally enforceable for several reasons: (1) it binds the parties only 
“to a certain degree,” or to “certain major terms”; (2) it leaves “other terms 
open for further negotiation”; (3) it “does not commit the parties to their 
ultimate contractual objective”; and (4) the parties are only obligated to 
negotiate open issues in good faith in order to achieve the stated “objective 
within the agreed framework.”118 
Once more, memoranda of understanding are preliminary agreements. 
Therefore, applying the Type I test,119 some state and federal courts have 
                                                                                                                         
‘binding’ terms of the MOU constitute nothing more than an agreement to negotiate and 
enter into a contract in the future. Therefore, the MOU is unenforceable.”); Keystone 
Land & Dev. Co. v. Xerox Corp., 994 P.3d 945, 948 (Wash. 2004) (“The second type of 
agreement is an agreement with open terms. Under an agreement with open terms, the 
parties intend to be bound by the key points agreed upon with the remaining terms supplied 
by a court or another authoritative source.”). 
113 Cochran, 919 A.2d at 708. 
114 Id. 
115 See Fairbrook Leasing, Inc. v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 519 F.3d 421, 426–27 (8th Cir. 
2008); Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“In some circumstances, however, preliminary agreements can create binding obligations. 
[In general], binding preliminary agreements fall into one of two categories.”); SIGA 
Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 349 (Del. 2013) (“Federal courts interpreting 
New York law recognize two types of binding preliminary agreements, ‘Type I’ and 
‘Type II.’”). 
116 Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
117 Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 548. 
118 Id. 
119 See Brown v. Cara, 420 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Adjustrite, 145 F.3d at 
549) (“There are four [elements which courts used to] determin[e] whether a preliminary 
agreement is an enforceable [Type I agreement or binding contract. They are] (1) whether 
there is an expressed reservation of the right not to be bound in the absence of a writing; 
(2) whether there has been partial performance of the contract; (3) whether all of the 
terms of the alleged contract have been agreed upon; and (4) whether the agreement at 
issue is the type of contract that is usually committed to writing.”). 
424 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:405 
declared that certain MOUs were valid, legally binding and enforceable 
contractual agreements.120 In contrast, other courts have examined other-
wise “valid” MOUs, applied the Type II standard,121 and concluded that 
the written instruments were not enforceable contracts.122 But consider this 
fact: standardized, preprinted application forms are not MOUs, conditional 
binders, binding receipts, agreements in principle, or temporary binders.123 
                                                                                                                         
120 See, e.g., White v. AutoZone, Inc., 213 F. App’x 628, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Auto-
Zone argues that it could not have breached a contract ... because the [MOU] ... was 
merely a letter confirming a verbal offer and not a contract .... White received the [MOU] 
prepared and signed by Holland, an AutoZone manager, and began work ... under its terms. 
Therefore, both parties were contractually bound by the terms set forth in the Holland 
[MOU].”); Findling v. Lossing, No. 296841, 2011 WL 1565489, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Apr. 26, 2011) (“Lossing argues that, because the [MOU] was not a contract, she is not 
liable for any breach. She contends that the [MOU] was essentially a ‘contract to contract’ 
[and] that the [MOU] did not indicate what the parties intended their obligations to be, it 
contained no definitions, and nothing established what type of guaranty that she was to 
issue .... In this case, both parties were competent to contract with one another .... Further, 
they contracted to relinquish and redeem shares of that company respectively, as a result 
of the parties divorcing one another .... The [MOU] appears to meet all of the requirements to 
be deemed a valid contract.”); Stevens & Wilkinson of South Carolina, Inc. v. City of 
Columbia, 721 S.E.2d 455, 456, 459 (S.C. App. 2011) (“The City of Columbia entered 
into a [MOU] with members of a development team .... When the City gave the project to 
another team ... some members of the original development team [sued] the City for breach of 
the MOU .... The City [filed] a motion for summary judgment contending [that] the MOU 
[was] not a contract, and the circuit court granted the motion .... [T]he circuit court erred 
[by] ruling as a matter of law that the MOU [was] not a contract .... [E]vidence in the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the MOU ... supports a reasonable inference that the 
MOU was a contract.”); see also The King v. Shinfield, [1811] 104 Eng. Rep. 709 (K.B.). 
In Shinfield, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding. Id. Lanesbury asserted 
that the memorandum stated the parties’ respective intent and was a binding apprenticeship 
contract. Id. Defendant Palmer and the King’s Bench disagreed. Id. 
121 See Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(Lower courts must consider several factors to decide whether a preliminary agreement is 
a binding Type II agreement: “whether the intent to be bound was revealed by (1) the 
language of the agreement; (2) the context of the negotiations; (3) the existence of open 
terms; (4) partial performance; and (5) the necessity of putting the agreement in final form, as 
indicated by the customary form of such transactions.”). 
122 See, e.g., id. at 72–73 (“The language of the [MOU]—two references to the pos-
sibility that negotiations might fail and the reference to a binding sales agreement to be 
completed at some future date—shows that Arcadian did not intend to be bound .... The 
language of the [MOU] reveals ... that ... API should not have believed that Arcadian intended 
to be bound.”); Olszowy v. Norton Co., 553 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226 (App. Div. 1990) (“The func-
tion of the memorandum and related negotiating notes is merely to remind the negotiators 
of what was orally agreed upon during the interim period prior to the preparation and 
execution of the formal contract document. The memorandum is not a contract in and of 
itself .... Accordingly, only plaintiff’s conjecture, speculation, and lack of memory 
support his erroneous interpretation of the memorandum of agreement.”). 
123 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 909 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(“The Banner application form [stated that e]xcept as provided in the conditional receipt 
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Therefore, since some MOUs, and other preliminary agreements may qualify 
as binding and enforceable contracts, an important question begs for an an-
swer: whether standardized application forms are enforceable Type I pre-
liminary agreements. Based on a conservative reading of state and federal 
courts’ analyses and decisions, the answer is no. There is a rich, common 
law distinction between standardized application forms and, Type I prelimi-
nary agreements—which are often totally integrated and binding contracts.124 
The relevance of this important proposition will be discussed in Part V. 
C. The Parol Evidence Rule and the Admissibility of Standardized 
Application Forms to Contradict or Vary Terms in Totally Integrated 
Written Contracts 
Again, preprinted application forms appear in many varieties—benefits, 
employment, grant, housing, goods, insurance, loan, membership, publishing, 
                                                                                                                         
bearing the same number as this application, no insurance applied for will take effect until 
the full first premium is paid and such policy is delivered to the owner.”) (emphasis added); 
Ventolas v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., No. 93-3429, 1995 WL 808892, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 24, 1995) (“[The corporate applicant] met with [the insurance agent] ... and applied 
for a disability insurance policy. The application form reference[d] a conditional receipt 
and [did] not by its terms make any promise of coverage.”) (emphasis added); Wallace v. 
Time Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 468, 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (“Wallace contacted ... an in-
surance broker ... [and] completed an application for a combined policy of life and dis-
ability insurance .... The application form provided that coverage would be effective as of 
the date the policy was issued by the company and received by the insured unless provided 
otherwise in a conditional receipt.”). 
124 See Optiwind v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Goshen, No. LLICV084007819S, 
2010 WL 4070580, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2010) (“Since the preliminary agree-
ment extended to the plaintiff the legal interest to build such a wind turbine, and the 
subject matter of the commission’s decision centered on an application for a special permit to 
construct a wind turbine, the plaintiff can demonstrate a specific, legal interest in the 
subject matter of the commission’s decision, and can show that the commission’s decision has 
specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest.”) (emphasis 
added); River Glen Assocs., Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 870, 870 
(App. Div. 2002) (citing Adjustrite Sys., Inc. v. Gab Bus. Svcs., 145 F.3d 543, 549 (2d Cir. 
1998)) (“We agree with the motion court that there was no binding preliminary agree-
ment to negotiate in good faith plaintiff’s application for a commercial mortgage in view 
of the disclaimers in the application and the sophistication and experience of plaintiff’s 
principals.”) (emphasis added); see also Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Dep’t. of Educ., 
940 N.E.2d 1256, 1262–63 (Ohio 2010) (“Viewing the ODE’s review of a community-
school sponsorship application under R.C. 3314.015 as a two-stage process is further sup-
ported by the last sentence of R.C. 3314.02(C)(1), which permits any entity that falls within 
one of the six enumerated categories to enter into preliminary agreements with any per-
son or group of individuals .... The ability of an eligible entity to enter into preliminary 
agreements prior to a final decision on the merits of its application to sponsor a 
community school presumes that there has been a threshold determination by ODE that an 
entity falls within one of the R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) categories.”) (emphasis added). 
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and securities registration applications.125 And among courts’ considering 
the issue, a majority view has emerged: standing alone, standardized ap-
plication forms are not contracts.126 On the other hand, a definitive answer 
to a related question remains exceptionally elusive: whether words and 
phrases in standardized applications may alter or contradict words and 
phrases in totally integrated contracts—those evolving from completed, 
signed and approved applications? 
Briefly, the parol evidence rule is a commonsensical doctrine that 
memorializes and protects parties’ contractual intentions, rights, obliga-
tions and reasonable expectations.127 More specifically, the parol evidence 
rule prevents a party from introducing extrinsic evidence—prior or con-
temporaneous, written or oral agreements—to contradict or vary terms in 
an unambiguous written contract.128 Or, when a written instrument facially 
expresses parties’ final contractual agreement, the parol evidence rule 
prevents a party from adding more contractual undertakings, terms, condi-
tions, exclusions and/or limitations.129 Moreover, attempting to introduce 
oral or extrinsic evidence becomes even more difficult, if a written contract 
contains a merger clause. Quite often, merger clauses will state that the writ-
ing is the complete integration of the parties’ intentions.130 
                                                                                                                         
125 See, e.g., Cent. Ohio Alt. Program v. Ballinger, No. 3:06CV01083, 2007 WL 846506, 
at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2007) (“The defendant reasonably argues that the grant appli-
cation on which COAP relies was not a contract .... By presenting and relying on only the 
grant application, COAP has not shown that the parties entered into a contract.”); Vakas 
v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 242 F.R.D. 589, 599 (D. Kan. 2006) (“[A]n 
application ... for life insurance is not a contract .... [T]he contract is the clearest intention 
of the parties, not the application.”); Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness and Poverty v. U.S. 
Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 799 F. Supp. 148, 155 (D.D.C. 1992) (“The government was 
mistaken when it translated an application for housing into a full-blown lease or a deed.”); 
Harden v. Maybelline Sales Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[A]n applica-
tion for employment is not a contract.”). 
126 See cases cited supra note 125. 
127 See, e.g., Garret v. Ellison, 72 P.2d 449, 451–52 (Utah 1937) (discussing the 
general principle underlying the rule). 
128 See, e.g., Gilliland v. Elmwood Props., 391 S.E.2d 577, 581 (S.C. 1990); see also EPA 
Real Estate P’ship v. Kang, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209, 211 (Ct. App. 1992) (“The parol evidence 
rule ... prohibits the introduction of extrinsic evidence—oral or written—to vary or contra-
dict the terms of an integrated written instrument.”); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. 
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:1, at 862 (4th ed. 2012) (explaining that 
the parol evidence rule “prohibits the admission of [extrinsic] evidence of prior or contem-
poraneous oral ..., or prior written agreements, [to explain the meaning of a contract when 
the parties have reduced their agreement to an unambiguous integrated writing]”). 
129 See U.S. Leasing Corp. v. Janicare, Inc., 364 S.E.2d 202, 205 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988). 
130 See Blackwell v. Faucett, 108 S.E. 295, 296 (S.C. 1921) (reiterating that parol evi-
dence may not be admitted to add or modify terms if a writing appears to express the parties’ 
whole agreement); Wilson v. Landstrom, 315 S.E.2d 130, 134 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984). 
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Certainly, exceptions to the parol evidence rule exist. Consider Justice 
Andrews’s analysis in Mitchill. He wrote: 
[Before an oral agreement may vary a] written contract, at least three 
conditions must exist: (1) The [oral] agreement must ... be a collateral 
one; (2) it must not contradict express or implied provisions of the writ-
ten contract; (3) it must be one that parties would not ordinarily be ex-
pected to embody in the writing, or, put in another way, an inspection of 
the written contract, read in the light of surrounding circumstances, 
must not indicate that the writing appears “to contain the engagements 
of the parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of such 
engagement.” Or, again, it must not be so clearly connected with the 
principal transaction as to be part and parcel of it.131 
Furthermore, a party may introduce extrinsic evidence to interpret an am-
biguous term in a contract, even if a merger or an integration clause appears 
in the contract.132 Also, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements—
those fashioned before a final, totally integrated contract—are admissible to 
establish “illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration, or other 
invalidating cause.”133 
But reconsider the question: whether the language in an approved and 
preprinted application form may alter, contradict or modify language in an 
applicant and offeror’s subsequent and wholly integrated contract? A canvas 
of common law rulings and state statutes reveals that the answer depends 
on whether a consumer applied for, say, insurance, or whether the individual 
applied for employment or housing. To help illustrate the point, consider 
Texas Insurance Code section 1151.052. It reads: 
Entire Contract 
(a) An industrial life insurance policy must provide that the policy is 
the entire contract between the parties, except that at the option of the 
insurer, the insurer may make the policy and the policy application the 
entire contract between the parties. 
                                                                                                                         
131 Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 647 (N.Y. 1928). 
132 See Martin v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 233 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Agree-
ments and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are 
admissible ... to establish the meaning of ambiguous terms in the writing, whether or not 
the writing is integrated.”); Duncan v. McCaffrey Grp., Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280, 306 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (stressing that extrinsic evidence may be admitted to explain ambiguous language 
in a contract). 
133 See Ingraham v. Geico Ins. Co., No. 06-111, 2009 WL 793046, at *15 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 24, 2009) (finding that parol evidence may be introduced to vary a writing if a 
contractual term evolved from fraudulent conduct, a mistake or an accident); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 (1981). 
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(b) To make the policy application a part of the contract, a copy of 
the application must be endorsed on or attached to the policy at the time 
the policy is issued.134 
Unmistakably, under section 1151.052, the parol evidence rule would not 
preclude an individual from citing words and phrases in the insurance appli-
cation to contradict or alter terms in the insurance policy. Section 1151.052(b) 
is clear: if an application is “attached to the policy” when the policy is issued, 
the two written instruments form a totally integrated contract.135 Also, a care-
ful review of other states’ insurance statutes reveals that some completed 
and approved applications for insurance and the insurance policies comprise 
the “entire insurance contract.”136 Consequently, in those jurisdictions, the 
parol evidence rule does apply—if the standardized applications are en-
dorsements to binding and enforceable insurance instruments.137 
Now, assume that an individual completes and signs a preprinted em-
ployment application. Also assume that the employer and applicant ulti-
mately form a contractual relationship under a preprinted, standardized 
employment contract. May the terms in the approved and standardized em-
ployment application alter, contradict or modify language in the subsequent 
and wholly integrated employment contract? The analyses and rulings in 
McLain v. Great American Ins. Companies138 and Slivinsky v. Watkins-
Johnson Company139 provide some limited insight. 
                                                                                                                         
134 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1151.052 (West 2003) (emphasis added). 
135 Id.; see also id. § 1101.003 (“[The life insurance] policy and the application for the 
policy constitute the entire contract between the parties.”). 
136 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1205A (1993) (“[T]he policy and the appli-
cation ... if a copy of the application is ... attached to the policy when issued, shall con-
stitute the entire contract between the parties.”) (emphasis added); CAL. INS. CODE 
§ 10113 (West 2014) (“Every policy of life, disability, or life and disability insurance 
issued ... by any insurer ... shall contain and be deemed to constitute the entire contract 
between the parties and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to any ... appli-
cation or other writings [or] either of the parties ... unless the same are indorsed ... or attached 
to the policy.”) (emphasis added); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 224(1)(c) (2011) (“[T]he policy, 
together with the application ... a copy of which shall be endorsed upon or attached to the 
policy ... shall constitute the entire contract between the parties.”) (emphasis added); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-420(2) (2013) (“[T]he policy together with the application, if a copy 
[is] endorsed ... or attached to the policy shall constitute the entire contract between the 
parties.”) (emphasis added); MINN. STAT. § 61A.05 (2014) (“Every policy of insurance issued 
or delivered ... by any life insurance corporation ... shall contain the entire contract between 
the parties. Every policy which contains a reference to the application, shall have a copy 
of such application attached thereto or set out therein.”) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 38.2-3344(A) (West 2014) (“[T]he policy, or the policy and the application for the policy, 
if a copy of the application is endorsed ... or attached to the policy when issued, shall 
constitute the entire contract between the parties.”) (emphasis added). 
137 See statutes cited in supra note 136. 
138 256 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1989). 
139 270 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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In McLain, Robert McLain secured one of Great American’s standardized 
employment application forms and applied for work.140 At the bottom of the 
form, the phrase “For Company Use Only” appeared.141 Great American 
never signed or completed the bottom portion of the application.142 On the 
back page of the application form, the following provision appeared: 
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and 
regulations of the Great American Insurance Company, and I agree that 
my employment and compensation can be terminated with or without 
cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the 
Great American Insurance Company or myself. I also understand and 
agree that the terms and conditions of my employment may be changed, 
with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time by the Great 
American Insurance Company. I understand that no representative of 
the Great American Insurance Company, has any authority to enter into 
an agreement for any specified period of time, or to make any agree-
ment contrary to the foregoing.143 
After completing and signing the application, McLain returned the 
form to Great American.144 In the course of events, Great American hired 
McLain.145 And even though McLain’s probationary review was favorable, 
Great American fired McLain after eight months of employment.146 McLain 
filed a lawsuit.147 Among other claims, McLain alleged that Great American 
breached an implied-in-fact contract148 that permitted the employer to termi-
nate McLain only for cause.149 In its answer, Great American asserted that it 
terminated McLain for “insubordination.”150 But, McLain insisted he never 
read an insubordination clause and no one from Great American discussed 
                                                                                                                         
140 McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 865. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 





148 Id. at 867; see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988) 
(“[F]actors apart from consideration and express terms may be used to ascertain the 
existence and content of an employment agreement, including ‘the personnel policies or 
practices of the employer, the employee’s longevity of service, actions or communications 
by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the 
industry in which the employee is engaged.’... [T]he totality of the circumstances deter-
mines the nature of the contract. Agreement may be shown by the acts and conduct of the 
parties, interpreted in the light of the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances.”). 
149 McLain, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 867. 
150 Id. at 865. 
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it with him.151 “The jury found in favor of McLain and awarded $62,000 
in compensatory damages.”152 Great American appealed.153 
On appeal and citing the language in the application, Great American 
argued that McLain could be terminated with or without cause.154 In addi-
tion, Great American asserted that the preprinted employment application 
form was a totally integrated contract.155 Therefore, according to Great 
American, the lower court violated the parol evidence rule when that tribu-
nal allowed McLain to introduce evidence about termination procedures in 
an allegedly implied-in-fact contract.156 To reach its decision, the California 
Court of Appeals performed a two-part analysis.157 First, the court asked 
whether the parties intended for the terms in the application form to be the 
complete and final agreement.158 If so, the parol evidence rule evidence 
would preclude the introduction of additional terms or conditions in a collat-
eral, independent agreement.159 Second, the court asked whether the terms in 
the employment application were susceptible to the interpretation and mean-
ing that McLain proffered.160 
To determine whether the application form was a totally integrated and 
independent contract, the court of appeals weighed the following factors: 
(1) whether the writing in the application was “complete,” (2) whether the 
application form contained an integration clause, (3) whether the terms in 
the alleged implied-in-fact agreement were material, (4) whether the latter 
terms contradicted the terms in the preprinted application form, (5) whether 
the parties would “naturally” form the allegedly implied-in-fact agreement 
as a separate, independent agreement, (6) whether the circumstances sur-
rounding the employment were probative, (7) whether the nature and ob-
jective of the employment were material, and (8) whether the introduction 
of the extrinsic evidence mislead the jury.161 In the end, the McLain court 
concluded that the standardized, preprinted application form was not a 
totally integrated contract.162 In addition, the application did not contain an 
                                                                                                                         
151 Id. 










162 Id. at 868 (“Because the application was a standardized form, did not cover several key 
aspects of the employment relationship and ... expressly stated that the terms and conditions of 
employment could be changed, we conclude that it was not an integrated document.”). 
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integration clause. On the other hand, the implied-in-fact employment agree-
ment was an independent contract; therefore, Great American was liable 
for breaching it.163 
Now, consider the facts and the dispute in Slivinsky v. Watkins. Sandra 
Slivinsky applied for a job with Watkins-Johnson Company (Watkins), a 
large aerospace manufacturer.164 Directly above the signature line on the 
preprinted-standardized application form, the following language appeared: 
“I understand that employment ... is conditional upon ... execution of an 
Employee Agreement .... I further understand that if I become employed 
by Watkins-Johnson Company, there will be no agreement expressed or 
implied, between the company and me for any specific period of employ-
ment, nor for continuing or long term employment.”165 Watkins evaluated 
Slivinsky’s credentials and work history.166 After Watkins’ agents inter-
viewed Slivinsky several times, they employed Slivinsky.167 
On the first day of her employment, Slivinsky signed the Employee 
Agreement, which was described in Slivinsky’s completed and signed pre-
printed application form.168 The last paragraph in the Employee Agree-
ment read: “Employee acknowledges that there is no agreement, express 
or implied, between [the] employee and the Company for any specific 
period of employment, nor for continuing or long-term employment. Em-
ployee and the Company each have a right to terminate employment, with 
or without cause.”169 
In January 1986, the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster occurred.170 In 
the wake, many governmental contracts were cancelled—including the con-
tracts that Watkins had formed with the federal government.171 Consequently, 
six months later, Watkins fired Slivinsky and many more employees.172 
Slivinsky sued Watkins under several theories of recovery—including an 
                                                                                                                         
163 Id. at 869 (“McLain introduced ... evidence to establish that there was an implied 
contract that he could only be terminated for cause .... The testimony of two Great American 
employees also suggests that McLain could not be terminated without cause .... Finally, 
McLain testified that he left the independent adjusting firm based upon ... promises of 
long-term advancement possibilities coupled with the assurance that McLain would be a 
permanent employee once the 90-day probationary period ended. Based upon the forego-
ing, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to establish an implied contract that 
McLain could only be terminated for cause.”). 
164 Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 586 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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action for breach of contract.173 In her complaint, Slivinsky insisted that 
the reasons for her termination were pretextual: (1) she was fired to reduce 
her superior’s cost overruns; (2) her superior did not like her; and (3) her 
superior had difficulty communicating with her.174 Slivinsky also asserted 
that Watkins made several oral promises during the pre-hire interviews—
promising to employ her long term, indefinitely or permanently, and promis-
ing that ordinary business cycles would not affect her employment.175 
Responding to the lawsuit, Watkins filed a motion for summary judg-
ment—stressing that Slivinsky failed to state any viable cause of action.176 
Additionally, the employer asserted that under the written employment 
agreement, Slivinsky was an employment-at-will employee.177 The trial court 
granted Watkins’ motion for summary judgment.178 On appeal, Slivinsky 
argued that the trial court’s adverse summary judgment was erroneous.179 
But, to resolve the controversy, the California Court of Appeals fashioned 
the appellate question in a somewhat novel way: whether Slivinsky could 
introduce parol and/or extrinsic evidence—beyond Watkins’s written em-
ployment agreement—to determine the parties’ “complete” agreement.180 
Citing the parol evidence rule, the court of appeals stressed that the 
employment-termination procedures were enforceable only if the parties 
intended for Slivinsky’s completed and signed application and Watkins’ 
Employment Agreement to comprise the final and totally integrated con-
tract.181 If so, any evidence of a prior agreement or a contemporaneous oral 
agreement could not be introduced to contradict Slivinsky and Watkins’s 
completely integrated, written employment contract.182 Applying that stan-
dard, the appeals court concluded that the preprinted application form and 
the subsequent employment agreement constituted the entire contract.183 
To reach that conclusion, the appellate court found that Slivinsky’s stan-
dardized employment application “specifically conditioned employment upon 
execution of an employee agreement.”184 Moreover, the preprinted applica-
tion stated: “[If Watkins employs Slivinsky, there will be no express or 
                                                                                                                         
173 Id. at 586 (The mixed-claims and mixed-theories complaint included the following: 
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, 
and invasion of privacy.). 
174 Id. at 587. 
175 Id. at 586. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 587. 
178 Id. at 586. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 587. 
181 Id. at 587–88. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 588. 
184 Id. 
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implied agreement] for any specific period of employment, nor for continuing 
or long term employment.”185 Also, when Slivinsky executed the Employee 
Agreement, she acknowledged that she and Watkins had “a right to termi-
nate the employment, with or without cause.”186 
Clearly, the McLain and Slivinsky courts reached different conclusions 
after applying the parol evidence rule. Again, in McLain, the court declared 
that application form and the employment contract did not constitute the 
final embodiment of the parties’ intentions.187 So, may language in a stan-
dardized application form vary or modify language in a subsequent employ-
ment agreement? The answer is yes, if and only if both parties intended for 
terms in both the standardized application and the employment agreement 
to encompass the parties’ final and entirely integrated contract. At this point, 
it is extremely important to reiterate a previously discussed principle of 
contract law: stand-alone and preprinted application forms are not valid, bind-
ing and enforceable contracts.188 
II. A SHORT REVIEW OF PERTINENT FEDERAL AND STATE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 
A. Federal and State Antidiscrimination and Civil Rights Laws 
During the late 1800s, the United States Congress enacted four stat-
utes to help identify and eradicate ethnicity-based discrimination.189 Nearly 
one hundred years later, Congress learned that persistent “irrational dis-
crimination”190 remained in occupations,191 in residential and public 
                                                                                                                         
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 McLain v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 256 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (Ct. App. 1989). 
188 See supra Part I.A and accompanying notes; see also Wagner v. Glendale Adventist 
Med. Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding an application for employment 
is not a contract; it is a mere solicitation of an offer of employment). 
189 Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 U.S.C.A. § 243 (West 2014); Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2014); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (West 2014); 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985 (West 2014). 
190 See, e.g., Ohio, ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“Although 
the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to prohibit plainly irrational discrimination 
against aliens, it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some 
instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of a 
permitted classification.”) (citations omitted); see also Katherine M. Franke, What’s 
Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 705–06 (2013) (“Discrimination ... 
‘is irrational and unjust because it denies the individual what is due him or her under 
society’s agreed upon standards of merit.’”). 
191 See, e.g., E. Ericka Kelsaw, Help Wanted: 23.5 Million Unemployed Americans 
Need Not Apply, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 19–20 (2013) (“[A]s Title VII was 
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places,192 within educational and financial institutions,193 and against 
disabled persons.194 Consequently, the federal legislative body enacted ad-
ditional antidiscrimination statutes to eliminate or minimize irrational dis-
criminatory practices based on age, ancestry, disability, ethnicity, familial 
status, gender, marital status, national origin, and religion.195 
                                                                                                                         
originally enacted, all successful plaintiffs could recover back and front pay, declaratory 
and injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees, but not compensatory or punitive damages. In 
1991, finding that ‘additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter ... intentional 
discrimination in the workplace,’ Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. With 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made punitive and compensatory 
damages available to plaintiffs claiming intentional discrimination.”). 
192 See, e.g., Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1035 (11th Cir. 
1992) (Congress discovered that housing discrimination against families was a pervasive 
national problem.). 
193 See Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory Access to 
Loans, Credit, and Insurance: A Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who 
Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950–1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
583, 585–86 (1996); Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI Title 
IX and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219, 225–45 (1986). 
194 E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). Con-
gressional findings revealed: “[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate 
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social 
problem,” that “the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and 
to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous,” and that 
discrimination “costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses 
resulting from dependency and non-productivity.” Id. §§ 12101(a)(2)–(8). The Act’s pur-
pose is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and “to provide clear, strong, consis-
tent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 
Id. §§ 12101(b)(1)–(2). 
195 See National Housing Act of 1937, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5 
(2012)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2012); Title IX of the 
Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012); Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012); Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012); Job Training Partnership Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 1577 (2012); Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–
2009 (2012); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 
(2012); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611–2654 (2012); Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. § 476 (2012); Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012); Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal 
Access to Public Accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Equal Access to Federal Funds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal Access to Employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 
(2012); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 
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Also, various states and American territories amended their constitutions 
or enacted antidiscrimination statutes.196 And, like federal statutes, state laws 
were designed to stop irrational discrimination based on age, ethnicity, dis-
ability and/or gender.197 Unlike federal statutes, however, many state’s anti-
discrimination statutes allow alleged victims of irrational discrimination to 
receive substantially more remedies and monetary relief.198 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                         
3602(a), 3604, 3605, 3606 (2012); Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (2012); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 554 (2012). 
196 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 24-8-4 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.210 (West 2013); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107 (West 2013); 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2013); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. Const. Art. 1, § 20 (West 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4501 
(West 2013); D.C. CODE § 1-2515 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.01 (West 2013); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 8-3-203 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. Const. Art. 1, § 5 (West 2013); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-7301 (West 2013); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1510 / 50 (West 2013); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-19 (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 44-1001 (West 1953); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.150 (West 2013); LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. Const. Art. 1, § 12 (1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4552 (2013); MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAW § 12-305 (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1 (West 2013); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. Const. Art. 1, § 2 (West 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.59 (West 2013); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-33-723 (West 1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.055 (West 2013); MONT. 
CODE ANN. Const. Art. 2, § 4 (West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-134 (West 1943); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:1 (2013); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 296 (McKinney 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-422.2 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 14-02.4-16 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 25, § 1302 (West 2013); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1680.402a (West 2013); P.R. 
LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-5.4 (West 1956); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 31-21-60 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-10 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-
606 (West 2013); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-
5-106 (West 1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (West 2013); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3 
(2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.4 (West 1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West 
2013); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 5-11A-6 (West 1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 
2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (West1977); see also FindLaw, State Civil Rights Law, 
http://statelaws.findlaw.com/civil-rights-laws/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http: 
//perma.cc/36VV-2TMN. 
197 See statutes cited supra note 196. 
198 See Andrea Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent 
Jurisdiction Under Title VII: Access To Federal Courts, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 784–85 
(1983) (“[S]tate statutory schemes and common law causes of action may allow for com-
pensatory and punitive relief, whereas under Title VII, a claimant is limited to equitable 
relief, which usually takes the form of reinstatement or back pay or both. In addition, the 
statute of limitations applicable to common law contract and tort claims generally is longer 
than the limitations provision applicable to either Title VII or state employment dis-
crimination statutes. Moreover, if the complainant invokes common law remedies, often 
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fairly recently, several states enacted antidiscrimination laws to eradicate 
or minimize invidious and irrational discrimination based on one’s sexual 
orientation.199 
B. Most Renowned and Litigated Federal Consumer Protection Laws 
Congress and states have enacted literally hundreds of consumer protec-
tion statutes, too numerous to list and discuss here.200 The most renowned 
or major statutes are designed to protect two large categories of consumers. 
First, Congress enacted a series of statutes to protect consumers from “preda-
tory” lending and credit practices. For example, in 1968, Congress passed 
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).201 The purpose of the TILA is to protect 
consumers from unfair and inaccurate credit practices.202 Under the TILA, 
lenders or creditors must disclose a number of items: lenders’ total financial 
undertaking, finance charges, annual percentage rates, and the total number of 
payments to be made—including a payment schedule.203 And, responding to 
reportedly exorbitant mortgage-settlement costs and other allegedly abusive 
settlement practices, Congress enacted the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act (RESPA) in 1974.204 Quite simply, under RESPA, lenders must 
                                                                                                                         
he can avoid the procedural hurdles that must be overcome when a suit is brought pur-
suant to either Title VII or a state statute.”). 
199 See Arash Jahanian & Alan K. Tannenwald, Sexuality and Transgender Issues in 
Employment Law, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 505, 515 n.81 (2007) (listing nearly twenty 
states which have extended employment discrimination laws to sexual orientation discrimi-
nation); see also Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information, http://www.aclu.org 
/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/PWK6-TVSJ (ACLU’s website presents a state-by-state summary 
of statutes which outlaw irrational, sexual orientation, and gender identity discrimination.). 
200 See Legal Resources—Statutes Relating to Consumer Protection Mission, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.shtm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived 
at http://perma.cc/Y9BF-6LDP; Checklist of Significant California and Federal 
Consumer Laws: Legal Guide M-1, CAL. DEP’T CONSUMER AFFAIRS, http://www.dca.ca 
.gov/publications/legal_guides/m-1.shtml (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/4HDG-796W; State and Federal Consumer Laws, PEOPLESLAWYER.NET, http:// 
www.peopleslawyer.net/consumer-law.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/PH6-VQJC; Consumer Protection Law, http://www.federalreserveconsumerhelp 
.gov/learnmore/consumer-protection-laws.cfm, FED. RESERVE (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/EXW6-MMN8. 
201 Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601–1693 (2012)). 
202 Id. 
203 15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (2012). 
204 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2012)). 
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give borrowers a good faith estimate of closing costs prior to closing.205 In 
addition, lenders must provide a uniform settlement form at closing, which 
itemizes all of the borrowers’ loan-settlement-service charges.206 
Congress also enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in 1974.207 
This act was designed to “improve the adequacy of information available 
to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing 
of consumer products.”208 Magnuson-Moss was a response to merchants’ 
widespread misuse of express warranties and disclaimers.209 Therefore, sec-
tion 2310(d) creates a statutory right of action for consumers “who [are] 
damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to 
comply with any obligation under this chapter or under a written warranty, 
implied warranty, or service contract.”210 Four years after Magnuson-
Moss’s enactment, Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA) of 1978.211 FDCPA regulates creditors, and it protects consum-
ers against unfair debt collection practices.212 More specifically, the 
FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using abusive, unfair, and deceptive 
collection practices.213 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that debt 
collectors employ deceptive practices and cause substantial adverse con-
sequence for consumers.214 Under the FDCPA, consumers may secure a 
variety of civil remedies.215 
Finally, in 1994, Congress amended the TILA by enacting the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).216 The purpose of HOEPA 
is to protect consumers and to impose additional disclosure requirements 
for high-cost or high-rate loans.217 The legislative history of HOEPA—in 
both the Senate and House Reports—is clear: HOEPA amendments are 
                                                                                                                         
205 Id. 
206 12 U.S.C. § 2603 (2012). 
207 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (2012). 
208 Id. § 2302(a). 
209 Id. § 2301. 
210 Id. § 2310(d). 
211 Id. §§ 1692–1692p. 
212 Id. § 1692f. 
213 Id. 
214 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2011: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
ANNUAL REPORT, APRIL 2011 2, available at http://perma.cc/ML42-7W42. 
215 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2012). 
216 Id. §§ 1601–1693. 
217 Clark v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 00C7778, 2003 WL 21277126, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
June 2, 2003) (“Generally, HOEPA lays out the guidelines, rules, and parameters governing 
alternative mortgages. HOEPA and its regulations establish a cost threshold, which once 
exceeded, triggers a set of restrictions on lending practices related to high risk loans.”) 
(citation omitted); see 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2012). 
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designed to address the problem of “reverse redlining”—“the practice of 
targeting residents in certain geographic areas for credit on unfair terms.”218 
Generally, TILA, RESPA, HOEPA, and FDCPA require lenders to disclose 
material information in order to increase consumers’ likelihood of making 
informed credit decisions.219 
The second large category of federal statutes protects consumers from 
dangerous products. For example, in 1972, Congress enacted the Consumer 
Product Safety Act (CPSA).220 The CPSA was passed to protect the public 
against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products and to 
help consumers to evaluate the comparative safety of consumer products.221 
To underscore the CPSA’s importance, Congress also enacted the Consumer 
Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008.222 This latter legislation amended 
major federal consumer product safety statutes by setting lead levels in prod-
ucts and paint, and by restricting the use of several chemical compounds 
known as phthalates.223 
C. State Consumer Protection Laws 
All fifty states have enacted consumer-protection statutes, which give 
state agencies or private actors the right to prosecute consumer fraud or 
deceptive trade practices.224 Predictably, among the state statutes, the types of 
protections, scope of civil liabilities, and types of remedies that consumers 
might receive vary considerably.225 To illustrate, a majority of states allow 
all aggrieved consumers to commence private actions.226 Iowa, Nebraska, 
New York, and Nevada, however, prohibit certain private right of actions.227 
                                                                                                                         
218 Clark, 2003 WL 21277126, at *2; see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-652, at 158 (1994), 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1977, 1981. 
219 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1692b 
(2012). 
220 Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972). 
221 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1)–(4) (2012). 
222 Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (2008). 
223 Id. §§ 101–108. 
224 See Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection 
Liability: An Economic Approach, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010) (“Every state in the 
nation has some kind of consumer protection statute.”). 
225 Id. at 12–13. 
226 Id. at 14. 
227 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1601(2) (West 2014) (allowing private actions only if 
plaintiffs prove that an offending behavior caused a public-interest impact); N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW § 349 (McKinney 2014) (allowing private actions only if plaintiffs prove that an offend-
ing behavior caused a public-interest impact); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598.0977 (2014) (only 
allowing the elderly or disabled consumers to commence private actions); Molo Oil Co. v. 
River City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 222, 229 (Iowa 1998) (finding no private 
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In addition, many state consumer protection statutes contain a “laundry 
list” of specific violations.228 Other statutes, however, only provide broad 
definitions of a violation without enumerating an array of specific acts.229 
Moreover, although most states allow agitated consumers to file class actions, 
several southern states and one state in the northwest do not.230 Additionally, 
within each region of the country, one finds a number of states preventing 
dissatisfied consumers from certifying certain types of class actions,231 limit-
ing a prevailing class of consumers’ damages awards,232 and limiting the 
types of persons who may qualify as class members.233 
It should be stressed, however, that an even more impressive develop-
ment has occurred over the past fifty years. Most states have adopted a 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).234 These statutes either mirror the 
exact version of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA),235 
or the DTPA statutes are “substantially equivalent” or “fairly similar” to the 
                                                                                                                         
cause of action under Iowa consumer protection statute); Patterson v. Beall, 19 P.3d 839, 
846 n.10 (Okla. 2000) (noting that Oklahoma did not allow private actions until 1988). 
228 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-5 (2014); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2014); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.903 (West 2014). 
229 See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505 / 2 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 
(West 2014); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2014). 
230 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-10(f) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (West 2014); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1409 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(4) (West 2014); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133(1) (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (2013). 
231 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(d) (West 2014) (limiting class actions to certain 
consumer claims). 
232 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-608(1) (West 2014) (limiting class recovery to 
actual damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-634(d) (West 2014) (limiting class recovery to 
actual damages); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.911(3) (West 2014) (limiting class 
recovery to actual damages); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(E) (West 2014) (limiting class 
recovery to actual damages). 
233 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(b) (West 2014) (limiting class actions to 
residents or consumers injured within the state). 
234 See Dag E. Ytreberg, Legislation Protecting Consumers Against Unfair or Deceptive 
Trade Practices, 17 AM. JUR. 2D § 280 (2003). (“Generally speaking, the states have modeled 
their legislation on the Federal Trade Commission Act, or have adopted the Uniform 
Consumer Sales Practice Act or the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act or based their 
statutes thereon.”); Donald M. Zupanec, Practices Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Prac-
tice and Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R.3d 449, at *2a (1979) (updated Mar. 2004). 
235 The following twelve states have adopted the 1964 or 1966 version of the Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-105 (West 2000); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2532–2536 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-370 –375 (West 2000); 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 481a-1–5 (West 2000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 510 / 1–7 (West 
2001); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1211–1216 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325d.43–48 
(West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-301–303.06 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 598.0905–0915 (West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4165.01–04 (West 2000); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 51–55 (West 1999); and OR. REV. STAT. § 646.608 (West 1999). 
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UDTPA.236 In a nutshell, DTPA statutes “make it unlawful [for any person] 
to use or otherwise engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of trade or commerce.”237 
D. The Prevalence of Consumer Protection and Irrational Discrimination 
Complaints—Statistical Evidence from Federal and State Agencies, 
Courts and Private Research Organizations 
Since the enactment of state and federal antidiscrimination statutes, al-
leged victims of irrational discrimination have filed thousands of adminis-
trative complaints and lawsuits.238 For example, employment-discrimination 
suits have increased substantially each year since Congress enacted Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1967.239 In fiscal year 1997, the Equal Employment 
                                                                                                                         
236 The “substantially equivalent” or “fairly similar” DTPA-related statutes are: ALA. 
CODE § 8-19-5 (2014); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.471 (West 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 44-1211 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (West 2014); Id. § 4-101-201 (gov-
erning the sale of fracture-filled and clarity-enhanced diamonds); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 17200 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2014); D.C. CODE 
§ 28-3904 (2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (West 2014); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603 
(West 2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5 (West 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16 (West 
2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4403 (West) (repealed 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 367.170 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1405 (2014); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 13-301 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 445.903 (West 2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-5 (West 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 407.020 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-103 (West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 598.0915 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 56:8-2 (West 2014); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349, 350 (McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 66-74 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 51-15-02 (West 2013); 73 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-3 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13.1-2 (West 2014); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-6 (2014); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 47-18-104 (West 2014); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 2013); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 13-11-4 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453 (West 2014); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 59.1-200 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020 (West 2014); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 46A-6-104 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 40-12-105 (West 2014). 
237 Cf. Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection In The States—A 50-State Report on 
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. INC., 
archived at http://perma.cc/3EZP-BWEU. 
238 See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 1997 
THROUGH FY 2012, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter EEOC Charge Stats], archived at http://perma.cc/P888-JWLR 
(The report discloses that 80,680 “charges were filed in fiscal year 1997. In fiscal year 2012, 
the number of charges had increased to 99,412. The charges were racial/color, gender, 
disability and religion discrimination, retaliation, and violations of the equal pay act.). 
239 See Michael J. Sniffen, Job Bias Suits Rise—Justice: Private Sector Litigation for 
Discrimination More than Triples in Decade, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, 1/17/2000 
LBPRESS at A16, 2000 WLNR 1358301 (“Aided by new federal laws, private lawsuits 
 
2015] IRRATIONALLY BIASED IN FAVOR OF THE FAA 441 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reported that 80,680 persons filed anti-
discrimination complaints.240 In fiscal year 2012, the number of filings in-
creased appreciably—nearly one hundred thousand (99,412) persons filed 
EEOC-related charges.241 
More specifically, after reviewing fiscal year 2012 statistics more thor-
oughly, the EEOC found the following: (1) a large group of disgruntled per-
sons (38.1%) filed 37,836 complaints, accusing defendants of practicing 
“work-place retaliation”; (2) more than a third of the complainants (33.7%) 
filed 33,512 “racial-discrimination charges”; (3) among all “retaliation 
charges,” 31 percent (31.4%) or 31,208 were allegedly Title VII violations; 
(4) about a third of the complainants (30.5%) filed 30,356 “gender-based 
discrimination charges”; (5) a relatively smaller group of complainants 
(26.5%) filed 26,379 “disability-discrimination charges”; and (6) 23 percent 
(23.0%) of the aggrievants filed 22,857 “age discrimination charges.”242 
Also, after the debt collection industry increased its compliance efforts, 
the number of debt collection administrative complaints rose dramatically. 
To illustrate, the FTC reported that dissatisfied consumers filed 119,609 
complaints in 2009.243 One year later, the number of FDCPA complaints 
increased to 140,036, and the annual number of lawsuits continued to 
climb.244 Additionally, in very recent years, consumers of financial services 
filed a record number of FCRA, TCPA, and truth in lending lawsuits. TCPA 
litigation more than doubled, and FDCPA litigation set a record 11,811 
filings in 2011.245 What is more, the number of FDCPA lawsuits continues 
                                                                                                                         
alleging discrimination in the work place more than tripled during in the 1990s, the 
Justice Department said .... [J]ob bias lawsuits filed in U.S. District Courts soared from 
6,936 in 1990 to 21,540 in 1998 .... Civil rights complaints of all varieties more than doubled 
from 1990 to 1998, from 18,793 to 42,354 .... New civil rights laws paved the way for the 
explosion in job bias cases, including the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .... The 1991 law amended five older federal employment 
discrimination laws. It also allowed plaintiffs to win compensatory and punitive damages 
in certain cases, permitted jury trials when plaintiffs sought monetary damages, and 
overturned seven Supreme Court rulings.”). 
240 EEOC Charge Stats, supra note 238. 
241 Id.; see also Paul Feely, Lawyer: Ruling Opens Door to More Anti-Bias Suits, N.H. 
UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Feb. 13, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 2918838. 
242 EEOC Charge Stats, supra note 238; see also Feely, supra note 241. 
243 EEOC Charge Stats, supra note 238. 
244 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 214, at 5–6. 
245 See WEBRECON L.L.C., FDCPA and Other Consumer Lawsuit Statistics—Full Year 
2011 Recap, WEBRECON.COM, https://dev.webrecon.com/fdcpa-and-other-consumer-lawsuit 
-statistics-full-year-2011-recap/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PE65 
-25SJ (“[T]he Denver Colorado district court saw the most suits filed—totaling 658. 
Philadelphia was 2nd with 634 suits. Los Angeles was 3rd with 623, followed by Chicago 
with 592 and Newark with 486. Statewide, California led with 1654 lawsuits in 2011. 
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to grow each year.246 In 2009, FDCPA litigation reached a new peak; the 
new percentage was a 52 percent increase above the aggregate percentage 
for prior years.247 On the other hand, consumers still file truth in lending 
lawsuits. In recent years, however, the rates have fallen.248 Arguably, the 
unforeseeable financial calamity in 2008 caused the higher-than-usual 
spike: consumers filed the greatest number of truth-in-lending lawsuits—
against banks and mortgage companies—after the collapse of the mortgage-
housing market.249 Those numerous lawsuits originated under Title 15, 
section 1601 of the TILA.250 
There is more. Without question, the National Fair Housing Alliance 
(NFHA) is a politically “partisan” for-profit and non-profit organization.251 
Yet, by most objective measures, the NFHA is a thoroughly competent, 
resourceful and transparent organization.252 Each year, NFHA collects data 
                                                                                                                         
Florida was next with 1146 lawsuits, followed by New York with 1128, Pennsylvania 
with 940 and New Jersey with 711.”). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 See TRAC REPORTS, INC., Truth in Lending Federal Lawsuits Continue to Decline, 
TRAC.SYR.EDU, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/civil/323/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7SDR-QVMF (“During May 2013 the government reported 
only 16 new truth-in-lending civil filings. This followed only 26 such suits filed in April 
and 14 suits begun during March, according to the case-by-case information analyzed by 
the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). Truth in lending lawsuits have 
fallen 89 percent, down from the peak of 152 reached four years ago in May 2009.”). 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 See Mission Statement, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, http://www.nationalfairhousing 
.org/AboutNFHA/MissionandVision/tabid/2606/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/XC89-WKGK (“NFHA works to eliminate housing discrimi-
nation and to ensure equal housing opportunity for all people through leadership, 
education, outreach, membership services, public policy initiatives, advocacy and enforce-
ment.”); see also Rigging Antidiscrimination Law, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2013, at A16 
(“It’s rare for a case that reaches the Supreme Court to be pulled from the docket ... twice 
in two years on the same legal issue. Yet [this] happened .... Township of Mount Holly v. 
Mount Holly Gardens Citizens asked whether the 1968 Fair Housing Act allows the 
government to charge discrimination by using statistics rather than specific intent. The 
feds had never employed this theory in housing until the Obama Administration began to 
use it against lenders .... There’s no evidence that the Obama Administration played a 
direct role in scuttling the case this time, but its housing allies did. Mount Holly, the Ford 
Foundation, George Soros’s Open Society Foundations, the National Fair Housing Alliance 
and Self Help Community Development contributed money to a developer who will build 
new homes for the plaintiffs and other private buyers. That deal led to the settlement.”) 
(emphasis added). 
252 Cf. Federal Reserve Board of Governors Holds a Public Hearing on Potential 
Revisions to the Board’s Regulation C—Final, in FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE, Sept. 24, 
2010 (“[O]n behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, I’d like to 
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from private and non-profit fair-housing organizations as well as from gov-
ernment entities.253 In particular, NFHA collects large volumes of data in-
volving various types of housing-related transactions: rentals, sales, mortgage 
lending, homeowners’ insurance, advertising, harassment, homeowners and 
rental associations’ practices, zoning procedures, and persons’ gaining access 
to shelters.254 The annual research is designed to measure the numbers of fair-
housing complaints and the types of remedies that private and state actors 
employ to arrest consumers concerns.255 
In 2013, NFHA’s statistical report disclosed several pertinent findings. 
First, during calendar year 2012, displeased consumers filed 28,519 adminis-
trative and judicial housing-discrimination complaints.256 In 201l, there 
were 27,092 complaints.257 Private fair housing groups—rather than gov-
ernmental agencies—investigated and reported the highest number of com-
plaints. “In 2012, private fair housing organizations investigated 69.0% of 
all housing-discrimination complaints in the United States.”258 In 201l, the 
percentage was 67.6 percent.259 The report also stated: 
A conservative estimate puts the number of violations of fair housing laws 
at four million every year. Many people do not report housing discrimi-
nation because they don’t know where to go .... Also, landlords, managers, 
real-estate agents, loan officers, and insurance agents who choose to 
discriminate have become quite sophisticated in their practices. It is rare 
for someone in the industry to engage in blatant discrimination; instead, 
                                                                                                                         
welcome everyone ... to discuss changes to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act .... [W]e have 
heard from key players ... academics and researchers, consumer advocacy and commu-
nity development organizations, data experts .... Although they play different roles, we 
believe that all share a common goal—to ensure that the mortgage market is responsible, 
transparent, efficient, and serves the needs of consumers and market participants alike .... 
[We thank all of you] for being here on this panel .... [W]e have Jay Brinkmann, chief 
economist and senior vice president of Research and Economics for the Mortgage Bankers 
Association; Thomas Noto, associate general counsel at Bank of America; [and] Lisa Rice, 
vice president, National Fair Housing Alliance.”) (comment of Elizabeth A. Duke, former 
member of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors) (emphasis added). 
253 NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, MODERNIZING THE FAIR HOUSING ACT FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: 2013 FAIR HOUSING TRENDS REPORT 16 (Apr. 11, 2013), archived at http://perma 
.cc/S8NU-YF9J; see also NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, http://www.nationalfairhousing 
.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/L6VX-QN6Y. 
254 NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE, supra note 253, at 16. 
255 Id. 
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people looking for homes, loans or homeowners’ insurance will get the 
run around.260 
Even more relevant, many fair-housing complainants are applicants—
“people looking for homes, loans or homeowners’ insurance.”261 To prove 
the assertion, consider these findings: (1) in 2012, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) sued Countrywide Financial Corporation, alleging that Countrywide 
discriminated against more than 200,000 ethnic-minority applicants who ap-
plied for residential loans;262 (2) DOJ filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo 
Bank in 2012, accusing Wells Fargo of systemically discriminating against 
ethnic-minority applicants who applied for mortgages between 2004 and 
2009;263 (3) in 2012, DOJ sued Bank of America, asserting that the lender 
violated the Fair Housing Act by discriminating against 25,000 disabled ap-
plicants who applied for loans;264 and, (4) in 2012, the NFHA reported that 
220 persons—who applied for housing—were discriminated against on the 
basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity.265 
Again, the evidence is incontrovertible: Congress and state legislatures 
enacted various consumer protection and antidiscrimination laws to help 
eliminate or decrease deceptive trade practices as well as irrational discrimi-
natory practices and transactions. Furthermore, a careful examination of 
the various statutes discussed in Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C of this Article re-
veals another indisputable fact: state and federal legislators gave protected 
classes of dissatisfied consumers the right to use courts and formal admin-
istrative proceedings to secure legal and equitable remedies.266 Congress, 
                                                                                                                         
260 Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). 
261 Id. 
262 Id. at 30. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 32. 
265 Id. at 9. 
266 See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 866 (2011) (holding a 
fiancée who was allegedly fired in retaliation after his fiancé filed a charge of discrimina-
tion with the EEOC has standing to sue under Title VII as an aggrieved person); Anjelino 
v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 88–93 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that male employees had 
standing to assert sex discrimination claims for discrimination against female workers 
because they suffered pecuniary injuries); Fiedler v. Marumsco Sch., 631 F.2d 1144, 1150 
(4th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a white student who was expelled from school for allegedly 
dating a black student had standing to sue under Section 1981); DeMatteis v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir. 1975) (declaring that a white man who was the 
victim of discrimination because he sold his house to a black person had standing to sue 
under Section 1981); Tessier v. Moffat, 93 F. Supp. 2d 729, 735–36 (E.D. La. 1998) (“To 
have standing to sue under Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they are consumers or business competitors.”). 
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however, enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, which compels contractual 
parties to arbitrate their disputes in private and informal dispute-resolution 
proceedings.267 Conversely, common law rules of contract formation and 
interpretation are equally clear: standing alone, standardized-preprinted ap-
plication forms are not binding and enforceable contractual agreements.268 
Therefore, several highly FAA-related questions plead for commonsensi-
cal and intelligible answers: (1) whether Congress intended for discontented 
persons—who applied for goods and services—to arbitrate consumer protec-
tion claims in private arbitration hearings or to litigate those claims in state 
and federal courts; (2) whether Congress intended for disgruntled applicants 
to resolve their discriminatory practices claims before private arbitrators or 
before jurors in state and federal courts; (3) whether Congress intended for 
the FAA to preempt federal and state courts’ enforcement of antidiscrimina-
tion and consumer protection laws; and (4) whether Congress envisioned 
for competent state and federal judges or private nonlawyers/arbitrators to 
determine and enforce persons’ rights under federal antidiscrimination and 
consumer protection laws. To begin the search for answers, the next Sec-
tion briefly reviews the FAA in pertinent part and discusses congressional 
intent that undergirds the statute. 
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1924 
Again, section 2 of the FAA reads in relevant part: “A written provision 
in any ... contract ... to settle by arbitration a controversy ... arising out of 
such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”269 Thus, spanning a period of nearly forty years, the Supreme 
Court has issued multiple decisions and stated emphatically: “judicial 
hostility to arbitration” was the sole impetus behind Congress’s decision to 
enact the FAA.270 To be sure, English courts had a long history of refusing 
                                                                                                                         
267 Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883, 883–84 (1925). 
268 Giesela Ruhl, The Battle of the Forms: Comparative and Economic Observations, 
24 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 189, 190–91 (2003). 
269 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
270 See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308–09 (2013); AT&T 
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (stating Congress enacted 
the FAA in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration); EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (“[Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act of 
1925] to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had 
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbi-
tration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Exp., 
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to enforce arbitration provisions in private contracts.271 The Court’s repeated 
and single “judicial hostility” explanation,272 however, overlooks some criti-
cal and historical facts. 
First, unlike English courts, American courts have an exceedingly long 
history of enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts—especially provisions 
in standardized insurance contracts.273 Second, the Supreme Court’s “judi-
cial hostility” explanation does not comport with Congress’s intent in 1924. 
The FAA’s legislative history is exceptionally clear: merchants and mem-
bers of exclusive trade associations encouraged Congress to enact the FAA—
primarily to prevent merchants from warring among themselves and battling 
                                                                                                                         
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989); Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
225 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (“The United States 
Arbitration Act ... revers[ed] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”). 
271 H.R. Rep. No. 96-68, at 1–2 (1924) (“Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy 
of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to 
arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This 
jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the 
English common law .... American courts ... have felt that the precedent was too strongly 
fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized 
the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it. This 
bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a 
procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.”) (emphasis added). 
272 See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510. 
273 Using Westlaw electronic data service, the author accessed the Insurance-Law 
(MIN-CS) database and submitted the following query:(CONTRACT! AGREEMENT /P 
ARBITRATION ARBITRAT!) & DA(BEF JAN 1, 1923) (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). The 
search generated 904 cases. The earliest arbitration-related case was decided in 1797. See 
especially Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Payne, 57 Kan. 291, 46 P. 315, 317–18 
(Kan. 1896) (concluding that “[a]n award is prima facie conclusive between the parties as 
to all matters submitted to the arbitrators .... If every award must be made conformable to 
what would have been the judgment of this court in the case, it would render arbitrations 
useless and vexatious, and a source of great litigation; for it very rarely happens that both 
parties are satisfied. The decision by arbitration is the decision of a tribunal of the parties’ 
own choice and election .... [C]ourts have always regarded [arbitration] with liberal 
indulgence .... They have only looked to see if the proceedings were honestly and fairly 
conducted, and, if that appeared to be the case, they have uniformly and universally 
refused to interfere with the judgment of the arbitrators.”) (emphasis added); see also 
Solem v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 109 P. 432, 433 (Mont. 1910) (declaring ap-
praisers’ award was binding upon the insured and the insurance company when the 
parties agreed to submit the disputed amount to arbitration under the terms of the fire 
insurance contract); Caldwell v. Va. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 S.W. 698, 704 (Tenn. 1911) 
(declaring that under the terms of the insurance contract, “the complainant was bound in 
the event of loss to submit the question of sound value of his loss and damage to 
arbitrators for an award”). 
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each other in courts.274 More precisely, the FAA was enacted primarily “to 
preserve business friendships” among members of mercantile associa-
tions,275 to reduce “bitterness” among members of trade organizations,276 
to “preserve trade customs,”277 to resolve “merchants versus merchants” 
disputes efficiently and amicably,278 and to eliminate mercantile members’ 
financial costs of litigating intra-association disputes in courts.279 
                                                                                                                         
274 See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 7–8 (1924) 
[hereinafter Joint 1924 Hearings on Federal Arbitration Bills] (statement of Charles 
Bernheimer, Chairman, Committee on Arbitration—Chamber of Commerce of the State 
of New York) (“The lawyer’s work ... is an economic wastage in the everyday commercial 
transactions. It does not benefit the lawyer and does not benefit the client. There are four 
known methods ... to meet trade disputes, the ordinary everyday trade disputes .... 1) the 
parties [can] settle ... 2) the parties [can] settle by negotiation ... 3) the parties [can] enter 
into formal arbitration ... which has legal sanction, ... so that the parties cannot—as they 
can in most ... states—back out at the last moment when they see [that] the case is going 
against them; and 4) the last method is ... litigation, which is ... the worst method of all .... 
Speaking for those who have had experience and who are engaged in business, ... 
arbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money. There is no question about that .... It 
preserves business friendships .... Friendliness is preserved in business. It raises business 
standards. It maintains business honor, [and] prevents unnecessary litigation .... [My] 
statement ... is backed up by 73 commercial organizations in this country who have, by 
formal vote, approved ... the bill before you.”) (emphasis added); id. at 24 (statement of 
Samuel M. Forbes, Secretary of Converters’ Association) (“Our association has had 
[much] experience under the New York arbitration act and with arbitration generally .... 
[W]e most strongly feel that the adoption of a Federal arbitration act such as is now pro-
posed will be one of the most forward steps in commercial life. Our members have found 
arbitration to be expeditious, economical, and equitable, conserving business friendships 
and energy.”). 
275 Id. at 7. 
276 See id. at 28 (statement of Alexander Rose representing the Arbitration Society of 
America) (“[I]n closing, I need hardly add to what has been said [regarding] the ethical 
importance of arbitration in avoiding bitterness.”). 
277 See id. at 29 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, Member, Committee on Commerce, 
Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association and General Counsel for the 
New York State Chamber of Commerce) (“The trade organizations ... have a tremendous 
interest and influence in establishing trade customs .... [One rule is,] ... if you are a 
member you arbitrate your differences .... The silk association has it; the fruit association 
has it; and the lumber association has it. Now, ... [the proposed arbitration act will not] 
increase the customs [but it will add] legal force [to the customs].”). 
278 See id. at 12 (statement of R.S. French, Representing the National League of 
Marine Merchants of the United States, the Western Fruit Jobbers’ Association of American, 
and the International Apple Shippers’ Association of America) (“[T]he principles of this 
arbitration bill are substantially in accord with those principles which [our members] 
adopted and made a part of [their respective] constitutions and by-laws ... at [those organi-
zations’] inception 25 or 30 years ago .... [Our] organizations [approve] ... this measure 
which is before this committee .... I represent ... large exporters and importers of perishable 
goods .... [And in our organizations], disputes may arise in domestic as well as in foreign 
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Yet the Supreme Court continues to embrace incessantly and unapolo-
getically the “judicial hostility” argument in order to justify and enforce three 
of the Court’s engineered “judicial policies”: (1) a liberal federal policy must 
favor arbitration agreements;280 (2) an unequivocal federal policy must 
favor “arbitral dispute resolution”;281 and (3) any doubt regarding the scope 
of arbitrable issues must be resolved in favor of arbitration.282 
Absolutely, Congress enacted the FAA to remove any doubt about the 
enforceability of arbitration provisions in all types of negotiated and stan-
dardized contracts—construction, insurance, financial, goods, services, 
employment, trade association, real estate, and professional contracts.283 
Additionally, one may conclude correctly that Congress structured the FAA 
to be rationally rather than irrationally biased in favor of arbitration. Like-
wise, merchants, corporations, and large financial, educational, political, and 
                                                                                                                         
commerce. We handle at home and from abroad over 600,000 carloads of freight annually, 
and naturally the opportunity for disputes arises frequently.”); see also id. at 35 (The 
American Bar Association’s Brief of the Proposed Federal Arbitration Statute which was 
made a part of the record) (“The United States Department of Commerce has recently 
made a most significant declaration regarding the policy of the business world in relation 
to arbitration. In its publication entitled—Trade Association Activities—[the Department] 
devotes an entire chapter ... to ‘Trade disputes and ethics.’ This entire chapter is largely a plea 
for arbitration and a suggestion of methods which trade bodies may follow .... Contributions 
to this discussion were made by ... representative[s] of widely different lines of business.”) 
(emphasis added). 
279 Id. at 12. 
280 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); 
see also AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (reaffirming the 
“liberal federal policy [which] favor[s] arbitration agreements”); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2001) (reaffirming the “liberal federal policy [which] favor[s] 
arbitration agreements”); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 
(1991) (reaffirming the “liberal federal policy [which] favor[s] arbitration agreements”). 
281 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 
(1985) (stating that the FAA reflects an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral 
dispute resolution”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24 (observing that “questions 
of arbitrability [must] be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”). 
282 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (citing Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. and reaffirming that “[a]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration”); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) (reaffirming Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
and stressing that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues ... be resolved in 
favor of arbitration”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25 (“The Arbitration 
Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”). 
283 H.R. Rep. No. 96-68 at 2 (1924) (“The bill declares simply that such agreements 
for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their 
enforcement.”). 
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professional entities should be encouraged to arbitrate their contractual dis-
agreements in “unlettered tribunals or rusticum forums.”284 And the reason 
is not terribly complicated: the proceedings in “unlettered tribunals” are gen-
erally less expensive than federal and state court proceedings.285 
But, a compelling question remains: whether federal and state courts 
should be categorically, defiantly, and irrationally biased in favor of man-
datory arbitration if disputes arise out of noncontractual relationships? In 
light of the FAA’s legislative history and congressional intent, the com-
monsensical answer is no. Consider Justice Thurgood Marshall’s measured 
and intelligible analysis in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.286 Writing 
for the majority in 1985, Justice Marshal wrote: 
The legislative history of the [FAA] establishes that the purpose behind its 
passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agreements 
to arbitrate. We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal 
of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of 
claims .... [P]assage of the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a 
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had en-
tered .... We ... are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict between 
two goals of the Arbitration Act—enforcement of private agreements and 
encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute resolution—must be re-
solved in favor of the latter in order to realize the intent of the drafters.287 
Even more importantly, the FAA’s savings clause reads: “[An arbitra-
tion provision in any contract] shall be valid ... and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity.”288 Still, a cursory examination 
of reported cases reveals an unsettling truth: large numbers of federal judges 
have become irrationally or strongly biased in favor of mandatory arbitra-
tion.289 Additionally, one can find judicial conflicts and considerably more 
                                                                                                                         
284 Cf. Suarez-Valdez v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Exp., Inc., 858 F.2d 648, 649–50 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“[An agreement to arbitrate] indicates the parties’ prefer-
ence for more informal, less expensive procedures .... [Litigating in court, therefore,] 
would subject the parties to the very complexities, inconveniences and expenses of 
litigation that they determined to avoid ….”); Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Payne, 46 
P. 315, 318 (Kan. 1896) (emphasis added) (“[Arbitration] is a popular, cheap, convenient, 
and domestic mode of trial, which the courts have always regarded with liberal indulgence. 
They have never exacted from these unlettered tribunals—this rusticum forum—the 
observance of technical rule and formality.”) (emphasis added). 
285 Springfield Fire & Martine Ins. Co., 46 P. at 318. 
286 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
287 Id. at 219–21 (emphasis added); see also Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576, 588 (2008) (reaffirming that Dean Witter “reject[ed] the suggestion that the over-
riding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims”). 
288 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2014). 
289 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that 
any prejudice from piecemeal litigation is overcome by the “strong bias in favor of 
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evidence of irrational judicial bias among cases in which state and federal 
courts decided a narrower question: whether arbitration provisions in stan-
dardized, preprinted application forms are enforceable under the FAA? 
IV.  “IRRATIONALLY BIASED” RULINGS AND PERSISTENT JUDICIAL 
CONFLICTS OVER THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN 
EMPLOYEES’ AND CONSUMERS’ APPLICATION FORMS 
Unquestionably, the FAA permits all business and commercial entities 
to fashion valid contracts which contain mandatory-arbitration provisions.290 
But, as discussed earlier, applications for employment as well as for goods 
and services increasingly contain arbitration clauses.291 And to reiterate a 
settled common law principle of contract law, writings in standardized, pre-
printed application forms are not enforceable contracts.292 Therefore, in light 
of this latter principle, several weighty, FAA-specific questions become 
readily apparent: (1) whether arbitration provisions in preprinted applications 
are enforceable contracts under the FAA’s “written provisions in a contract” 
clause; (2) whether, under the FAA, applicants’ common law and statutory 
claims may “arise out of” application forms rather than binding contracts; 
(3) whether arbitration clauses in standardized application forms are en-
forceable under the FAA without any bargained-for exchange consideration; 
and, (4) whether the FAA preempts the application of the parol evidence rule 
                                                                                                                         
arbitration” under the Federal Arbitration Act); THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., L.L.C. v. 
Spradlin, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1179 (D.N.M. 2012) (stressing that “the FAA [has a] strong 
bias in favor of arbitration”); Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 
2d 334, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that ‘any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration—
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an alle-
gation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ This bias in favor of arbitration, 
‘is even stronger in the context of international transactions.’”) (citations omitted); see also 
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 316 (S.C. 2012) (reiterating that there 
is a “strong policy favoring arbitration”); David Korn & David Rosenberg, Concepcion’s 
Pro-Defendant Biasing of The Arbitration Process: The Class Counsel Solution, 46 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1151 (2013) (“By mandating that numerous plaintiffs litigate 
their common question claims separately in individual arbitrations rather than jointly in 
class action arbitrations, the Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion en-
trenched a potent structural and systemic bias in favor of defendants.”). 
290 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
291 Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 106 (2010). 
292 See supra Part I.B and accompanying notes; see also Wagner v. Glendale Adventist 
Med. Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (1989) (“[An application for employment is not a 
contract], it is a ... mere solicitation of an offer of employment.”). 
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and allows arbitration provisions in preprinted application forms to supersede 
writings in subsequent and totally integrated employment, goods, and ser-
vices contracts? These questions and related issues are discussed in this 
Part of the Article. 
A. Judicial Conflict—Whether Mandatory-Arbitration Clauses in 
Standardized Application Forms Are Enforceable “Written Provisions 
in a Contract” Under the Federal Arbitration Act 
To reemphasize, under the FAA section 2, an arbitration agreement is 
enforceable only if it is a written provision in a contract.293 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court and state supreme courts have stressed repeatedly: courts 
must always employ state law principles of contract formation, interpreta-
tion, and enforcement to determine whether parties formed an arbitration 
agreement or an arbitration clause in a contract.294 In J.M. Davidson, Inc. 
v. Webster,295 the Texas Supreme Court was quite emphatic about the im-
portance of judges’ carefully applying state-law principles of contract 
before forcing parties to enter private arbitral proceedings: 
A [party] attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dis-
pute ... falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement .... [A]lthough 
we have repeatedly expressed a strong presumption favoring arbitration, 
the presumption arises only after the party seeking to compel arbitration 
proves that a valid arbitration agreement exists .... [A] federal policy 
                                                                                                                         
293 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
294 See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (holding that 
“courts generally ... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 
contracts” when deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) (reaffirming that 
state-law principles of contract law must be used to create, interpret and enforce 
arbitration agreements); Title Max of Birmingham, Inc. v. Edwards, 973 So. 2d 1050, 1054 
(Ala. 2007) (“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and this court applies the ordinary state-
law principles governing contracts in construing an agreement to arbitrate.”); Lane v. 
Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672, 677 (Colo. 2006) (“In determining whether the parties have agreed to 
submit the issue in question to arbitration, we follow state law principles governing con-
tract formation.”); Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 156 (Del. 
2002) (holding that “[t]he policy that favors alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, 
such as arbitration, does not trump basic principles of contract interpretation.”); Melena v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 107–08 (Ill. 2006) (holding that arbitration agreements 
must be analyzed using ordinary principles of contract law); Aiken v. World Fin. Corp. of 
S.C., 644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (S.C. 2007) (“Because even the most broadly worded arbitration 
agreements still have limits founded in general principles of contract law, [we] will refuse 
to interpret any arbitration agreement as applying to outrageous torts that are unforeseeable 
to a reasonable consumer in the context of normal business dealings.”). 
295 J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003). 
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favoring arbitration does not apply to the determination of whether there 
is a valid agreement to arbitrate; instead, ordinary contract principles 
[apply] .... Thus, [a party who attempts] to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment must show the agreement meets all requisite contract elements.296 
To establish a valid and enforceable contract, the vast majority of state 
supreme courts require a party to prove the following elements: (1) two or 
more contracting parties agreeing to be bound; (2) sufficient consideration; 
(3) a sufficiently definite agreement; (4) the parties’ legal capacity to make a 
contract; (5) the parties’ mutual assent; and (6) the contract will not violate 
common law and statutory law.297 In addition, state supreme courts also 
embrace several other principles: 
When examining a contract, a court should first examine the four cor-
ners of the contract to determine how to interpret it. If the language in the 
contract is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the contract must be effec-
tuated. Vagueness and ambiguity are more strongly construed against 
the party drafting the contract. [If] the intent of the parties is not clear, 
[a] court should ... resort to extrinsic evidence.298 
Now, assume that a third-year law student applies for a consumer loan 
to purchase law casebooks and braces for her child. The parent-student com-
pletes and signs only a preprinted, standardized application form. Also as-
sume: (1) the loan application contains an arbitration clause; (2) the lender 
rejects the application; (3) the student-parent sues the lender for allegedly 
discriminating irrationally on the basis of gender; and (4) the lender demands 
mandatory arbitration. Clearly, based on the rules outlined above, the stu-
dent’s stand-alone loan application is not an enforceable contract under com-
mon law principles of contract law. 
Nevertheless, would the arbitration clause in the law student’s completed 
and signed loan application still be enforceable under the FAA section 2? As 
of this writing, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the narrow 
question: whether an arbitration clause in a stand-alone, preprinted appli-
cation form qualifies as a “written provision in a contract” under section 2 of 
the FAA?299 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has decided two contro-
versies involving the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a standard-
ized application form that was “a part of” an enforceable contract.300 
                                                                                                                         
296 Id. at 227–28. 
297 Rotenberry v. Hooker, 864 So. 2d 266, 270 (Miss. 2003). 
298 Id. (emphasis added). 
299 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013). 
300 See infra notes 301–32 and accompanying text. 
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First, consider the relevant facts and holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/ 
Johnson Lane Corporation.301 Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Inter-
state) employed Robert Gilmer to serve as a financial services manager.302 
Under the terms of Interstate’s employment contract, Gilmer had to become a 
member of a third party, stock exchange organization.303 Gilmer completed 
and signed the third party standardized application form, entitled Uniform 
Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer (UASIR).304 
Under the terms of the UASIR, Gilmer agreed to arbitrate any dispute—be-
tween Gilmer and Interstate—that required arbitration under the third party 
organization’s rules, constitutions or bylaws.305 Briefly put, Gilmer com-
pleted a membership application and formed a contractual relationship with 
the securities exchange organization.306 
Six years later, Interstate fired Gilmer.307 In response, the sixty-two-year-
old employee filed an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission.308 Later, Gilmer sued Interstate in federal 
court.309 He alleged that Interstate’s firing violated the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).310 In response, Interstate filed a motion 
to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim.311 Interstate relied upon the 
arbitration agreement in Gilmer’s securities registration application.312 The 
employee, however, cited language in FAA section 1, which reads in perti-
nent part: “nothing herein ... shall apply to contracts of employment of sea-
men, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce.”313 Gilmer argued that he should not be compelled 
to arbitrate his federal claim.314 
In the course of events, the controversy reached the Supreme Court. 
Several amici curiae supported Gilmer and argued that all disputes involving 
                                                                                                                         




305 Id. (“NYSE Rule 347 provides for arbitration of ‘[a]ny controversy between a 
registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the 





310 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
311 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
312 Id. 
313 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
314 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26–27. 
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“contracts of employment” should be excluded from mandatory arbitration 
under FAA section 1.315 However, the Court stressed: 
[I]t would be inappropriate to address the scope of [the exclusion under 
FAA §1], because the [disputed] arbitration clause ... is not contained in a 
contract of employment .... The record before us does not show, and the 
parties do not contend, that Gilmer’s employment agreement with Inter-
state contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration 
clause ... is in Gilmer’s securities registration application—which is a 
contract with the securities exchanges.316 
Therefore, the Supreme Court embraced lower courts’ rulings and declared 
that the exclusionary language in FAA section 1 did not bar arbitration 
clauses which appear in securities exchange members’ registration ap-
plications.317 Once more, according to the Court, a third party’s registration 
application and the securities organization’s membership agreement formed a 
binding contract between Gilmer and Gilmer’s employer.318 
Ten years after deciding Gilmer, the Supreme Court decided Circuit City 
Stores v. Adams.319 The relevant facts in the latter case are fairly similar to 
those in Gilmer. Saint Clair Adams visited a Circuit City Store in Santa Rosa, 
California.320 He completed and signed an employment application form, 
which read: 
I agree [to] settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or con-
troversies arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for em-
ployment, employment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City, 
exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral Arbitrator. 
By way of example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, 
and local statutory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 
including the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and [the] law of tort.321 
Ultimately, Circuit City employed Adams as a sales counselor.322 Two 
years later, a dispute arose between Circuit City and Adams.323 In response, 
                                                                                                                         
315 Id. at 25 n.2. 
316 Id. (emphasis added) (“Gilmer ... did not raise the issue in the courts below, it was not 
addressed there, and it was not among the questions presented in the petition for certiorari.”). 
317 Id. (“[W]e therefore hold that § 1’s exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer’s 
arbitration agreement.”). 
318 Id. 
319 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
320 Id. at 109. 
321 Id. at 109–10. 
322 Id. at 110. 
323 Id. 
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Adams filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against Circuit City in 
state court alleging that the employer violated California’s Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act,324 and committed various torts under California 
law. Circuit City filed an action in federal court asking the district court 
judge to compel arbitration of Adams’s claims under FAA section 1.325 Cir-
cuit City prevailed.326 The controversy reached the Supreme Court, how-
ever, where the parties asked the Court to resolve an inter-circuits conflict 
over whether an arbitration clause in a standardized employment form is 
an excluded “contract of employment” under FAA section 1.327 To resolve 
the conflict, the Court declared that the “contract of employment” lan-
guage exempted transportation workers from mandatory arbitration under 
section 1 of the FAA.328 
In addition, the Court stressed: “The instant case [does not involve] the 
basic coverage authorization under § 2 of the Act, but the exemption from 
coverage under § 1.”329 Even more importantly, Circuit City insisted that 
the signed and completed application form was not an excluded contract 
under section 1 of the FAA.330 The Supreme Court, however, declined to 
grant certiorari regarding the question of whether Adams’s signed employ-
ment application was a stand alone “contract of employment.”331 Still, in 
the end, the Court accepted implicitly—without deciding—that Adams’s 
completed application form and his employment formed a totally integrated 
contract.332 Plainly, the Gilmer and Circuit City courts did not address the 
                                                                                                                         
324 Id. (citing CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 12900–12907 (Deering 2013)). 
325 Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 110. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 110–11. 
This comprehensive exemption had been advocated by amici curiae in 
Gilmer, where we addressed the question whether a registered securi-
ties representative’s employment discrimination claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 
U.S.C. § 621 et seq., could be submitted to arbitration pursuant to an agree-
ment in his securities registration application. 
Id. at 112. 
328 Id. at 112 (“Most Courts of Appeals conclude the exclusion provision is limited to 
transportation workers, defined, for instance, as those workers ‘actually engaged in the move-
ment of goods in interstate commerce.’ As we stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit takes a different view and interprets the § 1 exception to exclude all 
contracts of employment from the reach of the FAA.”) (citation omitted). 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 113. 
331 Id. 
332 Id. The Courts’ explanation is found in the employment application form, which 
stated in pertinent part, “I will settle any ... disputes ... relating to my application ... employ-
ment and/or cessation of employment with Circuit City ... by ... arbitration.” Id. at 109–10. 
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question of whether an arbitration clause in a completed, signed, and stand-
alone standardized application form is a “written provision in a contract” 
under FAA section 2. Consequently, among lower courts, this highly im-
portant question has generated conflicting rulings. To illustrate the essence 
of the split, consider the facts and rulings in two cases which were decided 
in the same year and after Gilmer and Circuit City. 
In Burch v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of 
Washoe,333 James and Linda Burch (Burches) purchased a new house from 
Double Diamond (Diamond).334 Approximately four months after closing, 
Diamond gave Linda Burch a “thirty-one-page warranty booklet.”335 At that 
time, Diamond also offered the homeowners a “2-10 Year Home Buyers 
Warranty” (HBW) and asked the consumers to complete and sign a one-page 
“Application for Home Enrollment” form.336 In response, Linda signed the 
standardized application form; but, she did not read the thirty-one-page 
booklet.337 Purportedly, the HBW was an express warranty—promising that 
the house would be (1) free from materials and workmanship defects for one 
year; (2) free from electrical, plumbing, and mechanical systems defects 
for two years; and (3) free from structural defects for ten years.338 More 
relevant, the one-page “Application for Home Enrollment” form stated: 
By signing, [the] Homebuyer acknowledges that s/he has viewed and 
received a video of “Warranty Teamwork: You, Your Builder & HBW,” 
read the warranty, ... received a copy of this form with the Home Buyers 
Warranty Booklet, and CONSENTS TO THE TERMS OF THESE DOC-
UMENTS INCLUDING THE BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION  
contained therein.339 
The arbitration clause in the HBW read in pertinent part: 
Any controversy ... arising out of or relating to Builder’s workmanship/ 
systems limited warranty coverages ... shall be settled by final and 
binding arbitration in accordance with the Construction Arbitration 
Services (CAS) or other [National Home Insurance Company] NHIC/ 
HBW approved rules ... in effect at the time of the arbitration .... Any 
controversy concerning a claim arising out of or relating to the Builder’s 
ten year structural coverage (insured by NHIC) shall be settled by final 
                                                                                                                         
333 49 P.3d 647 (Nev. 2002). 
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and binding arbitration .... Arbitration of all structural warranty disputes 
will be conducted by arbitrators supplied by an NHIC approved arbitra-
tion service.340 
Nearly two years after purchasing the house, the Burches discovered 
“‘serious problems underneath [their] house’—saturated floor joists, wet 
insulation, muddy ground, and a wet, moldy foundation.”341 The consumers 
reported the defects to Diamond and requested certain repairs.342 Put simply, 
the Burches did not like the offer and consequently filed a lawsuit in state 
court, raising several common law theories of recovery: breach of express 
and implied warranties, negligence, and fraud and misrepresentation.343 
Diamond filed a motion to stay the trial and a motion to compel arbitra-
tion.344 The builder argued that the terms of the application and the booklet 
required the parties to arbitrate all disputes relating to the construction of 
the Burch’s home.345 
The district court granted Diamond’s motion to compel arbitration.346 
The lower court concluded that the one-page warranty application—which 
referenced the HBW—was a valid contract.347 The Burches appealed, filing a 
writ of mandamus and arguing that the district court’s motion to compel 
arbitration should be vacated.348 On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that “the FAA establishes a strong public policy favoring arbi-
tration for the purpose of avoiding the unnecessary expense and delay of 
litigation where parties have agreed to arbitrate.”349 But the state supreme 
court stressed: FAA section 2 “does not mandate the enforcement of an un-
conscionable contract or arbitration clause.”350 Examining the record, the 
                                                                                                                         
340 Id. 
341 Id. at 649. 
342 Id. (“[The Burches] requested that Double Diamond remedy the situation by 
removing the insulation, professionally treating the area with mildew and fungicide 
controls, installing upgraded insulation with proper venting, constructing a proper water 
barrier underneath the house, and reimbursing them for all current and future fees for 
professional inspections. While contesting liability, Double Diamond offered to com-
pletely dry the crawl space underneath the house, install two additional foundation vents 
and a six-mill vapor barrier, treat all areas of active fungus with an approved fungicide, 







349 Id. at 650. 
350 Id. at 650 (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) 
(holding that generally applicable contract defenses—such as unconscionability—may be 
used to invalidate an arbitration clause)). 
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Nevada Supreme Court outlined several reasons for reversing the district 
court’s ruling.351 One explanation, however, shines brightly: “The Burches 
did not have an opportunity to read the one-page application form, or the 
thirty-one-page HBW booklet ... before signing ‘the application.’ The arbi-
tration clause was located on page six of the HBW booklet.”352 Therefore, 
the arbitration clause in the standardized application form was procedurally 
unconscionable, thereby effectively precluding the formation of a valid 
arbitration contract.353 
Now consider the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, 
Hamilton & Scripps,354 which was decided almost seven weeks after Burch. 
Donald Scott Lagatree (Lagatree) applied for a position as a full-time legal 
secretary with the law firm of Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps LLP 
(Luce).355 Luce was impressed with Lagatree’s credentials and experi-
ence.356 Therefore, on his first day of work, Lagatree received the law firm’s 
standard, conditional-offer-of-employment letter.357 The letter outlined 
Lagatree’s salary and benefits.358 In addition, the letter stated that Lagatree 
or the firm “could terminate [his] employment at any time, with or without 
cause.”359 An arbitration provision also appeared in the letter, requiring 
Lagatree to submit all “claims arising from or related to his employment” 
to binding arbitration.360 More specifically, the arbitration clause read in 
relevant part: 
In the event of any dispute ... arising from or related to your employment or 
the termination of your employment, we jointly agree to submit all such 
                                                                                                                         
351 Id. (“The Burches did not receive a copy of the HBW’s terms until after Double 
Diamond had paid the premium to enroll the Burch home in the warranty program— 
almost four months after they closed [the] escrow on their home. Double Diamond told 
the Burches that the HBW’s issuance was ‘automatic’ and offered extra protection for 
their home, when in fact the warranty limited their protection under Nevada law .... The 
Burches were not sophisticated consumers, they did not understand the HBW’s terms, 
and the HBW’s disclaimers were not conspicuous.”). 
352 Id. 
353 Id. (“Under these circumstances, the Burches did not have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to decide if they wanted to agree to the HBW’s terms, including its arbitration 
provision. As a result, the HBW was [also] procedurally unconscionable.”). 
354 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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disputes or claims to confidential binding arbitration, under the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Any arbitration must be initiated within 180 days after 
the dispute or claim first arose, and will be heard before a retired State or 
Federal judge in the county containing the firm office in which you were 
last employed. The law of the State in which you last worked will apply.361 
For two days, Lagatree worked “without a contract.”362 Moreover, as 
an applicant, Lagatree realized: “[Signing the arbitration provision in the 
letter] was the only way that he could ... become an employee of the 
firm.”363 Still, for various reasons, Lagatree refused to sign the conditional-
offer-of-employment letter that housed the arbitration provision.364 Shortly 
thereafter, Luce withdrew the job offer.365 And the record is clear: Luce 
refused to employ Lagatree “only because he would not sign the arbitra-
tion provision.”366 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Luce on 
behalf of Lagatree.367 The EEOC alleged that Luce retaliated against 
Lagatree—which is a violation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,368 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),369 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),370 and the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963 (EPA).371 The EEOC asked the federal district court to award 
various damages372 and grant injunctive relief—preventing Luce from forcing 
employment applicants to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of 
employment.373 The district court refused to award compensatory damages 
and rejected EEOC’s request for injunctive relief.374 The district court, how-
ever, ordered Luce to stop forcing applicants to arbitrate Title VII claims.375 
                                                                                                                         
361 Id. 
362 Id. at 998 (emphasis added). 
363 Id. 
364 Id. at 997–98 (“[H]e ‘couldn’t sign ... the arbitration agreement’ because ‘it was 
unfair.’ ... [And he could] not sign an arbitration agreement under an at-will employment 
situation because he believed he needed to keep in place his ‘civil liberties, including the 
right to a jury trial and redress of grievances through the government process.’”). 
365 Id. at 998 (emphasis added). 
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
368 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012). 
369 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2012). 
370 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012). 
371 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2012). 
372 Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d at 998 (“Lagatree sought lost wages, 
damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages.”). 
373 Id. at 997. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. 
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The lower court also declared that applicants for employment do not have 
to arbitrate claims under the ADA, ADEA, and EPA.376 Luce appealed.377 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and issued mul-
tiple rulings.378 First, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated 
explicitly: employers may require applicants “to sign agreements to arbi-
trate Title VII claims as a condition of their employment.”379 Of course, that 
required Lagatree and Luce to form a binding and enforceable contract. But, 
the record is clear: Lagatree worked just two days “without a contract.”380 
Even more importantly, the language of FAA section 2 is unambiguous: a 
party may compel arbitration under the FAA only if the party presents proof 
of an arbitration clause in a valid, written, and legally enforceable contract.381 
So, what compelled the Ninth Circuit to reject the district court’s conclu-
sion that employment applicants do not have to arbitrate Title VII claims? 
Simply put, the court of appeals ignored settled principles of contract law, 
circumvented the “written contract” requirement under section 2 of the 
FAA, focused on the language in FAA section 1, and applied the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Circuit City.382 Once more, in Circuit City, the Court did 
not address the question of whether—absent a valid contract—applicants 
for goods, services or employment must arbitrate federal and state law claims 
under FAA section 2. Instead, citing FAA section 1, the Supreme Court 
simply declared that the FAA covers every “contract of employment” ex-
cept transportation workers’ employment contracts.383 Without a doubt, 
the rulings in Burch and Luce conflict.384 Therefore, when the opportunity 
                                                                                                                         
376 Id. 
377 Id. at 998. 
378 Id. at 997 (“We vacate the district court’s permanent injunction against Luce 
Forward .... We additionally reject the EEOC’s retaliation theory. Lagatree did not 
engage in a protected activity when he refused to sign the Luce Forward arbitration 
agreement, and consequently, Luce Forward did not retaliate by refusing to hire him.”). 
379 Id. 
380 Id. at 998 (emphasis added). 
381 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
382 Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d at 1003. 
383 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001). 
384 Compare Haynes v. Fincher, 525 S.E.2d 405, 406–07 (Ga. App. 1999) (“[T]he 
Hayneses applied for the builder’s warranty .... [The] signed application provides that the 
warranty consists of that application and the warranty program booklet .... [T]he booklet 
establishes that any disputes the buyers have with the builder may be submitted to 
binding arbitration governed by the procedures of the Federal Arbitration Act .... The 
Hayneses argue that the binding arbitration provision ... is not an enforceable agreement 
because neither they nor Fincher initiated it as required by [the code]. The argument is 
without merit because [the code] requires parties to initial arbitration clauses only in home 
sale or loan contracts. The builder’s warranty ... is not a home sale or loan contract .... 
Consequently, the absence of the parties’ initials beside the warranty’s arbitration provision is 
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arises, the Court should address and answer intelligibly the question of 
whether an arbitration clause in a standardized, preprinted application 
form or in a conditional-offer-of-employment letter is an enforceable writ-
ten contract under FAA section 2. As of this writing those instruments are 
not enforceable contracts under the settled principles, which are outlined 
intelligibly and clearly in two classic contract law cases—Mitchill v. Lath 
and Lucy v. Zehmer.385 
B. Judicial Conflict—Whether Disgruntled Applicants’ Antidiscrimination, 
Civil Rights and Harassment Claims Arose Out of Valid Employment 
Contracts or From Allegedly Unenforceable Standardized Employment 
Application Forms 
To repeat, the FAA section 2 also reads in relevant part: “[A] con-
troversy ... arising out of such [written] contract [may be settled by arbi-
tration].”386 Of course, the FAA does not define “arising out of such 
contract.”387 A conservative reading of the phrase, however, means courts 
may not compel arbitration unless parties’ disagreements evolve from within 
the four corners of a written contract. On the other hand, several courts have 
adopted a more liberal definition—concluding that disputes arising from 
non-negotiated instruments and relationships are also covered.388 But note 
that in Hobley v. Yellow Transp., Inc.,389 the federal district court judge 
discussed a middle position. Citing Texas law, the federal judge penned 
the following interpretation of the phrase “arising out of a contract”: 
[Courts employ] a two-part test: (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate must 
exist between the parties; and (2) the dispute in question must fall within 
the scope of that arbitration agreement. Under Texas law, ... [a] claim is 
arbitrable if it is so interwoven with the underlying contract that it 
could not stand alone; however, it is not arbitrable if the claim is so 
                                                                                                                         
not fatal.”) (emphasis added), with Mendez v. Puerto Rican Intern. Cos., Inc., 2010 WL 
2654439, at *3 (D. Virgin Islands July 1, 2010) (Plaintiffs signed certain dispute resolu-
tion agreements (DRAs) when they applied for work. “This dispute presents a question of 
arbitrability .... Defendants contend that [a valid] agreement exists .... Plaintiffs contend 
that they never intended to agree to such a one-sided bargain. Under normal principles of 
contract interpretation, there is no good reason to conclude that by signing the DRAs, 
Plaintiffs intended to commit themselves to such an unbounded, far-reaching duty .... 
Without clear and unmistakable evidence that Plaintiffs did intend to bestow such a bene-
fit on Defendants, this court will not assume that the parties so intended.”). 
385 See discussion supra Introduction. 
386 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
387 Id. 
388 See infra notes 391–437 and accompanying text. 
389 No. 3:09-CV-1160-K, 2010 WL 286690 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2010). 
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independent of the contract that it can be maintained without reference 
to the contract .... The court must look to the facts forming the basis of 
each claim to determine whether it could be maintained without refer-
ence to the contract, ... not simply whether it references the contract.390 
Still, the “arising out of a contract” language continues to produce con-
flicting rulings among state and federal courts over the enforceability of 
arbitration clauses in standardized application forms. Again, an important 
principle of contract law must be stressed: stand-alone, standardized, pre-
printed application forms are not valid contracts. Yet, when deciding whether 
to compel arbitration of various claims, several courts have ignored that 
principle. Quite simply, several tribunals have created exceptions to the 
FAA’s arising-out-of-a-contract requirement and granted motions to com-
pel arbitration when movants simply established: (1) the controversy only 
arose out of the application process; (2) the dispute was only related to an 
application form; and (3) a disagreement was related in any manner to the 
intake process and application.391 
Consequently, in the wake of those exceptions, a questionable and 
controversial multi-part doctrine has evolved among some inferior federal 
courts. Under the FAA section 2, arbitration is mandatory if (1) disgrun-
tled individuals complete and sign preprinted stand-alone applications, 
                                                                                                                         
390 Id. at *1 (emphasis added). 
391 See, e.g., Adams v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., No. CIV-12-1310-HE, 2013 WL 
1450507, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 9, 2013) (The non-negotiated instrument read: “[Parties 
agree to arbitrate all] controversies arising out of or relating to the applicant’s application or 
candidacy for employment, promotion, demotion, or termination of employment with the 
[c]ompany.”) (emphasis added); Mendez v. Puerto Rican Int’l Cos., Nos. 05-cv-00174 
-LDD, 05-cv-00199-LDD, 2010 WL 2654439, at *2, n.8 (D.V.I. July 1, 2010) (The arbi-
tration clause read in pertinent part: “Regardless of whether Wyatt offers me employment, 
both Wyatt and I agree to resolve ... all ... controversies arising out of or relating to ... my 
application or candidacy for employment.”) (emphasis added); Hobley, 2010 WL 
286690, at *1 (“I agree to resolve all ... controversies arising out of, or related to, my 
application for employment, my employment, or the cessation of my employment.”); 
Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha, Inc., No. 06-1735, 2007 WL 707364, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 
2007) (“The aspirant ... and [the Fraternity] ... agree that any and all disputes ... arising 
out of or relating in any manner whatsoever to the Intake process and application shall 
be subject to and resolved by compulsory and binding arbitration.”) (emphasis added); 
Allen v. Labor Ready Sw., B237673, 2013 WL 1910293, at *2 (Cal. App. May 9, 2013) 
(The employment application read: “I agree that any disputes arising out of my applica-
tion for employment or employment ... will be resolved by final and binding arbitration.”) 
(emphasis added); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Brenner, Nos. 13-12-00564-CV, 13-12-00620-
CV, 2013 WL 3326640, at *4 (Tex. App. June 27, 2013) (The instrument read: “[A]ny 
claim, controversy and/or dispute ... arising out of and/or in any way related to [the] 
application for employment, employment and/or termination of employment’ would be 
‘resolved by arbitration.’”) (emphasis added). 
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absent any evidence of valid and enforceable employment contracts; (2) the 
standardized application forms contain arbitration clauses; and (3) the 
complainants’ employment discrimination claims are interwoven with the 
arbitration provisions in completed and signed application forms.392 To be 
sure, the exceptions to the FAA’s arising-out-of-a-contract rule effectively 
marginalize or undermine a previously discussed FAA’s requirement: federal 
courts must apply ordinary state-law principles of contract to determine 
whether a valid arbitration contract exists or whether an arbitration clause 
is valid and enforceable.393 
To help prove the latter assertions, consider the Indiana district court’s 
analysis and decision in Baumann v. The Finish Line, Inc.394 Tonya Baumann 
applied for a position at Finish Line’s call center in Indianapolis, Indiana.395 
Finish Line required her to complete and sign a standardized employment-
application form before hiring her.396 The application contained an “Appli-
cant Statement,” which read in relevant part: 
I agree [to settle all] ... controversies arising out of or relating to my 
application or candidacy for employment and/or cessation of employ-
ment with The Finish Line ... exclusively by final and binding arbitra-
tion .... [C]laims include claims under federal, state, and local statutory 
or common law, such as ... Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, including the amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 .... 
Complete details of my agreement to submit these claims to arbitration 
are contained in [the] ... Employee Dispute Resolution Plan, which has 
been made available for my review prior to the execution of this appli-
cation. I have read and understand the above paragraph and have vol-
untarily agreed to it.397 
The Employee Dispute Resolution Plan (Plan) read: “Application for 
employment, initial employment, or continued employment ... constitutes 
consent and agreement by both the Employee and the Company to be 
bound by this Plan.”398 The record, however, revealed that Finish Line and 
Baumann never executed a written employment contract.399 Instead, 
Baumann began working as an at-will employee—again, without contract 
                                                                                                                         
392 See infra note 551 and accompanying text. 
393 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (reaffirming the principle that 
courts apply general state-law principles of contract to determine whether an arbitration 
agreement falls within the scope of the FAA). 
394 No. 108-cv-1385-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 2750094 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009). 
395 Id. at *1. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. (emphasis added). 
398 Id. 
399 Id. at *1–2. 
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of employment.400 As things progressed, Baumann became dissatisfied 
with her work environment and filed a sex discrimination charge against 
Finish Line.401 In response, the company fired her.402 Later, Baumann com-
menced an employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII).403 Finish Line filed a motion 
to compel arbitration, asserting that “a valid and binding arbitration agree-
ment” barred the Title VII lawsuit.404 
The federal district court embraced Finish Line’s argument and granted 
summary relief.405 What influenced the judge’s decision? The court began its 
analysis by citing the settled rule of contract law: arbitration agreements are 
treated as ordinary contracts.406 But, after applying that principle, the federal 
district court rejected Baumann’s arguments.407 In her answer, Baumann 
argued that the Applicant Statement and the Plan did not comprise a valid 
and enforceable arbitration contract.408 She stressed: (1) the Plan did not con-
tain an effective date; and (2) she received a copy of the Plan before Finish 
Line formally adopted the instrument.409 Put simply, the judge concluded: 
the application and Plan comprised a totally integrated, written employ-
ment contract.410 The judge also declared that Baumann acknowledged 
receiving the Plan when she signed the Applicant Statement.411 
The federal district court judge’s analysis and ruling in Baumann are 
less than stellar for several reasons. First, a conservative reading of the facts 
in Baumann strongly suggests that Finish Line’s Plan was nothing more 
than words and phrases in an employee handbook. Indiana law is exceed-
ingly clear; employee handbooks are not unilateral contracts of employ-
ment.412 In Orr v. Westminster Village North, Inc.,413 the Indiana Supreme 
                                                                                                                         
400 Id. at *4. 
401 Id. at *1. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. (Finish Line filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration. 
The court converted the request “into a Motion for Summary Judgment on the sole issue 
of whether the Court must dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration.”). 
405 Id. at *6. 
406 Id. at *3. 
407 Id. at *6. 
408 Id. at *3. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. 
411 Id. (“Baumann has not apprised the Court of a single provision in either the 
Applicant Statement or the Plan that was conditioned upon the Plan having an effective 
date .... The Court concludes that the blank line is legally insignificant.”). 
412 City of Indianapolis v. Byrns, 745 N.E.2d 312, 317 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
413 689 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. 1997). 
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Court outlines the test to determine whether an employee handbook might 
be an enforceable employment contract.414 The Baumann court, however, 
never applied or mentioned the Orr test.415 
Second, the FAA’s arising-out-of-a-written-contract test was not satis-
fied because Baumann’s stand-alone, completed application form was not 
a written contract under Indiana law.416 Consequently, the application and 
the Plan could not comprise a totally integrated employment contract. 
Third, the indisputable facts in the record undermined the court’s implicit 
summary judgment ruling: she was an employment-at-will worker, per-
forming without the protection of a written employment contract. Still, the 
federal judge concluded implicitly that Baumann’s statutory sexual harass-
ment claim evolved from a written employment contract.417 Furthermore, 
assuming that a valid employment contract existed between the applicant 
and the employer, the court did not explain how the sexual harassment claim 
arose from the written contract.418 
The material facts in Heseman v. Hensler419 and Baumann are quite 
similar. The holdings, however, conflict. In Heseman, the defendant, Joseph 
Hensler, was the owner, president, and chief executive officer of Clarklift, 
Inc.420 Carolyn Heseman, the applicant and plaintiff, applied for a job at 
Clarklift.421 She completed and signed an application form, which con-
tained an arbitration clause.422 The latter read in pertinent part: 
In the event you contend that Clarklift-Team Power ... [violated] ... any 
of your rights, you and Clarklift-Team power agree to submit any such 
matter to binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal 
Arbitration Act. If the company does not receive a written request for 
                                                                                                                         
414 Id. at 720–22 (The Indiana Supreme Court requires a party to prove several 
elements: (1) proof of an employee handbook that contains an unambiguous promise or 
an offer of employment; (2) proof of an employee handbook that adequately informs 
employees about the scope and parameters of the offer; (3) proof that an employee read 
the handbook and the offer, and (4) proof that the employee accepted the offer by be-
ginning to work.). 
415 Id. at 712–22. 
416 See, e.g., W.S.K. v. M.H.S.B., 922 N.E.2d 671, 695 (Ind. App. 2010) (reiterating that 
“mutuality of obligation” must be present to create a contract and concluding applications 
for medical-staff positions are not contracts). 
417 Baumann v. The Finish Line, Inc., No. 108-cv-1385-LJM-JMS, 2009 WL 2750094, at 
*1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009) (“The court has considered the parties’ arguments and, 
without addressing the merits of the complaint.”). 
418 Id. at *1–6. 
419 No. C044769, 2005 WL 941362 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. Apr. 22, 2005). 
420 Id. at *1. 
421 Id. at *1–2. 
422 Id. 
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arbitration from you within 6 months of the date of this application, 
you agree you will have waived any right to raise any claim.423 
Clarklift hired Heseman to manage the accounts payable department, 
and she “received several promotions and pay raises.”424 But, all was not 
well. Allegedly, one of Clarklift’s mechanics began harassing Heseman.425 
After Heseman complained about the harassment, Hensler terminated 
Heseman, claiming that her job performance was substandard.426 Later, 
Heseman filed a complaint under California’s antidiscrimination code, assert-
ing that Hensler and Clarklift condoned and practiced sexual harassment, 
sexual discrimination, and retaliation.427 Defendants filed a motion to 
compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the Application for 
Employment.428 The superior court denied the motion and Clarklift and 
Hensler appealed.429 
The California court of appeals began its analysis by asking whether 
the application form was a valid contract.430 Embracing the superior court’s 
ruling, the appellate court concluded that the application and the arbitration 
clause were procedurally unconscionable.431 But even more importantly, the 
court of appeals found that the arbitration provision covered only “claims 
                                                                                                                         
423 Id. at *2. 
424 Id. at *1. 
425 Id. (Allegedly, the mechanics harassed Heseman by “repeatedly commenting on 
her physical appearance and attractiveness, offering to take her out to lunch even though ... 
[she] told him that she was married and not available, proposing that he was more virile 
than her husband, telephoning her with sexual overtures, telling a female coworker that 
he wanted to have sex with [Heseman], and asking the coworker about ... [Heseman’s] 
personal life.”). 
426 Id. 
427 Id; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2014) (“It is an unlawful 
employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or, except 
where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the 
State of California ... [f]or an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color, 
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic 
information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual 
orientation, or military and veteran status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the 
person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to employment, or 
to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training program leading to 
employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment.”). 
428 Heseman, 2005 WL 941362, at *1. 
429 Id. 
430 Id. at *3. 
431 Id. at *2 (“The arbitration provision is both procedurally unconscionable, as it is 
presented to each applicant on a take it or leave it basis, and substantively unconscio-
nable, as it forces the employee to agree to arbitrate all claims while the employer does not 
have to arbitrate any of its claims.”). 
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arising out of the application process itself.”432 Heseman’s sexual harass-
ment, sexual discrimination, and retaliatory discharge claims “arose more 
than six months after” she completed and signed the standardized application 
form.433 Therefore, the non-negotiated, standardized arbitration provision 
did not cover the claims outlined in Heseman’s complaint.434 
The court’s analyses and conclusion in Heseman are more intelligibly 
convincing than those in Baumann. And the reason is not terribly compli-
cated. The California court carefully reviewed settled principles of contract 
law and applied those principles to address two important FAA-related 
questions: (1) whether Clarklift and Heseman formed a valid contract that 
contained an arbitration clause; and (2) whether Heseman’s claims evolved 
from the terms of the written contract.435 In the end, the answer to both 
questions was no.436 Still, in the near future, the Supreme Court will have 
to address the following question directly: whether FAA section 2 requires 
workers to arbitrate their antidiscrimination, civil rights, and harassment 
claims if those claims evolved from standardized employment application 
forms or arose out of an employment application process?437 
C. Judicial Conflict—Whether Applicants’ Consumer Protection Claims and 
Lawsuits Arose Out of Valid and Enforceable Financial Services Contracts 
or Out of Allegedly Unenforceable Standardized Application Forms 
In the wake of Superstorm Sandy’s widespread destruction in 2012, 
the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs encouraged storm victims 
                                                                                                                         
432 Id. at *5. 
433 Id. at *2. 
434 Id. at *5. 
435 Id. at *3. 
436 Id. at *2 (“[Heseman] opposed the motion on the grounds that the agreement, by 
its terms, did not apply to [her] claims, which arose more than six months after her em-
ployment commenced; the agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it 
required her to waive her right to judicial redress of further claims as a condition of 
employment; the agreement was substantively unconscionable because it applied only to 
her claims against Clarklift, and not to any claims Clarklift might have against her; and 
the agreement did not encompass her noncontractual, statutory claims against the 
individual defendants.”). 
437 Compare McLean v. Byrider Sales of Ind. S, L.L.C., No. 2:13-cv-524, 2013 WL 
4777199, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2013) (concluding that plaintiffs’ claims under the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. § 4311, and 
Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 arose out of plaintiffs’ applications or candidacies for em-
ployment), with Niolet v. Rice, 20 So. 3d 31, 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that plaintiff’s 
assault and battery claims were not directly or indirectly related to plaintiff’s employment 
(citing Smith v. Captain D’s, L.L.C., 963 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (Miss. 2007) (holding that a 
sexual-assault assault claim had no connection with the employee’s employment))). 
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to apply for home rebuilding grants.438 On Sandy’s first anniversary, how-
ever, thousands of homeowners and consumers in New Jersey filed a racial 
discrimination lawsuit against Governor Christopher Christie and his admin-
istration.439 In particular, the fairly large group of disgruntled consumers 
alleged: “Latino and African-American applicants were disproportionately 
rejected for rebuilding funds.”440 Governor Christie and the state disputed 
the allegations.441 
As the author was penning this Article, a legal question evolved: whether 
Governor Christie would ask a court to force the complaining consumers 
into binding arbitration under the FAA section 2. Arguably, the answer to 
                                                                                                                         
438 Melissa Hayes, Group Claims Sandy Aid Has Been Discriminatory, NORTHJERSEY 
.COM (Nov. 27, 2013, 6:46 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/news/Group_claims_Sandy 
_aid_has_been_discriminatory.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V5X8-35J3 (“The depart-
ment oversees two main housing programs: the Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Elevations 
and Mitigation grants, often called RREM, which provide up to $150,000 for repairs and 
home elevations; and separate $10,000 resettlement grants for storm victims who agree to 
stay in their county for three years.”). 
439 Id.; see also Star-Ledger Editorial Board, Christie Administration Is Blowing Smoke 
On Sandy (Dec. 4, 2013, 9:46 AM) http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2013/12/the 
_christie_administration_is.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P4AP-EFHV (“As thousands 
of Hurricane Sandy victims desperately wait for word on whether or not they’ll get relief 
money to rebuild, the Christie administration continues to brush off the most basic ques-
tions about its grant programs .... [M]ore than a year after the devastating storm, it’s [sic] 
distributed only 10 percent of its funds for rebuilding homes .... Some were told they’re 
ineligible and have no idea why .... The state says Sandy victims who were rejected were 
informed in writing of the reason for their ineligibility, and can always appeal. But applicants 
say ... they were never informed that they can appeal a wide variety of state decisions .... 
‘Just so it’s general notice to all of you, don’t ask me any questions about Fair Share 
Housing,’ said Christie, declaring its team of lawyers not worth ‘my time or my breath.’ 
Never mind that this so-called ‘hack’ group has been advocating for fair housing in New 
Jersey for almost 40 years, and just won three major court victories over the administration, 
this year alone.”). 
440 Hayes, supra note 438 (“[According to the Fair Share Housing Center, state] docu-
ments reveal a disorganized system of processing applications that in effect discriminated 
against Latino and African-American applicants, and that changed its policies without ... 
informing the public .... Adam Gordon, Fair Share’s staff attorney, said ... it was clear 
that Latino and African-American applicants were disproportionately rejected for re-
building funds .... The rates of success in terms of people getting funding vary dramatically 
by race, ethnicity and geography.”). 
441 Id. (“[T]he commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs ... 
disputed the allegations, [asserting that] ‘[r]ace and ethnicity absolutely did not factor in 
to the application processing’ [and that] the state used a random application process to 
ensure that low- and moderate-income and elderly and disabled residents were given 
equal access to funds to rebuild their homes or move elsewhere in the same county.”); see 
also Hurricane Sandy and New Jersey’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2013, at A22. 
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the latter question depends in part on answers to the following questions: 
(1) whether the Superstorm Sandy home rebuilding application contains 
an arbitration clause; and (2) whether Governor Christie believes that he 
can continue an otherwise successful political career without maintaining 
the support of Latino and African American voters in New Jersey and 
elsewhere. As of this writing, the answer to the political question is no. 
Conventional wisdom strongly indicates that a Republican-designated 
Christie will need support from significant numbers of minority voters to 
win the White House in 2016.442 Therefore, assuming that an arbitration 
clause appears in the home rebuilding application form, the Governor has 
decided to defend its administration in a court of law instead of seeking the 
assistance of private arbitrators.443 
Unlike Governor Christie, however, numerous other defendants have 
filed motions to compel arbitration, after displeased consumers and finan-
cial services applicants filed lawsuits.444 Again, FAA section 2 requires 
arbitral claims to arise out of written contracts.445 Yet, a review of consumer 
protection cases reveals that federal and state courts are split on whether 
financial services claimants must enter binding arbitration if consumer 
protection disputes arose out of completed and signed application 
forms.446 Below, the controversies and decisions in two representative cases 
are discussed to help illustrate the essence of this particular judicial conflict. 
                                                                                                                         
442 Cf. Kate Zernike & Jonathan Martin, Chris Christie Coasts to 2nd Term as Governor 
of New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2013, at A1. (“Governor Christie won decisively, 
making impressive inroads among younger voters, blacks, Hispanics and women—all 
groups that Republicans nationally have struggled to attract. Gov. Chris Christie of New 
Jersey won re-election by a crushing margin ... a victory that vaulted him to the front 
ranks of Republican presidential contenders and made him his party’s foremost proponent of 
pragmatism over ideology .... Mr. Christie’s gains among black and Hispanic voters at the 
polls are the result of an aggressive, years-long effort: He has held more than 100 town 
hall-style meetings, including several in predominantly black areas that he lost in 2009.”). 
443 Cf. Come Clean On Sandy Grants, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Sept. 15, 2013, available 
at 2013 WLNR 23037333 (“Families denied superstorm Sandy rebuilding help are now 
suing the state just to get answers as to why they were denied funds .... [What was the] 
response ... to the lawsuit by the state Department of Community Affairs? ‘No comment’ 
.... Information about funding eligibility requirements, the criteria used in deciding which 
applications to approve, and data about the number of applications received, rejected and 
approved should be online now.”) 
444 See, e.g., Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, 547 F. 3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 
2008); Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1027 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Hopkins v. World Acceptance Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1399 (N.D. Ga. 2011). 
445 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2013). 
446 Compare Edwards v. Costner, 979 So. 2d 757, 759, 765–66 (Ala. 2007) (con-
cluding that a nonsignatory third-party cannot be forced to arbitrate his claims, even if the 
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First, consider the most salient facts in Pake v. Fry.447 Before his death, 
Norman E. Luster (Luster) was legally incompetent and had approximately 
$115,000 in assets.448 A court appointed Luster’s cousins—Joseph Pake 
(Pake) and Regina Rose (Rose)—as coguardians of Luster and his estate.449 
SouthTrust Securities, Inc. and AXA Financial Inc. are subsidiaries of The 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (Equitable).450 
Stephen Fry (Fry) was SouthTrust’s agent.451 Pake and Rose decided to 
invest Luster’s cash and contacted the agent.452 Fry completed the customer 
cash account application form, which contained an arbitration clause.453 
Pake signed the application form.454 However, “Rose did not sign the 
Account Application.”455 
Embracing Fry’s recommendation, Pake purchased shares in several mu-
tual funds.456 But, after considering Fry’s subsequent recommendations, 
Pake sold the mutual fund shares and purchased an annuity from AXA 
Financial.457 According to Pake, Fry promised that “the owners of the an-
nuity ... would receive not less than the principal amount and a 5% return 
annually.”458 In truth, “the value of the annuity ... dropped to approximately 
                                                                                                                         
arbitration agreement covers “all disputes ... resulting from or arising out of ... [a] trans-
action ... sought to be entered into ... [or] taking place either before or after the parties 
entered into this agreement”), and S. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 385 S.W.3d 770, 
774 (Ark. 2011) (declaring that the insurer could not enforce the arbitration provision in 
the application for insurance under the FAA § 2), with Nichelson v. Soeder, No. 4:06CV1403, 
2006 WL 3079109, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2006) (compelling the arbitration of “any 
claim ... arising out of ... any application ... to obtain [a] loan”), and Salvadori v. Option 
One Mortg. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2006) (concluding that any federal 
or state contract, tort, statutory, regulatory, common law or equitable claim must be 
arbitrated even if the arbitration clause included “[a]ny claim ... arising out of ... any 
application ... to obtain [a] [l]oan”). 
447 No. COA05-325, 2005 WL 3046532 (N.C. App. Nov. 15, 2005). 
448 Id. at *1. 
449 Id. 
450 Id. 
451 Id. at *4. 
452 Id. at *1. 
453 Id. 3 (“With respect to their negligent misrepresentation claims, plaintiffs assert 
defendants ‘prepared the application and all accompanying documents for the annuity pur-
chased from [AXA Financial], and said application and all data and information furnished 
to [AXA Financial] by [Fry and SouthTrust] contained substantial errors regarding the 





458 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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$60,400.00.”459 But Fry reported that the total value of “the life insurance 
and annuity interest would total approximately $121,965.70.”460 
After Luster’s death, Equitable refused to pay the insurance proceeds, 
alleging that (1) Pake rather than Luster was “named annuitant”; (2) Luster 
was the owner of the annuity; (3) the annuity did not provide death bene-
fits for Pake; and (4) a penalty had been assessed for “withdrawing more 
than 10% of the annuity’s total.”461 As administrators of Luster’s estate, 
the cousins sued AXA Financial, Fry and SouthTrust (SouthTrust).462 The 
complaint listed several common law and statutory claims: negligent mis-
representation, fraud and securities violations.463 In response, SouthTrust 
filed a motion to compel arbitration.464 
The trial judge concluded that Pake and Rose’s claims—on behalf of 
Luster’s estate—“[arose] out of the relationship between Luster and South-
Trust” and “[fell] within the scope of the arbitration clause in the Account 
Application.”465 Still, the trial court denied SouthTrust’s motion to compel 
arbitration for two reasons: (1) Rose did not ratify Luster’s contract with the 
defendants; and (2) Rose did not sign the application form that contained 
the arbitration clause.466 In the end, the trial court declared that Pake’s sole 
signature on the account application form could not bind Luster’s estate; 
therefore, arbitration was not required.467 
SouthTrust appealed and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court’s ruling in part.468 The appellate court simply concluded: 
“By its terms, the scope of the arbitration provision covers the transactions 
involving Luster and Luster’s estate.”469 The court of appeals, however, 







465 Id. at *2. 
466 Id. at *1, *4.The Account Application contained a hand-added “X” beside the first 
of two “Applicant’s Signature” lines, the first of which was signed by Pake. The Account 
Application also contained a hand-added “X” beside the second “Applicant’s Signature” 
line, to the immediate right of the signature line signed by Pake. However, the second 
Applicant’s Signature line was left blank. Rose did not sign the Account Application. 
Id. at *1. 
467 Id. at *2. 
468 Id. at *1. 
469 Id. at *2. “In the instant case, there is no issue regarding whether the dispute be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants falls within the substantive scope of the arbitration clause 
in the Account Application.” Id. at *3. 
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did not explain how they reached that conclusion, because the court never 
cited an arbitration clause in any contract.470 Instead, the appellate court 
simply reported that a phantom arbitration clause appeared in one of 
SouthTrust’s preprinted application forms.471 But again, it is important to 
stress that FAA section 2 is unequivocal; a tribunal may not compel par-
ties to arbitrate a dispute unless a disagreement arose out of a written con-
tract that contains an arbitration provision.472 The appellate court’s ruling 
is problematic for another reason: Under North Carolina’s settled princi-
ples of contract law, a completed, signed and stand-alone application for 
various services is not a valid contract.473 
Finally, the facts in Pake are incontrovertible: Pake purchased several 
mutual fund contracts.474 Many months later, he cancelled those investment 
instruments and purchased an annuity contract on behalf of Luster.475 There-
fore, one is compelled to ask whether the arbitration clause in the completed 
and signed application became an integral part of the respective mutual 
fund and annuity contracts. If the answer is yes, the appellate court failed 
to discuss and explain why the parol evidence rule would not apply. And if 
the application never became an integral part of the controversial annuity 
contract, the application—and its arbitration clause—stood alone as an un-
enforceable instrument under North Carolina’s law. 
In Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,476 the federal district court 
also addressed whether parties must arbitrate a consumer protection dispute 
that allegedly arose out of a completed and signed application form.477 But, 
the federal court’s analysis and disposition are remarkably different from 
those in Pake. 
                                                                                                                         
470 Id. at *1–5. 
471 Id. at *2. 
472 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
473 See Kerik v. Davidson County, 551 S.E.2d 186, 193, 232–33 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
(concluding the board of commissioners approval of a rezoning application was not an 
illegal contract, even though the rezoning applicant made promises to the board of com-
missioners and the board did not obligate itself to the applicant); City of Winston-Salem 
v. Robertson, 344 S.E.2d 838, 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (“The granting of an application 
for a driveway permit is not a contract.”); Gaynoe v. First Union Direct Bank, N.A., No. 97 
CVS 16536, 2001 WL 34000142, at *7 (N.C. Super. Jan. 18, 2001) (concluding that a con-
tract was not formed by a credit-card application alone). 
474 Pake, 2005 WL 3046532, at *1. 
475 Id. 
476 Civ. A. No. 10-918, 2011 WL 93062 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2011). 
477 Id. at *1. 
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Sisc Johnson was a co-owner of Choice Carpet and Floors (CCF).478 
BB&T Bankcard Corporation (Bankcard) issued credit cards.479 In 2007, 
Johnson secured a commercial credit card application from Bankcard.480 A 
“Commercial Card Plan Agreement” (Agreement) and a personal guaranty 
agreement were attached to the application form.481 Johnson and the other 
coowner of CCF executed the “signature and authorization” provision on the 
application, which read in pertinent part: “[CCF] by the signature of its 
authorized officer(s) below, requests that a BB & T Commercial Card(s) to be 
issued to the authorized Cardholders as set forth on the BB & T Bankcard 
Corporation Commercial Card Application.”482 
In addition, referencing an arbitration provision, the attached Agree-
ment stated: “By applying for a card, Cardholder agrees that if a dispute 
of any kind arises out of or relates to this Agreement or Cardholder’s 
application for a Card, either Cardholder or [BB & T Bankcard] can 
choose to have that dispute resolved by binding arbitration as set forth 
in the Arbitration Provision.483  
The latter provision also stated:  
‘Claim’ ... means any claim, dispute or controversy between Cardholder 
and Bank arising from or including the validity and scope of this 
Arbitration Provision or the Agreement .... The term [also] includes ... 
any claim, dispute, or controversy between Cardholder and Bank that 
arises from or relates to ... your application for the Account ... Upon the 
election of either Cardholder or Bank, any claim between Cardholder 
and Bank shall be resolved by binding arbitration pursuant to this Arbi-
tration Provision.484 
In late January 2008, Johnson traveled to Branch Banking and Trust 
Company (Branch) for two purposes: (1) to remove herself as a guarantor 
for the credit card debt; and (2) to return the credit card.485 At that time, 
Branch’s agents assured Johnson that her status as a guarantor had been 
terminated.486 Yet that assurance did not stop Branch from sending multi-
ple debt collection letters to Johnson.487 In each letter, Branch alleged that 
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Johnson was responsible for the outstanding credit card debt.488 Later, 
Johnson learned that Bankcard had reported the delinquencies to several 
credit report agencies.489 
Ultimately, the erroneous information on the credit reports adversely 
affected Johnson’s credit.490 Johnson filed a lawsuit against Branch and 
BB&T Financial (BBT).491 Generally, Johnson alleged that BBT and Bank-
card furnished inaccurate information to credit reporting agencies and failed 
to investigate disputed items.492 More specifically, the complaint included 
statutory and common law claims: alleged violations under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA),493 defamation, invasion of privacy, and negli-
gence.494 Citing an allegedly ironclad and enforceable agreement between 
CCF and Bankcard, the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration.495 
The federal district judge denied the motion.496 
How did the Johnson court reach its conclusions? First, given the di-
versity of the various litigants, the federal district judge researched both 
Georgia’s and Pennsylvania’s common law rules.497 In both jurisdictions, 
courts must apply ordinary state law principles of contract formation and 
interpretation to determine whether parties have agreed to arbitrate.498 In 
addition, a court may not grant a motion to compel arbitration, unless: 
(1) a valid arbitration contract exists; and (2) a particular dispute falls 
within the scope of the agreement.499 But even more importantly, to be en-
forceable, a valid contract requires competent contracting parties, suffi-
cient consideration, each party’s willingness to be bound, and a clear subject 
matter or undertaking.500 




491 Id. at *1. 
492 Id. 
493 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
494 Johnson, 2011 WL 93062, at *1. 
495 Id. 
496 Id.          
497 Id. at *3 (“With regard to claims against BB & T Financial, Johnson argues with-
out dispute that Georgia law governs whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable.”). 
498 See Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 
513, 524 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 
(1995)); Simmons Co. v. Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp., 532 S.E.2d 436, 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000) (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944). 
499 See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009). 
500 See Cone Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. Co. of Wausau, Civ. A. No. 7:09-CV-118(HL), 
2010 WL 4639295, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2010); SKF USA, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Smalls), 
714 A.2d 496, 500 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (“To form a valid contract, all of the essential 
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Johnson admitted that she completed and executed a commercial credit 
card application.501 She also admitted that an arbitration provision was at-
tached to the application.502 But, fighting defendant’s motion to compel ar-
bitration, she insisted that the application was not a valid contract under 
the FAA.503 Ultimately, the district court found: (1) Johnson “did not assent 
to be personally bound” under the terms of the Arbitration Provision;504 
(2) BB&T and Johnson never formed an arbitration agreement; (3) assum-
ing that a valid arbitration agreement was formed, it was between Choice 
Carpet and Floors and Bankcard/BB&T;505 and (4) the agreement included 
an ambiguous term, “Cardholder,” which was construed in favor of Johnson. 
Therefore, in light of its findings, the court denied the motion to compel arbi-
tration and allowed Johnson to proceed with her lawsuit.506 
But, the federal district court judge’s intelligent analysis did not end there. 
The defendants argued that the broad scope of the arbitration clause cov-
ered all of Johnson’s claims—those falling within the eight corners the Ap-
plication and Agreement as well as those resulting from the relationship 
between the Application and Agreement.507 In contrast, Johnson stressed 
that her lawsuit was beyond the scope of the Arbitration Provision for two 
reasons: (1) Choice Carpet and Floors—a party to the Arbitration Clause—
was not a complainant in the lawsuit; and (2) several irregularities sur-
rounding Johnson’s personal credit history formed the foundation for her 
FCRA claim.508 
To determine whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration 
agreement, the prevailing rule is uncomplicated: a court must examine 
factual allegations in an underlying complaint instead of focusing solely on 
the underlying theories of recovery.509 And if the factual allegations of the 
dispute are reasonably connected to the arbitration provision in a contract, a 
court may grant a motion to compel arbitration.510 Applying these principles, 
                                                                                                                         
elements, including consideration, must exist.”) (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. First Pa. Bank, 
466 A.2d 753 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983)). 
501 Johnson, 2011 WL 93062, at *1. 
502 Id. 
503 Id. at *3. 
504 Id. 
505 Id. 
506 Id. at *5. 
507 Id. at *4. 
508 Id. 
509 See, e.g., Medtronic AVE., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 247 F.3d 44, 55 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
510 See, e.g., Dusold v. Porta-John Corp., 807 P.2d 526, 530 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) 
(“[O]nly those disputes that the parties could reasonably intend to be submitted to 
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the federal district judge found that the Agreement and the attached Arbi-
tration Provision covered only line of credit disputes between Choice 
Carpet and Floors and Bankcard/BB&T.511 On the other hand, Johnson’s 
amended complaint included “allegedly erroneous information ... on 
Johnson’s personal credit report.”512 Consequently, the judge declared that 
Johnson’s statutory and common law claims were beyond the scope of the 
Arbitration Provision.513 But even more importantly, the judge ruled, as-
suming that the commercial credit card application was a valid arbitration 
contract between Johnson and the defendants, Johnson’s statutory and com-
mon law claims did not fall within the scope of that contract.514 
D. Judicial Conflict—Whether Arbitration Clauses in Standardized 
Application Forms Are Enforceable Under the FAA Without Any 
Probative Evidence of Bargained-For Exchange Consideration 
Again, under the common law, two elements must be satisfied before 
courts will enforce a contract: (1) the contract must be valid;515 and (2) each 
party must present sufficient consideration to support the valid contractual 
agreement.516 Once more, it is important to reiterate that a vast majority of 
                                                                                                                         
arbitration should be encompassed within their contractual agreement .... [T]he better-
reasoned cases start with the premise[:] ... [I]n order for the dispute to be characterized as 
arising out of or related to the subject matter of the contract, and thus subject to 
arbitration, it must, at the very least, raise some issue the resolution of which requires a 
reference to or construction of some portion of the contract itself. The relationship be-
tween the dispute and the contract is not satisfied simply because the dispute would not 
have arisen absent the existence of a contract between the parties. If such a connection to 
the contract is not present, tort claims between the parties could not reasonably be 
intended to have been subject to arbitration within the meaning of an arbitration clause 
requiring this method of resolution only for claims ‘arising out of or related to’ the 
contract.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
511 Johnson, 2011 WL 93062, at *4. 
512 Id. 
513 Id. at *5. 
514 Id. at *4. 
515 See, e.g., Orthodontic Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Hanachi, 564 S.E.2d 573, 575 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2002) (“Generally, a party seeking to enforce a contract has the burden of proving 
the essential elements of a valid contract.”); Anderson v. Gibbs Lumber Co., 10 P.2d 416, 
417 (Okla. 1932) (“[T]o enforce [a] contract, the agreement between the promisor and 
promisee ... must be a valid contract.”). 
516 See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368, 1376 (11th Cir. 
2005) (“[I]n determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts 
apply the contract law of the particular state that governs the formation of contracts .... 
Georgia law provides that mutual promises and obligations are sufficient consideration to 
support a contract.”); Magnusson Agency v. Pub. Entity Nat’l Co.-Midwest, 560 N.W.2d 
20, 26–27 (Iowa 1997) (stressing that consideration is a necessary element). 
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state supreme courts have adopted the rule that stand-alone, completed, and 
signed applications—for goods, services, employment, and membership—
are not valid contracts.517 Yet, among state and federal courts a serious 
divide exists over whether standardized, preprinted application forms are 
valid contracts if the applications contain arbitration clauses.518 But assume 
that the terms and arbitration provisions in executed application forms com-
prise valid contracts. Still, an important question remains: whether a “promise 
for a promise” may serve as sufficient and bargained-for exchange consider-
ation to enforce the arbitration provisions in the application forms? 
Section 71 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads awkwardly in 
relevant part: “To constitute consideration, a ... return promise must be bar-
gained for .... [A] return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promi-
sor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for 
that promise.”519 Certainly, an overwhelming majority of state supreme 
courts have adopted the “promise for a promise” rule.520 Nevertheless, state 
and federal courts are thoroughly divided over the question of whether an 
employer’s promise to consider an individual’s application and the appli-
cant’s promise to arbitrate disputes may serve as sufficient consideration 
to enforce an arbitration clause in a standardized application form. Below, 
cases are discussed which highlight the depth of the conflict among and 
between federal and state courts. 
First, consider the brief facts, analysis, and holding in Henry v. Pizza Hut 
of America, Inc.521 David Henry applied for employment at a Pizza Hut.522 
He completed and signed a two-page application form.523 It contained an 
arbitration clause, which read in pertinent part: 
                                                                                                                         
517 See supra Part I.A and accompanying text and notes. 
518 See supra Part IV and accompanying text and notes. 
519 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). 
520 See, e.g., Knack v. Indus. Comm’n, 503 P.2d 373, 376 (Ariz. 1972) (“A promise for a 
promise is adequate legal consideration to support a contract.”); Stub v. Belmont, 124 
P.2d 826, 829 (Cal. 1942) (concluding that the promise for a promise was good consider-
ation); Grossman v. Schenker, 100 N.E. 39, 41 (N.Y. 1912) (“[A] promise for a promise ... 
constitutes a good consideration.”); Stewart v. Herron, 82 N.E. 956, 959 (Ohio 1907) 
(“Among the considerations recognized in law as sufficient to support a contract is ... mutual 
promises, or ... a promise for a promise.”); Copeland v. Alsobrook, 3 S.W.3d 598, 606 (Tex. 
App. 1999) (“A promise for a promise is sufficient consideration in Texas.”); Omni Group, 
Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 645 P.2d 727, 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (“A promise for a 
promise is sufficient consideration to support a contract.”); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 
666, 672 (Wis. 1985) (“It is black letter law that a promise for a promise, or the exchange 
of promises, will constitute consideration to support any contract of this bilateral nature.”). 
521 No. 6:07-cv-01128-Orl-DAB, 2007 WL 2827722 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2007). 
522 Id. at *1. 
523 Id. 
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Because of the delay and expense of the court systems, Pizza Hut and I 
agree to use confidential binding arbitration, instead of going to court, 
for any claims that arise between me and Pizza Hut .... Without limitation, 
such claims would include any concerning compensation, employment 
(including, but not limited to, any claims concerning sexual harassment 
or discrimination), or termination of employment .... In any arbitration, 
the then prevailing employment dispute resolution rules of the American 
Arbitration Association will apply, except that Pizza Hut will pay the 
arbitrator’s fees, and Pizza Hut will pay that portion of the arbitration 
filing fee in excess of the similar court filing fee had I gone to court.524 
After Henry began working, he and Pizza Hut executed another written 
instrument entitled, “Acknowledgment of Receipt and Understanding.”525 
Among other obligations, the Acknowledgment required Henry to admit that 
he had received a copy of Pizza Hut’s orientation handbook and sexual 
harassment policy.526 Additionally, a slightly different arbitration provision 
appeared in the Acknowledgment.527 Put simply, the words and phrases in 
the two arbitration provisions did not mirror each other.528 
After working for a period of time, Pizza Hut fired Henry.529 Alleging 
that the firing was racially motivated and citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981,530 Henry 
filed a civil rights lawsuit in a state court.531 Pizza Hut removed the case to 
federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay the underly-
ing lawsuit.532 In its motion, Pizza Hut argued that Henry’s § 1981 claim 
fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the application.533 Henry 




527 Id. at *2. 
528 Id. (“The second arbitration clause contains two textual differences from the first 
clause. The second sentence omits the words ‘Without limitation’ and begins with ‘Such.’ 
In addition, the second arbitration clause omits language requiring Pizza Hut to pay arbi-
tration fees and any increase in filing fees associated with arbitration. Instead, the last 
sentence of the clause reads: ‘In any arbitration, the then prevailing employment dispute 
resolution rules of the American Arbitration Association (and, to the extent not inconsistent, 
the then prevailing rules of the Federal Arbitration Act) will apply.’”). 
529 Id. at *1. 
530 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads as follows: “All persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 
every kind, and to no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012). 
531 Henry, 2007 WL 2827722, at *1. 
532 Id. 
533 Id. 
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disagreed, arguing that the less offensive or burdensome arbitration provi-
sion in the Acknowledgment should apply.534 In the end, the court read the 
two clauses together and found a single, valid arbitration agreement.535 
As an alternative affirmative defense in the motion to compel arbitration 
proceedings, Henry argued that sufficient and mutual consideration did not 
support the parties’ purportedly valid arbitration agreement.536 Specifically, 
Henry argued that the mutuality-of-obligation doctrine required Pizza Hut 
“to expressly promise to provide a written response to employee complaints 
and ... to provide all employees with copies of the arbitration rules before 
signing the arbitration agreement.”537 Conversely, Pizza Hut argued that a 
promise for a promise may serve as sufficient consideration.538 To support its 
assertion, Pizza Hut stressed: (1) Henry gave a written promise to arbitrate 
when he “signed the employment application”;539 and, (2) the company’s 
promise to consider Henry for employment was sufficient consideration to 
support the arbitration agreement.540 Ultimately, the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Florida agreed with Pizza Hut and forced 
Henry into binding arbitration.541 
Several other federal courts have cited somewhat comparable language 
in other application forms, applied the promise-for-a-promise rule, and 
reached similar conclusions like the one in Henry. For example, in Carman v. 
Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC,542 the United States District Court for the 
                                                                                                                         
534 Id. at *2–3. 
535 Id. at *3 (“These two clauses do not differ in a way that will significantly affect this 
court’s analysis .... The second arbitration clause does not contain language that demonstrates 
an intent to supersede the first clause. Thus, the two clauses should be read together, to the 
extent they are consistent ... for purposes of assessing Pizza Hut’s motion to compel arbi-
tration and stay proceedings.”) (citing Sammons v. Sonic-North Cadillac, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-
277, 2007 WL 2298032, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007) (considering two substantially 
similar arbitration clauses together in assessing a motion to compel arbitration)). 
536 Id. at *6. 
537 Id. (emphasis added). 
538 Id. at *5. 
539 Id. (emphasis added). 
540 Id. 
541 Id. (“Pizza Hut considered him for employment. When Henry signed the second 
arbitration clause, Pizza Hut hired him as an employee. Both of these acts constitute con-
sideration under modern contracts law.”); see, e.g, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 71 (1981); Cintas Corp. No. 2 v. Schwailer, 901 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
542 No. 4:08CV1547 CDP, 2009 WL 248680, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 2, 2009) (“Christopher 
Carmen is an investment banker who was formerly employed by A.G. Edwards & Sons .... 
Wachovia Capital Markets ... succeeded to all assets and liabilities of A.G. Edwards. Fol-
lowing the takeover by Wachovia, Carmen’s employment was terminated .... Carmen 
claims that Wachovia breached the contract he had with A.G. Edwards, and that Wachovia 
now owes him certain sums for work performed while he was still employed. Wachovia 
has moved to stay this case and compel arbitration, or in the alternative to dismiss for 
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Eastern District of Missouri concluded: “The plain language of Carmen’s 
employment application demonstrates that there was a bargained-for agree-
ment .... A.G. Edwards undertook to consider Carmen’s application for em-
ployment in exchange for Carmen’s agreement to arbitrate any dispute 
arising out of that employment.”543 And, in Sheller ex rel. Sheller v. Frank’s 
Nursery & Crafts, Inc.,544 the signed employment application comprised 
an arbitration clause.545 The latter read in relevant part: “[The employer 
agrees] to consider Plaintiffs for employment if plaintiffs, upon employ-
ment, [agree] to abide by [the company’s] rules which include[s] the arbi-
tration of all claims.”546 The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois declared that the written promise for a promise was suf-
ficient bargained-for consideration.547 
                                                                                                                         
failure to state a claim. Wachovia argues that Carmen agreed in his employment application 
to arbitrate any dispute arising from his employment or termination. Additionally, Carmen 
agreed to submit any claims to arbitration when he registered to sell securities by completing 
his Securities Industry Form U-4 .... Carmen argues that the agreement to arbitrate found 
in his employment application is unenforceable.”). 
543 Id. at *2. 
544 957 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
545 Id. at 152. (“Frank’s Nursery & Crafts ... sells lawn and garden products, plants, 
flowers, home decorative items, and crafts. Plaintiffs Rebecca Bennett and Kimberly 
Sheller ... are former employees .... At the time Plaintiffs applied for employment and were 
terminated they were minors. Each signed an employment application that provided: ‘any 
claim that I may wish to file against the Company ... must be submitted for binding and 
final arbitration before the American Arbitration Association; arbitration will be the exclusive 
remedy for any and all claims unless prohibited by applicable law .... I have reviewed, 
understand and agree to the above.’ Following their discharge, Plaintiffs filed a charge of 
sexual discrimination ... [and sued] in this Court alleging sexual harassment in violation of 
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Plaintiffs allege that during their employment, they were 
subjected to a constant hostile work environment due to the sexual harassment by defendant’s 
assistant manager .... Defendant denies the allegations of sexual harassment.”). 
546 Id. at 154. 
547 Id. In Chatman v. Pizza Hut, Inc., the District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois reached the same conclusion. 
Alfredo Chatman filed a class action complaint in state court ... asserting 
claims against ... Pizza Hut ... and franchise owners ... under the Illinois 
Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”), 820 ILCS § 115/1, et seq. 
and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS § 105/1, et 
seq. Chatman electronically signed and submitted to Pizza Hut an online 
job application. The application contains [an] ... ‘Agreement to Arbi-
trate’ .... Pizza Hut argues that the Arbitration Provision is supported by 
three forms of consideration: (1) Pizza Hut’s promise to consider the 
plaintiff for employment; (2) Pizza Hut’s obligation to submit to bind-
ing arbitration; and (3) Pizza Hut’s continued employment of the plain-
tiff. We agree. Under Illinois law, each of these acts is sufficient to support 
the agreement .... [W]here an employer promises to consider an appli-
cant for employment in exchange for the applicant’s return promise to 
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But, three years after the Federal District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri issued its promise-for-a-promise ruling in Carman, the Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District decided Marzette v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.548 and reached a contrary promise-for-a-promise ruling. In 
Marzette, Alisha Marzette and Kathy Dunmire applied for employment at 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (Anheuser).549 Both Marzette and Dunmire completed 
and signed an employment application form, which contained an arbitra-
tion clause.550 In applicable part, the latter provision read: 
I agree that if I become employed by [Anheuser], and unless a written con-
tract provides to the contrary, any claim I may have against [Anheuser] 
will be subject to final and binding arbitration in accordance with [An-
heuser’s] dispute resolution program, and that arbitration will be the ex-
clusive method I will have for final and binding resolution of any such 
claim .... I acknowledge that no promise regarding employment has 
been made to me.551 
Anheuser hired Marzette and Dunmire to be security guards.552 And dur-
ing their employment, both employees received hourly wages and became 
union members.553 In the course of events, the two employees filed an em-
ployment discrimination suit against Anheuser.554 They alleged that the 
company violated provisions under the Missouri Human Rights Act.555 To 
counter, Anheuser filed a motion to compel arbitration.556 The employer 
asserted: (1) the terms and arbitration clause in Marzette’s and Dunmire’s 
signed employment applications were binding contractual agreements; and, 
(2) both employees had a contractual duty “to arbitrate any claims arising 
out of their employment” with Anheuser.557 The Missouri trial court denied 
                                                                                                                         
abide by company rules upon employment—including the arbitration of 
all claims—there is sufficient consideration to establish a valid, enforce-
able contract. 
Chatman v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 12 C 10209, 2013 WL 2285804, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 
2013) (citations omitted); see also Ravenscraft v. BNP Media, Inc., No. 09 C 6617, 2010 
WL 1541455, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010) (finding consideration where “defendant agreed 
to consider the plaintiffs for employment if the plaintiffs, upon employment, agreed to 
abide by the company rules”). 
548 371 S.W.3d 49 (Mo. App. 2012). 
549 Id. at 50 nn.1–2. 
550 Id. at 51. 
551 Id. (emphasis added). 
552 Id. 
553 Id. 
554 Id. at 50. 
555 MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010–213.137 (West 2012). 
556 Marzette, 371 S.W.3d at 51. 
557 Id. 
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Anheuser’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the employees and 
Anheuser never formed a valid arbitration agreement.558 Moreover, even 
assuming that the parties formed a valid contract, the trial court declared 
that sufficient consideration did not support the purported valid arbitration 
agreement.559 Anheuser appealed.560 
Citing federal and state courts’ promise-for-a-promise holdings in Sheller, 
Carmen, Henry and Martindale v. Sandvik,561 Anheuser encouraged the 
Missouri Court of Appeals to embrace those decisions and reverse the trial 
court’s ruling.562 Although recognizing that this issue has generated a split 
among courts, the court of appeals refused.563 Instead, the Missouri Court 
of Appeals cited the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Indiana’s decision in Geiger v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.564 
In Geiger, the court declared that an employer’s promise to consider an 
employment application was insufficient consideration for an applicant’s 
promise to arbitrate.565 Finding the Geiger court’s analysis and conclusion 
persuasive, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that Anheuser’s willingness to 
consider Marzette’s and Dunmire’s employment applications was insufficient 
consideration to support promises to arbitrate in purportedly valid arbitra-
tion contracts.566 It is important to stress that the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia as well as the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits 
have also embraced the Geiger court’s holding.567 
                                                                                                                         
558 Id. at 52–53. 
559 Id. at 51. 
560 Id. 
561 800 A.2d 872, 879 (N.J. 2002). 
562 Marzette, 371 S.W.3d at 52. 
563 Id. at 52 n.5 (“[C]ourts in other jurisdictions are split [over this issue; however, 
defendants] urge us to follow the holding in Sheller [in which] ... the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois found sufficient consideration for an arbitration 
agreement contained in an employment application.”). 
564 134 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989, 1001–02 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
565 Id. at 1001–02. 
566 Marzette, 371 S.W.3d at 52 n.6 (“[A]n employer’s willingness to consider an ap-
plicant for employment is insufficient consideration to support a prospective employee’s 
waiver of the right to a jury trial for employment disputes wholly unrelated to the application 
or hiring process.”). 
567 See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“We ... conclude that Ryan’s has failed to demonstrate that, under Tennessee law, an 
employer’s promise to consider an employment application is adequate consideration for a 
promise to arbitrate employment disputes that are wholly unrelated to the application or 
hiring process.”); Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 
2001) (finding no evidence under Indiana law that a mere promise to consider an ap-
plication for employment may serve as consideration for an applicant’s contractual promise to 
arbitrate); State ex rel. Saylor v. Wilkes, 613 S.E.2d 914, 924 (W. Va. 2005) (“[A]n 
employer’s promise merely to review an employment application in exchange for a job 
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V. EMPIRICAL AND STATISTICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
ENFORCING MANDATORY-ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN EMPLOYMENT, 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND OTHER TYPES OF STANDARDIZED 
APPLICATIONS—FINDINGS FROM A CASE STUDY 
Again, FAA section 2 requires state and federal courts to compel arbi-
tration if parties’ controversies “arose out of” written contracts or transac-
tions.568 On the other hand, to determine whether a dispute falls within the 
scope of an arbitration agreement, courts must apply states’ traditional rules 
of contract construction and interpretation.569 Additionally, among the states, 
a universal rule has emerged: courts must ignore particular causes of action or 
the “legal labels attached to allegations” and consider only the underlying 
factual allegations and defenses to determine whether the disputed claims 
fall within the scope of arbitration clauses.570 
But reconsider some earlier observations, which appear in this Article: 
each day, extremely large universes of individuals apply for all types of 
goods, services, positions and affiliations.571 Invariably, the preprinted, 
standard application forms contain mandatory-arbitration clauses.572 And, 
more frequently than not, compelling circumstances force applicants to sign 
those forms and forfeit their constitutional or statutory right to litigate a 
claim before a jury.573 
Now, consider a general as well as an interrelated legal and empirical 
question: whether state and federal court judges weigh—wittingly or un-
wittingly—more than the factual allegations in disgruntled applicants/plain-
tiffs’ underlying complaints before deciding to grant or deny defendants’ 
motions to compel arbitration? Or stated more succinctly, the questions are: 
(1) do state and federal courts consider complainants’ underlying theories 
of recovery when deciding whether to compel arbitration?; (2) are state and 
                                                                                                                         
applicant’s promise to submit employment-related disputes—not associated with the 
application process—to arbitration does not represent consideration sufficient to create an 
enforceable contract to arbitrate such employment disputes.”). 
568 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) 
569 Entrekin v. Internal Med. Assocs. of Dothan, P.A., 689 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
570 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 622 n.9 
(1985); see also Medtronic AVE., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 247 F.3d 44, 55 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (declaring that courts must examine factual allegations in complaints instead of 
focusing on legal theories to determine whether claims fall within the scope of arbitration 
agreements); Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. 1995) (declaring 
that courts must focus on factual allegations in complaints, rather than on underlying causes of 
action to determine whether claims fall within the scope of arbitration agreements). 
571 See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
572 See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
573 See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text. 
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federal courts more or less likely to grant or deny a motion to compel arbi-
tration if the applicants-complainants are, say, consumers, hourly employees, 
or professionals?; (3) are state and federal courts more or less likely to grant 
or deny a motion to compel arbitration if defendants are, say, financial insti-
tutions and corporations?; (4) are state courts or federal courts significantly 
more likely to deny a motion to compel arbitration?; and (5) are state and fed-
eral judges equally likely to allow allegedly “irrational biases” or extrajudicial 
variables to sway the disposition of motion to compel arbitration disputes? 
Over two decades, the author cautiously and methodically analyzed a 
sizable number of reported cases and performed a content analysis on each 
case.574 That methodology allowed the author to assemble a large database 
of empirical evidence to determine whether allegedly “irrational judicial 
bias” appears in state and federal courts’ opinions, and, if so, whether such 
bias stains judges’ procedural and substantive rulings.575 In a series of pub-
lished law journal articles, the author documented and reported that judges 
often allow immaterial or extralegal variables to significantly influence all 
sorts of litigants’ likelihoods of prevailing procedurally and on the merits 
in both state and federal courts.576 
As reported earlier, judicial conflicts proliferate over whether mandatory-
arbitration provisions in standardized applications are enforceable under 
the Federal Arbitration Act.577 Therefore, in light of these continuing splits, 
the author decided to conduct an empirical study to determine whether ir-
relevant or prejudicial factors are systematically affecting—consciously or 
unconsciously—federal and state court judges’ dispositions of motion to 
compel arbitration disputes. Certainly, many jurists and commentators as-
sert that well-educated and well-intentioned judges only apply settled com-
mon law rules, statutes and/or public policy to achieve fair outcomes.578 As 
                                                                                                                         
574 See generally Robert Edward Mitchell, The Use of Content Analysis for Explana-
tory Studies, 31 PUB. OPINION Q. 230, 237 (1967); Daniel Taylor Young, How Do You 
Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using Algorithmic Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce 
Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2010–13 (2013) (“In 
order to test the ‘constitutional moments’ thesis, some metric is required for quantifying 
public attention to various topics. With technology making it easier to manipulate larger 
and larger sets of data, several tools have become available in recent years that purport to 
offer this kind of analysis .... Social scientists engaged in content analysis have long 
recognized that such studies often have embedded causal assumptions.”). 
575 See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial 
Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77, 88, 90–91 nn.58, 103,  111–12 (2008) (presenting a 
fairly comprehensive history and description of Professor Rice’s published content-analysis 
studies and theoretical analyses of various common law and statutory questions). 
576 Id. 
577 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 215 (1985). 
578 See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again, 30 
REV. LITIG. 671, 673 (2011) (reporting that historically judges were presumed to be impartial 
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discussed below, however, federal courts are more willing to weigh legally 
immaterial variables and issue arguably “irrationally biased” motion to com-
pel arbitration rulings.579 Furthermore, that same propensity increases the 
likelihood of motion to compel arbitration splits within and between state 
and federal judiciaries.580 
A. Data Sources and Sampling Procedures 
The general proposition in this study is simple: there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference between federal and state courts’ disposition of applicants-
respondents and defendants-movants’ motion to compel arbitration disputes. 
Thus, to construct a reasonably sound motion to compel arbitration database, 
the author used several research methodologies. First, Westlaw’s and Lexis’s 
data retrieval systems were used to locate every reported motion to compel 
arbitration decision that terminated in a trial, an appellate, or a supreme court. 
Also, if the electronically reported cases discussed or cited other unreported 
motion to compel arbitration cases, the author read the regional reporters 
and analyzed those cases. 
Using an encompassing query, this method identified more than 10,000 
state and federal court cases.581 Therefore, the author took a proportional 
stratified random sample582 of the disputes, which were decided procedurally, 
or on the merits between 1925 and 2014.583 The proportional sample com-
prises 563 cases, which center on the enforceability of arbitration clauses in 
written contracts.584 Employing a different query, the author uncovered 115 
                                                                                                                         
and “courts refused to entertain even the possibility of judicial bias); Michele Benedetto 
Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 140 (2013) (re-
porting that some judges refuse to believe their biases and wealthy backgrounds color 
judicial deliberations). 
579 See supra Part IV.A. 
580 See supra Part IV.B. 
581 The following query was constructed: sy(arbitration/p contract). Executing that 
expression in Westlaw’s ALLSTATES and ALLFEDS databases generated 6,319 and 3,698 
cases, respectively. 
582 See, e.g., Ratanasen v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 11 F.3d 1467, 1470–72 (9th Cir. 
1993) (explaining the differences between and the efficacy of employing “simple random 
sampling” and “stratified random sampling”); Bruce M. Price, From Downhill to Slalom: 
An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (And Some Unintended Conse-
quences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 138 (2007) (“Using a proportional, stratified, 
random sample of bankruptcy cases from [two twelve-month periods, the author created 
a] ... database of cases for every state in the Tenth Circuit.”). 
583 The investigator searched Westlaw’s MIN-CS, ALLSTATES, ALLFEDS, CTA and 
DCT databases between May 2013 and June 2014. In addition, the author searched various 
regional reporters as well as LEXIS’s Genfed COURTS File during the same period. 
584 See infra Table 1 and the accompanying discussion. 
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cases involving the enforceability of arbitration provisions in standardized, 
preprinted applications.585 To be sure, the relatively small number of the 
latter cases belies their significance. Among the application-dispute cases, 
many were class actions in which large classes of applicants argued that arbi-
tration provisions in standardized application forms are not enforceable 
under the FAA.586 
Furthermore, since the enactment of the FAA, private arbitrators have 
decided thousands of cases each year.587 These latter cases involve all types 
of disputes and complainants—both aggrieving applicants and non-appli-
cants. Moreover, studies suggest that private arbitrators are “biased,” too.588 
                                                                                                                         
585 The following query was fashioned: “applicant’s” “applied for” “application for” /p 
“federal arbitration act”). An execution of that query in Westlaw’s ALLCASES database 
generated 115 state and federal court cases. See also infra Table 1 and the accompanying 
discussion. 
586 See, e.g., Labor Ready Nw., Inc. v. Crawford, Civ. No. 07-1060-HA, 2008 WL 
1840749, at *1–3 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2008) (an arbitration dispute involving a large multistate 
employer who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a large class of applicants who 
signed employment applications that contained arbitration clauses and sued under Oregon’s 
Oregon wage-and-hour laws); Battels v. Sears Nat’l. Bank, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1210 (M.D. 
Ala. 2005) (a controversy involving Sears who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a 
large class of credit cardholders who signed applications that contained arbitration 
clauses and sued under the Fair Credit Billing Act and the Truth in Lending Act); Allen 
v. Labor Ready Sw., No. B237673, 2013 WL 1910293, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 2013) 
(a case involving an employer who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a class of 
approximately 600,000 temporary employees in the United States, Canada, and Puerto 
Rico who signed applications that contained arbitration clauses); Muhammad v. Cnty. 
Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 90 (N.J. 2006) (a case involving a payday 
lender who raised an FAA-preemption defense against a large class of borrowers who 
signed applications that contained arbitration clauses and sued under the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act and New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act). 
587 See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN REPORT, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COM-
PANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications 
/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7545, archived at http://perma.cc/7CQC-EE8C (reporting that 
private arbitrators decided 33,948 consumer arbitration cases between January 1, 2003 
and March 31, 2007). 
588 See, e.g., Simone Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card Arbitration, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 16, 2007, at A2 (“The National Arbitration Forum (NAF), 
one of the nation’s largest private arbitration firms, is commonly used by creditors and 
secondary debt buyers .... [The Monitor] found that the 10 most frequently used arbi-
trators—who decided almost 60 percent of the cases heard—decided in favor of the 
consumer only 1.6 percent of the time, while arbitrators who decided three or fewer cases 
decided for the consumer 38 percent of the time. NAF would not comment on the findings 
because it had not participated in the analysis, but maintains that its arbitrators are 
neutral .... [T]he knowledge that rulings bring repeat business may create financial 
pressures for arbitrators. ‘Arbitration work is often very lucrative, and arbitrators know 
that if they rule against a corporate defendant too frequently or too generously (from the 
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They exhibit an “irrational” tendency to decide arbitral disputes more often in 
favor of defendants than in favor of (1) consumers, or (2) applicants—spe-
cifically individuals who apply for financial services, employment, hous-
ing, and benefits.589 In light of these findings, some jurists have suggested 
that federal and state courts’ procedural and substantive dispositions of arbi-
tral controversies might be similar to arbitrators’ dispositions.590 Therefore, to 
secure enough cases to test this latter proposition, the author accessed exceed-
ingly large databases of arbitrators’ decisions—which were reported between 
1925 and 2014.591 Next, the author took several proportional stratified 
random samples of arbitrators’ decisions.592 Slightly more than three hun-
dred (303) private-arbitrator cases are included in this study.593 In the end, 
the author’s entire database comprises 981 cases.594 
B. Characteristics of Motion to Compel Arbitration Litigants in State and 
Federal Courts, 1925–2014 
In a typical motion to compel arbitration trial, the movant/plaintiff is the 
person who raised a defense in an underlying lawsuit; and, the respondent/ 
defendant is the applicant/plaintiff in the underlying action. Table 1 illus-
trates some selected demographic attributes of the persons who resolved 
disputes before private arbitrators. 
                                                                                                                         
standpoint of that corporation), they will lose the work,’ wrote F. Paul Bland, staff attorney at 
Public Justice, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit legal services group that opposes 
mandatory binding arbitration agreements in consumer contracts, in comments for the 
Congressional hearing. NAF’s Anderson denies any charges of pro-business bias. He 
says the arbitrators who work for NAF are former judges and attorneys with at least 15 years’ 
experience. Strict guidelines prevent any financial conflicts of interest.”) (emphasis added). 
589 Id. 
590 See, e.g., id. (“A Monitor analysis of the last year of available data from [the National 
Arbitration Forum] found that arbitrators awarded in favor of creditors and debt buyers 
in more than 96 percent of the cases. Such results may be similar to outcomes in court.”) 
(emphasis added). 
591 To secure a proportional and stratified sample of arbitrators’ decisions, several 
research queries were executed—respectively—in the following Westlaw and Lexis 
databases: (1) AAA Employment Arbitration Awards—SEARCH: “discrim”; (2) AAA 
Employment Arbitration Awards—SEARCH: “find! for claimant!” “in favor of claimant”; 
(3) Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA/NASD) Arbitration Awards—
SEARCH: “breach w/8 stocks” (4) Washington Arbitration Decisions—SEARCH: “injury” 
(N=2705) and “defense award” (N=2267). Only 60 cases were sampled; (5) WASHINGTON 
ARBITRATION AWARDS—SEARCH: “injury,” plus (“plaintiff award” and Insurance) and 
(not “admitted liability”); and (6) WASHINGTON ARBITRATION DECISIONS—SEARCH: 
“injury” (N=2705) and “plaintiff award” (N=2445). Only 150 cases were sampled. 
592 Id. 
593 See infra Table 1 and the accompanying discussion. 
594 See infra Table 1 and the accompanying discussion. 
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Also, the table presents background information for litigants who peti-
tioned courts to decide whether arbitration clauses in standardized applica-
tions and in certain written contracts were enforceable under the FAA. The 
first variable in Table 1 is “Jurisdictions.” Significantly, disputes involving 
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in applications were more likely to 
be resolved in state courts. Conversely, federal courts were more likely to 
decide the enforceability of arbitration provisions in contracts. The reported 
percentages are 58.3% and 52.2%, respectively. 
The second variable—”Geographic Regions”—describes the origin of ar-
bitral disputes. The reported percentages reveal two significant and interesting 
findings. First, disputes involving the enforceability of arbitration clauses in 
applications are significantly more likely to originate in the West and South—
24.5% and 22.8%, respectively. Also, disagreements surrounding the en-
forceability of arbitration provisions in contracts are more likely to evolve 
in the South and West—27.3%, 22.4%, respectively. On the other hand, 
litigants in the Southwest are significantly more likely (20.2%) to litigate 
disputes involving the enforceability of arbitration clauses in applications. 
And, in the Midwest, parties are considerably more likely (22.4%) to litigate 
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in contracts. 
In Table 1, the variable—“Types of Plaintiffs in the Underlying Law-
suits”—is self-explanatory. First, when movants filed lawsuits to enforce 
arbitration clauses in standardized applications (N = 115), the respondents 
or plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits were significantly more likely to be 
(1) dissatisfied applicants who applied for consumers’ good and services; or 
(2) dissatisfied applicants who applied for employment. The reported per-
centages are 39.1% and 34.0%, respectively. Similarly, when movants filed 
actions to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts (N = 563), nearly 60 percent 
(59.0%) of the respondents were dissatisfied persons who applied for con-
sumers’ good and services before commencing underlying lawsuits. And 
approximately 20 percent (19.0%) of the respondents filed employment 
applications before suing the movants in underlying lawsuits. On the other 
hand, when movants sued to enforce arbitration clauses in applications as 
well as in contracts, nearly equal numbers of plaintiffs in the underlying 
lawsuits were aggrievants who applied for professional memberships and 
“other” services. The combined percentages for the two groups are 26.9% and 
22.0%, respectively. 
In Table 1, the variable—“Types of Defendants in the Underlying Law-
suits”—is also self-explanatory: the movants were the defendants in the 
underlying lawsuits. Now, compare the movants who filed actions to enforce 
arbitration provisions in applications with those who filed motion to enforce 
arbitral clauses in contracts. A significantly larger percentage of corporations 
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filed motions to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts than in applications. 
The percentages are 64.0% and 52.2%, respectively. Conversely, a substan-
tially larger percentage of financial institutions filed motions to enforce arbi-
tration clauses in standardized applications than in contracts. The respective 
percentages are 36.6% and 21.7%. 
The final variable in Table 1 is entitled, “Plaintiff’s Theories of Recovery 
in the Underlying Lawsuits.” Before movants commenced actions to enforce 
arbitration clauses in application forms, the plaintiffs-respondents in the 
underlying lawsuits were significantly more likely to sue the movants-
defendants (1) for violating state and federal antidiscrimination laws (30.4%); 
or (2) for violating various breach-of-contract and tort-based rules (28.7%). 
Now, consider the movants-defendants who filed actions to enforce arbitra-
tion clauses in contracts. In the underlying lawsuits, the plaintiffs-respondents 
were significantly more likely to sue this latter group of movants (1) for vio-
lating consumer protection statutes (30.4%); or (2) for violating various 
breach of contract and tort-based rules (42.6%). 
C. Motions to Enforce Arbitration Provisions in Applications and the 
Bivariate Relationships Between Litigants’ Characteristics and the 
Disposition of Motions to Compel Arbitration in State and Federal Courts 
Again, the demographic variables in the previous Section present a de-
scription of movants and respondents who litigated motion to compel arbi-
tration disputes in state and federal courts between 1925 and 2014. Therefore, 
in light of the reported findings, reconsider section 2 of the FAA. It reads in 
relevant part: “[A] written provision ... to settle by arbitration a controversy ... 
arising out of [a] contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.”595 In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,596 the 
Supreme Court declared that under the FAA’s savings clause, “generally 
applicable contract defenses”—such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability—
may invalidate arbitration clauses in contracts.597 
Read more broadly, the FAA’s “savings clause” permits courts to weigh 
and apply judiciously settled principles of contract law as well as equitable 
doctrines when deciding whether to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts.598 
                                                                                                                         
595 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
596 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1741 (2011). 
597 Id. at 1746. 
598 Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 555 (W. Va. 2012) (“[U]nder the 
savings clause of Section 2, general state contract principles still apply to assess whether 
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Also, reconsider an important principle of contract law: independently, 
standardized applications are not binding and enforceable contracts.599 But, 
assume that applications are indeed legally binding contracts. The FAA’s 
savings clause would allow courts to apply common law principles of con-
tract law. Under the savings clause, however, judges do not have authority 
to use extrajudicial factors—for instance, types of defendants, or litigants’ 
respective legal status—to decide whether to enforce arbitration clauses in 
application forms. 
Yet, as illustrated in Table 2, state and federal judges ignore or mar-
ginalize the explicit admonitions appearing in the FAA’s language—“aris-
ing out of a contract” and “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity.” Instead, trial and appellate judges consciously or unconsciously 
allow impermissible extralegal factors to determine whether to enforce arbi-
tration clauses in application forms—again, instruments that are not valid 








[See Table 2 on the next page.] 
                                                                                                                         
those agreements to arbitrate are valid and enforceable, just as they would to any other 
contract dispute arising under state law.”). 
599 See Gilmer. v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (finding that 
a securities registration application was not a “contract of employment.”); C.I.T. Corp. v. 
United States, 150 F.2d 85, 95 (9th Cir. 1945) (“The application is not a contract .... It is 
an application for a loan.”); Harris Wayside Furniture Co., Inc. v. Idearc Media Corp., 
Civ. No. 06-CV-392-JM, 2007 WL 1847313, at *3 (D.N.H. June 25, 2007) (“[U]nder both 
New Hampshire and Texas law, [an] application is not a contract, so its provisions are not 
binding on the parties .... [Therefore], the [publishing] application was an offer to contract, 
not a contract.”). 
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To help prove the latter assertion, consider Table 2. It presents the 
findings among applicants who filed underlying lawsuits and sued various 
defendants for allegedly violating the applicants’ rights under state and fed-
eral laws. First, consider the findings, which are located under the heading, 
“Applications, Arbitration Clauses & Disposition of Movants’ Motions to 
Compel Arbitration in Trial Courts.” Focus on the variable entitled, Types 
of Courts. Unexpectedly, the finding reveals that federal district courts are 
significantly more likely (58.3%) to enforce arbitration clauses in standard-
ized applications; and state trial courts are significantly less likely (67.2%) to 
grant motions to compel arbitration. Again, this is a surprising and somewhat 
puzzling finding. And the reason is not complex. State trial court judges—
like federal district court judges—embrace unquestionably a frequently cited 
Supreme Court’s policy: “As a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning 
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”600 
Yet, a major split exists—between state trial court judges and federal district 
court judges—over the enforceability of arbitrations provisions in preprinted 
application forms. 
Furthermore, an examination of the statistics in Table 2 reveals a similar 
split between state and federal appellate courts. Consider the statistics appear-
ing under the heading, “Applications, Arbitration Clauses & Disposition of 
Movants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration in Appellate Courts.” Federal ap-
pellate courts are substantially more likely (70.8%) to grant movants’ motions 
to compel arbitration. Conversely, state appellate courts are significantly 
less likely (67.2%) to grant motions to compel arbitration, or significantly 
less likely to enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications. Again, 
an earlier observation needs repeating: The FAA’s savings clause does not 
                                                                                                                         
600 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1982) 
(emphasis added). Compare Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Ala. v. Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497, 
501–02 (Ala. 1999) (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25, and stressing that “trial 
courts are required to stay or dismiss proceedings and to compel arbitration when the 
parties have entered into a valid contract containing an arbitration agreement”), and State 
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 98CVS 14377-I, 2006 WL 3490937, at *7 (N.C. Super. 
Dec. 4, 2006) (embracing the federal arbitration policy), with Blankenship v. T.D. 
Ameritrade, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1:13-8048, 2014 WL 637144, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 18, 
2014) (reiterating that arbitration agreements must be construed with due regard to the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of arbitration.), 
and Schwartz v. CACH, L.L.C., 2014 WL 298107, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 2014) (citing 
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25, and embracing the “liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration agreements,” while stressing that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”). 
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encourage judges to consider litigants’ legal statuses or any extrajudicial 
factor when deciding whether to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts or 
in preprinted application forms. 
The second variable in Table 2 is entitled, “Alleged Victims and Plain-
tiffs in the Underlying State and Federal Lawsuits.” In state and federal trial 
courts, one finds general—although not statistically significant—trends: 
Lower court judges are generally more likely to enforce arbitration clauses 
in applications when the underlying applicants-victims are hourly employees 
and professionals/partners. The corresponding percentages are 51.3% and 
56.0%, respectively. In contrast, state and federal trial courts generally deny 
motions to compel arbitration when the underlying applicants are consumers 
and other alleged victims. The respective percentages are 66.7% and 83.3%. 
On the other hand, the statistics in Table 2 reveal that the legal statuses 
of the plaintiffs and victims in the underlying lawsuits had a statistically sig-
nificant effect on the disposition of motions in both state and federal appel-
late courts. For example, in these latter tribunals, justices are substantially 
and statistically more likely to enforce arbitration clauses in applications 
when underlying applicants-victims are hourly employees and professionals/ 
partners. The corresponding percentages are 51.3% and 84.0%, respectively. 
In contrast, both state and federal appellate courts are substantially and sta-
tistically less likely to grant motions to compel arbitration when the under-
lying applicants are consumers and other alleged victims. The respective 
percentages are 51.1% and 83.7%. 
The statistics in Table 2 also answer the question of whether courts allow 
the legal statuses of movants—the defendants in the underlying lawsuits—
to influence the disposition of motions to compel arbitration. State and federal 
trial courts are statistically and significantly more likely to enforce arbitration 
clauses in applications (57.1%) when financial institutions are the movants. 
But trial court judges are statistically and significantly less likely to enforce 
arbitration provisions in standardized applications when movants are corpora-
tions (61.7%) and insurers/others (77.0%). Although not statistically signifi-
cant, fairly similar trends are found among cases decided in state and federal 
appellate courts. Judges sitting on courts of appeals are also less likely to 
enforce arbitration clauses in preprinted application forms when movants are 
corporations (53.3%). Contrarily, appellate court justices are more likely to 
enforce arbitration provisions in applications when movants or underlying 
defendants are financial institutions (64.3%) and insurers/others (69.2%). 
Arguably, the remaining statistics in Table 2 reveal the most important 
and informative findings for practitioners who litigate motion to compel 
arbitration disputes in state and federal courts. Consider the last variable in 
the table entitled, “Plaintiffs’ Claims and the Alleged Violations in the Under-
lying State and Federal Lawsuits.” Trial court judges are significantly and 
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statistically more likely to enforce arbitration clauses in application forms 
when respondents or plaintiffs—in the underlying lawsuits—sue movants/de-
fendants for purportedly violating antidiscrimination and securities/financial 
laws. The corresponding percentages are 54.3% and 63.5%, respectively. 
On the other hand, trial court judges are substantially and statistically less 
likely to enforce arbitration clauses in applications when plaintiffs—in the un-
derlying lawsuits—sue movants/defendants for allegedly breaching contracts 
or committing torts (common law claims), and for violating consumer protec-
tion laws. Respectively, the latter percentages are 75.8% and 58.0%. And, 
although not statistically significant, similar and notable trends appear among 
the cases which were decided in state and federal appellate courts. 
Arguably, FAA policies are rationally biased in favor of enforcing arbi-
tration clauses in contracts. But the results reported in this study are equally 
clear. Courts act irrationally by allowing extrajudicial variables to influence 
the disposition of motions to compel arbitration. Briefly put, such variables 
should have no “predictive” power. Therefore, in light of the statistically 
significant findings in Table 2, two additional questions ask for answers: 
(1) whether extralegal factors are more or less likely to influence courts’ deci-
sions to enforce or not enforce arbitration clauses in negotiated or stan-
dardized contracts?; and (2) whether courts are likely to enforce arbitration 









[See Table 3 on the next page.] 
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The statistics appearing in Table 3 address both questions. First, in the 
center of Table 3, three columns of statistics appear under the heading, 
“Mandatory-Arbitration Provisions in Applications and the Disposition of 
Movants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration.” And, on the right side of the 
table, three additional columns of statistics are illustrated under the head-
ing, “Mandatory-Arbitration Provisions in Contracts and the Disposition 
of Movants’ Motions to Compel Arbitration.” 
Consider the first variable in the table—Trial Courts’ Dispositions. The 
findings are clear, regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in ap-
plications. Again, state trial courts are statistically and significantly more 
likely to deny motions (67.2%) and refuse to enforce arbitration provisions 
in applications. Conversely, federal district courts are statistically and mean-
ingfully more likely to enforce (58.3%) arbitration provisions in applica-
tions. Regarding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in negotiated or 
standardized contracts, the results are similar: State trial courts are substan-
tially less likely to enforce (60.0%) arbitration clauses in contracts. And fed-
eral district courts are significantly more likely to grant motions (51.4%) and 
enforce arbitration provisions in contracts. 
Now, examine the statistics in Table 3 which are associated with the sec-
ond variable—Courts of Appeals’ Dispositions. One of the findings among 
courts of appeals is a mirror image of a finding appearing among trial courts: 
like state trial courts, state appellate courts are significantly more likely to 
deny motions (55.2%) and refuse to enforce arbitration provisions in ap-
plications. On the other hand, federal courts of appeals are statistically and 
substantially more likely to grant motions (70.8%) and enforce arbitration 
provisions in applications. Even more revealing, both state and federal 
courts of appeals are equally likely to grant motions and enforce arbitra-
tion provisions in standardized and negotiated contracts. The reported per-
centages are 62.5% and 59.5%, respectively. 
In Table 3, the third and fourth variables are labeled, Federal & State 
Trial Courts Respondents, and Federal & State Appeals Courts Respondents, 
respectively. Review the corresponding rows of statistics in the center of the 
table. They confirm two earlier findings: state trial courts and federal district 
courts are less likely to enforce arbitration clauses in applications (68.5%) 
when respondents or underlying plaintiffs are consumers. State trial courts 
and federal district courts, however, are more likely to enforce arbitration pro-
visions in applications (54.0%) when respondents are employees or individ-
uals who applied for employment. Among state and federal appellate courts’ 
dispositions, the same patterns appear: Courts of appeals are less likely to 
enforce arbitration clauses in applications (51.8%) when respondents are 
consumers. On the other hand, courts of appeals are more likely to enforce ar-
bitration provisions in applications (62.3%) when respondents are employees. 
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Are the same statistical outcomes observed among state and federal 
courts when the question concerns the enforceability of arbitration clauses 
in negotiated and standardized contracts? The answer is no. Reviewing the 
statistics on the right side of Table 3, we discover that state trial courts and 
federal district courts are equally unlikely to enforce arbitration provisions 
in standardized and negotiated contracts when the respondents are con-
sumers or hourly employees. The reported percentages are 54.8% and 51.2%, 
respectively. In contrast, state and federal courts of appeals are equally more 
likely to grant motions and enforce arbitration clauses in contracts when the 
respondents are consumers or hourly employees. Respectively, the percent-
ages are 60.0% and 63.8%. 
The final two variables in Table 3 and the corresponding statistics illus-
trate the effects of consumers’ and employees’ theories of recovery on the 
disposition of motions to compel arbitration in state and federal courts. 
Regardless of their respective jurisdictions, all trial and appellate courts 
are significantly more likely to enforce arbitration clauses in both applica-
tions and contracts when consumers and employees file antidiscrimination 
lawsuits against the movants. The respective percentages are 53.5%, 54.6%, 
62.8%, and 63.0%. In addition, when respondents sue movants for violating 
financial and securities laws, the greater majority of state and federal, trial 
and appellate courts are statistically more likely to enforce arbitration clauses 
in both applications and contracts. The reported percentages are 63.6%, 
68.2% and 62.7%, respectively. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of 
state and federal, trial and appellate courts are significantly less likely to 
enforce arbitration clauses in applications and contracts when respondents 
sue movants for violating consumer protection and deceptive trade prac-
tices laws. The corresponding percentages are 74.0%, 52.1% and 56.0%. 
Did Congress intend to foster these types of statistically significant and, 
arguably, irrational judicial outcomes when that body enacted the FAA sec-
tion 2? Conservative readings of numerous primary sources—the FAA, its 
legislative history, and the Supreme Court’s FAA-related decisions—
provide a resounding answer: no. 
D. A Two-Stage, Multivariate Probit Analysis of the Interrelationships 
Between Movants and Respondents’ Attributes and the Dispositions of 
Motions to Compel Arbitration in State and Federal Courts of Appeals 
Above, numerous statistically significant findings were discussed. Un-
questionably, one’s focusing exclusively on the stand-alone or sole effect of 
any particular variable prohibits a jurist or statistician from arguing con-
vincingly: (1) state and federal courts are irrefutably “irrationally biased;” and 
(2) the irrational bias determines whether movants or respondents are more or 
less likely to win the majority of motion to compel arbitration disputes. In 
an earlier published article, the author cautioned jurists against embracing 
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such hasty and unwarranted conclusions.601 Why? Serious and careful re-
search always requires one’s conducting multiple tests to determine whether 
sufficient, statistical and probative evidence exist before concluding that 
judges’ dispositions are “irrationally biased.”602 
Furthermore, an impartial researcher must address straightforwardly an 
important question regarding the quality of the researcher’s sample data: 
Whether published cases in regional law reporters describe fairly and com-
prehensively the universe of judicial decisions in state and federal courts?603 
Therefore, to increase the likelihood of one’s implementing a comprehensive 
study, an investigator must (1) use statistical tests that generate “inferential” 
or “causal” coefficients, which are more “powerful” than simple percentages; 
(2) measure both independent and simultaneous effects of legal and extra-
legal variables on the disposition of, say, motions to compel arbitration; 
and (3) test for “selectivity bias” in the sample data.604 
One important reason explains why a researcher must test for “selectiv-
ity bias” in choice data. Unlike state trial courts or federal district courts’ 
decisions, courts of appeals’ decisions are significantly more likely to be 
respected and authoritative—since appellate decisions are markedly more 
likely to be “final decisions.” In addition, state trial courts and federal district 
courts often issue unfavorable rulings in, say, motion to compel arbitration 
trials. In response, some movants and respondents accept the adverse rulings 
                                                                                                                         
601 Willy E. Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” “Intimidating,” and “Incompetent” State 
Court Judges and the Questionable Removal of State Law Class Actions to Purportedly 
“Impartial” and “Competent” Federal Courts—A Historical Perspective and an 
Empirical Analysis of Class Action Dispositions in Federal and State Courts, 1925–2011, 
3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 419, 466 (2012). 
602 See generally Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over 
Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral 
Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory 
Judgments—1900–1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1194–1214, 1208–09 (1998) [herein-
after Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord] (presenting a case study of state 
and federal courts’ disposition of lawsuits involving corporate entities, insurers, and insur-
ance consumers, and discussing statistical problems which are associated with a researcher’s 
using only reported cases and simple percentages to make “causal” inferences). 
603 Id. at 1208–09. 
604 Elsewhere, the author has discussed “selectivity bias,” the inferential problems 
associated with it, and the tests for detecting such bias in sample data. See Willy E. Rice, 
Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions over Whether Insurers Must Defend Insureds 
that Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical and Empirical Review of Federal 
and State Court Declaratory Judgments 1900–2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1088–89 
nn.431–32 (2000); Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord, supra note 602, at 
1209 n.386 (testing for “selectivity bias” in “other- and self-selection data”); Willy E. 
Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical 
Analysis of State Supreme Courts’ Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenant-
of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900–1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 
371–76 nn.157–59 (1992) (explaining and testing for “selectivity bias” in “choice data”). 
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and decide not to seek appellate review.605 But, other litigants do not accept 
the rulings. In the end, some members of this latter group decide to seek 
more favorable rulings in state or federal courts of appeals.606 
Put simply, the purpose of a “selectivity bias” test is to determine whether 
statistically significant differences exist between the population of litigants 
who choose to appeal (“appellants”) adverse rulings and the population that 
decided not to appeal (“non-appellants”). And, if the researcher finds sig-
nificant differences between appellants and non-appellants, the aggregate 
of the dissimilar personal and background characteristics—rather than 
“irrational judicial bias” or other impermissible attributes—provides a better 
explanation of appellants’ likelihood of winning or losing motion to com-
pel arbitration lawsuits in state and federal courts of appeals. 
As illustrated in Tables 1, 2 and 3, the current sample contains infor-
mation about appellants’ and non-appellants’ characteristics. Therefore, a 
“selectivity bias” test must be performed before trying to determine whether 
state and federal appellate judges’ allegedly “irrational bias” explains the 
rather questionable, puzzling and unexpected outcomes in motion to com-
pel arbitration lawsuits.607 And, if selection bias is not, the next challenge 
is to secure the individual and statistical effects (“explanations”) of certain 
variables on courts’ dispositions of motions to compel arbitration—while 
controlling for and determining the multiple and simultaneous effects of 
other “presumed” predictors. 
Now, consider Table 4. It presents a multivariate, two-stage probit 
analysis608 of the disposition of motions to compel arbitration in state and 
federal appellate courts.609 The table illustrates several distributions, probit 
values, and statistics. 
                                                                                                                         
605 See infra Table 4 and compare the total sample size (N=981) with the number of liti-
gants (N=669) who decided to appeal adverse decisions to state and federal courts of appeals. 
606 See infra Table 4. 
607 See Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions, supra note 604, at 1088–89 
nn.431–32 (discussing measuring bias in sample data). 
608 In multiple published law review articles, the author has discussed and employed 
this statistical procedure to measure simultaneously independent and multiple effects of 
“independent variables” on the disposition of court decisions. See Rice, Allegedly “Biased,” 
“Intimidating,” and “Incompetent”, supra note 601, at 544–551 nn.790–838; Willy E. 
Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical and 
Historical Analysis of Courts’ Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbi-
tration and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-Ferguson Act—1941–1993, 43 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 399, 445–49 nn.213–19 (1994); Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative 
Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section 504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 
5 REV. LITIG. 219, 287 nn.406–09 (1986) (using StataCorp’s Stata Statistical Software to ana-
lyze the data generally and to compute the multivariate-probit coefficients in particular); 
Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection, supra note 604, at 
369–77 nn.157–60 (explaining multivariate probit analysis). 
609 A copy of the author’s database is on file with the author. 
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To begin, it is important to underscore that the findings in Table 4 are 
based on a multivariate probit analysis of 981 cases. Of this latter number, 
approximately 70 percent (678) of the litigants appealed motions to compel 
arbitration decisions to federal and state appellate courts. The remaining 30 
percent (312) decided not to appeal. Consequently they were “unobserved” in 
either state or federal courts of appeals. Again, the absence of the unobserved 
litigants could be a source of “selectivity bias,” which would effectively 
preclude three interrelated and unequivocal conclusions: (1) appellate courts 
are “irrationally biased” in favor of arbitration or the Federal Arbitration 
Act; (2) appellate courts’ irrational bias explains in part the disposition of 
motions to compel arbitration; and (3) courts of appeals weigh heavily 
extrajudicial factors when deciding whether to grant or deny motions to 
enforce arbitration provisions in standardized applications, which are not 
contracts under the FAA. 
Now, consider more carefully the variables and coefficients in Table 4. 
Fourteen (14) “dummy” variables610 or predictors appear in the table under 
four headings: “Underlying Legal Instruments” comprising three variables; 
“Litigants by Jurisdictions” containing predictors; “Types of Defendants 
in the Underlying Lawsuits” comprising two dummy variables; and “Plain-
tiffs in the Underlying Antidiscrimination Lawsuits” containing three dummy 
predictors. In addition, Table 4 illustrates two distributions of probit coef-
ficients along with their respective distributions of robust standard errors, 
z-statistics, and levels of statistical significance.611 
On the left, the first distribution of probit coefficients appears under 
the label “Decisions to Appeal Motion to Compel Arbitration Rulings to State 
and Federal Appellate Courts (N = 669).” Those probit coefficients answer 
whether the multiple, individual and simultaneous effects of fourteen dummy 
variables significantly influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal adverse 
motion to compel arbitration rulings. The findings show that some probit 
coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, we may conclude that some 
                                                                                                                         
610 Put simply, the subcategories or subgroups are individual binary (0, 1) or “dummy 
variables.” See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116–18 (5th ed. 2003) 
(explaining the purpose and use of dummy variables in regression analysis). 
611 See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL 
METHODS IN LAW 93, 233–34 n.4 (2010) (stating that “[w]hen a result has less than a 5 
percent chance of having been observed but is observed anyway, it is said to be statistically 
significant”, and explaining that a 1 percent chance “represents a ‘higher’ level of significance 
because it indicates a less probable outcome and hence a more rigorous statistical test”); 
David L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An 
Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 460 n.184 (2013) (“Statistical 
significance is the probability that an observed relationship is not due to chance .... A p-
value of less than 0.05 is usually considered statistically significant .... A 5% probability 
is equal to a p-value of 0.05 or less. Results with a p-value of less than 0.01 are con-
sidered highly statistically significant.”). 
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of the fourteen factors influenced movants and respondents’ decisions to 
appeal unfavorable trial and district courts’ rulings to state and federal 
appeals courts. 
More specifically, litigants’ decisions to appeal or not appeal can be 
explained by (1) knowing the movants who wanted to enforce arbitration 
provisions only in state-approved application forms; (2) knowing that 
movants in the Second and Ninth Circuits tried to enforce arbitration 
clauses; (3) knowing the movants who wanted to enforce arbitration clauses 
only in state appellate courts; (4) knowing the movants want to enforce arbi-
tration clauses only in federal courts of appeals; (5) knowing that movants 
were either defendants-employers or defendants–financial institutions in the 
underlying lawsuits; and (6) knowing the ethnicity or gender of respond-
ents/plaintiffs who filed the underlining antidiscrimination lawsuits against 
the movants. 
To repeat, some predictors influenced appellants and non-appellants’ 
decision to appeal adverse rulings to courts of appeals. And, some of the 
same predictors influenced courts of appeals’ dispositions of motions to 
compel arbitration. Thus, it is prudent to determine whether “selectivity bias” 
appears in the data. Or stated somewhat differently, it is necessary to assess 
whether there are any meaningful similarities between two equations or the 
two distributions of probit coefficients. At the bottom of Table 4, the find-
ings of a Wald test for independent equations appear. The Chi-square value 
is not statistically significant—suggesting that no disquieting “selectivity 
bias” appears in the sample data. 
Therefore, absent any meaningful “self-selection bias,” the next task is 
to determine the simultaneously individual and multiple effects of the four-
teen dummy variables on the dispositions of motions to compel arbitration. 
More specifically, the mission is to assess whether the predictors are sig-
nificantly more or less likely to influence appellate courts’ dispositions of 
motions to enforce arbitration clauses in standardized applications as well 
as in negotiated or standardized contracts. 
Even a hasty review of the four columns of statistics in Table 4 reveals 
that several of the fourteen predictors have statistically significant effects 
on motions to compel arbitration outcomes in state and federal courts. To 
illustrate, consider the subheading that appears on the right side of Table 
4—“Disposition of Motion to Compel Arbitration Lawsuits in State and 
Federal Courts of Appeals.” Four distributions of coefficients and statistics 
appear under that subheading in bold print. A closer look reveals that nine 
of the fourteen predictors have statistically significant probit coefficients.612 
                                                                                                                         
612 At all times, the interpretation of the “positive” and “negative” probit coefficients 
under this heading must be viewed from the perspectives of (1) the plaintiffs who filed the 
underlying lawsuits in state trial courts and in federal district courts, or (2) the respondents 
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First, the “Applications Only” variable has a negative (-.1711) probit 
coefficient. This means that generally, plaintiffs—who commenced under-
lying lawsuits—were statistically less likely to prevail when movants/de-
fendants asked appellate courts to enforce arbitration provisions only in 
standardized applications. Again, the “State Applications Only” predictor 
represents various applications that were fashioned and sanctioned under 
state laws.613 And, the positive (.2730) probit coefficient associated with this 
latter variable reveals that the respondents or the plaintiffs in the underly-
ing lawsuits are statistically more likely to win when appellate courts decide 
the enforceability of arbitration clauses in state-sanctioned application forms. 
Do state and federal courts’ jurisdictions or jurisdictional powers affect 
those tribunals’ dispositions of motions to compel arbitration? Do types of 
legal disputes influence the outcomes? The answer to each question is yes. In 
Table 4, locate these two predictors: “State-Based Disputes Only,” and 
“Federal Appellate Courts Only.” Their corresponding probit coefficients 
are negative and statistically significant. Put simply, the -.4917 coefficient 
                                                                                                                         
in the motion to compel arbitration proceedings. Of course, defendants in the underlying 
lawsuits also filed motions to compel arbitration in those same lower state and federal 
courts. So, focusing on the motion to compel arbitration litigation in the trial and district 
courts, this question arose: What was the outcome of each motion-to-compel-arbitration 
dispute? A dependent “dummy” variable—“OUTCOME-Trial-Court”—was created. It 
comprised two values (0, 1). If an underlying plaintiff prevailed in a state trial court or in 
a federal district court, the value 1 was assigned; and if the underlying plaintiff did not 
prevail, the value 0 was assigned. For cases decided in state and appellate courts, a second 
dependent “dummy” variable—“OUTCOME-Appellate-Court”—was fashioned. And the 
same coding scheme was applied. Thus, in Table 4, a negative probit coefficient means 
that the corresponding predictor decreased plaintiffs’ likelihood of winning a motion-to-
compel-arbitration dispute. On the other hand, a positive probit coefficient means that the 
corresponding predictor increased plaintiffs’ likelihood of winning a motion-to-compel-
arbitration dispute. 
613 See, e.g., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez, 107 P.3d 279, 286 (Alaska 2005) 
(“At the request of GEICO we have taken judicial notice that the Division of Insurance 
has approved application forms submitted by insurers and by agencies serving insurers 
that ... list the various levels of coverage required but do not state the premium that will be 
charged for each level of coverage.”) (emphasis added); Rosshirt v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 336 
S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (“The Allstate agent did not attach to his affidavit a 
copy of the state-approved application form which was in use.”) (emphasis added); Hall v. 
Shah, 953 N.Y.S.2d 758, 761 (App. Div. 2012) (“The date of application is the date that ... a 
signed state-prescribed application form, or a state-approved equivalent form ... is received 
by the facilitated enroller or the local district”) (emphasis added); Corcoran v. Atascocita 
Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-12-00982-CV, 2013 WL 5888127, at *5 (Tex. 
App. Oct. 31, 2013) (“There is no specific provision in the 1997 Guidelines authorizing 
homeowners to appeal [the Architectural Control Committee] disapproval to [Atascocita 
Community Improvement Association]. Furthermore, approved application forms attached to 
the 1997 Guidelines do not mention an ability to appeal to ACIA.”) (emphasis added). 
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indicates that plaintiffs are substantially less likely to win motion to compel 
arbitration disputes when plaintiffs’ underlying lawsuits comprise only state-
law claims.614 The -.5502 probit coefficient also has a similar meaning: in 
federal courts of appeals generally, respondents who filed the underlying 
lawsuits are substantially less likely to win in motion to compel arbitration 
proceedings. 
On the other hand, an underlying plaintiff’s likelihood of winning a 
motion to compel arbitration lawsuit increases or decreases substantially, 
depending on the location of the federal court of appeals. For example, the 
predictor variable “Second Circuit Only” has an accompanying negative 
probit coefficient (-.1307). And the predictor “Ninth Circuit Only” has an 
accompanying positive probit coefficient (.1095). Interpreting the two coeffi-
cients, we discover that respondents-plaintiffs are substantially less likely 
to win motion to compel arbitration disputes in the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit. But, in the Ninth Circuit, plaintiffs who commenced the 
underlying lawsuits are substantially and statistically more likely to prevail 
in motion to compel arbitration proceedings. 
Similarly, plaintiffs-respondents are more likely to prevail in motion to 
compel arbitration proceedings when the defendants-movants in the underly-
ing lawsuits are employers. The corresponding positive probit coefficient 
(.3166) is statistically significant. Conversely, plaintiffs-respondents are 
less likely to prevail when financial institutions file motions to enforce 
arbitration provisions in applications and contracts. The corresponding and 
statistically significant probit coefficient is negative (-.0994). 
                                                                                                                         
614 Without knowing more, this finding is arguably suspect or puzzling. And the 
reason is not very complex. In Table 3, the percentages show that state courts are signifi-
cantly more likely to deny motions to enforce arbitration provisions in both standardized 
applications and valid contracts. Thus, one could argue that state courts rather than 
federal courts are more “pro-plaintiff.” But, many state-law claims—which are filed in 
state courts—are removed to federal courts. See, e.g., Montero v. Carnival Corp., 523 
Fed. Appx. 623, 635 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Montero [sued] Carnival in Florida state court, 
asserting claims of Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure 
under maritime law. Carnival removed the case to federal court and filed a motion to compel 
arbitration based on the arbitration provision [in] the employment contract between 
Montero and Carnival.”); Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 653 F.3d 766, 767 (8th Cir. 
2011) (“Mack Green and other current or former shuttle bus drivers [sued] SuperShuttle in 
Minnesota state court alleging violations of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act .... 
After SuperShuttle removed the action to federal court, the district court granted Super-
Shuttle’s motion to compel arbitration.”); Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 
1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Cox filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Hawai’i Civil 
Rights Commission, and ... the Commission granted him the right to sue. Cox then filed a 
complaint in state court, which Ocean View removed to federal district court.”). Ultimately, in 
federal courts, the state law disputes or any accompanying motions to compel arbitration 
are greatly more likely to be adjudicated in favor of defendants. See Montero, 523 Fed. 
Appx. at 627; Green, 653 F.3d at 767; Cox, 533 F.3d at 1126; see also supra Table 3. 
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Earlier, an examination of the percentages in Tables 2 and 3 revealed 
that plaintiffs’ underlying theories of recovery or claims influence federal 
and state courts’ likelihood of granting or denying motions to enforce arbitra-
tion clauses in application forms and in valid contracts. Again, in many un-
derlying lawsuits, plaintiffs often sued defendants for allegedly violating 
consumer-protection, financial, securities, and/or deceptive trade practices 
laws. Furthermore, we discovered that state and federal courts occasionally 
grant defendants’ motions by enforcing arbitration clauses in standardized 
applications, and denying plaintiffs’ requests for a trial by jury.615 On other 
occasions, however, state courts refuse to enforce arbitration clauses in appli-
cations or in contracts, when consumer-protection, financial fraud, and/or de-
ceptive trade practices claims appear in plaintiffs’ underlying complaints 
or pleadings. 
In addition, as reported earlier, applications forms are ubiquitous. And 
each year, several million persons use such forms to apply for various goods, 
services, benefits and memberships.616 Furthermore, billions of contracts 
are formed annually.617 Consequently, such large numbers of applications 
and contracts guarantee that some persons will experience bad events. There-
fore, the question arises: are courts more or less likely to enforce arbitra-
tion clauses in applications or in contracts when disgruntled plaintiffs 
accuse defendants of violating state and federal antidiscrimination and 
civil rights laws? Again, in both Tables 2 and 3, one finding is unequivo-
cally clear and consistent: courts are always substantially more likely to com-
pel arbitration when plaintiffs commence antidiscrimination lawsuits against 
defendants-movants.618 
Of course, the next, narrower, and even more important question becomes 
whether courts of appeals permit plaintiffs’ ethnicity or gender to substan-
tially increase or decrease the likelihood of enforcing arbitration provisions 
in standardized applications and in contracts when plaintiffs file underlying 
antidiscrimination lawsuits? The unexpected answer appears in Table 4. 
Consider the three “dummy” predictors that appear under the general cate-
gory, “Plaintiffs in the Underlying Antidiscrimination Lawsuits.” The first 
coefficient (-.0202) is negative; which means that courts of appeals are likely 
                                                                                                                         
615 See supra Table 3. 
616 See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.A and II.D and 
accompanying text. 
617 See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnston, Internet Business Transactions Near 450 Billion a 
Day—The Truth about Digital Universe, WEBLOGIC.SYS-CON.COM, http://weblogic.sys 
-con.com/node/1404879 (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/62ZN 
-2RUP (“Commerce on the Internet continues to skyrocket .... IDC estimates that by 
2020, business transactions on the internet—[business to business] and [business to 
consumer]—will reach 450 billion a day.”). 
618 See supra Tables 2 and 3. 
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to compel arbitration when Anglo-American plaintiffs commence antidis-
crimination lawsuits against defendants. Additionally, the second negative 
probit coefficient (-.0277) indicates that federal and state appellate courts 
are more likely to compel arbitration when ethnic minorities file civil 
rights and antidiscrimination against defendants. 
But note that although the latter probit coefficients underscore a previ-
ously uncovered and discussed trend in Tables 2 and 3, the coefficients are 
not statistically significant. On the other hand, the effects of the last predic-
tor in Table 4—“Males Only”—is statistically significant. The correspond-
ing and negative probit coefficient (-.5028) reveals that state and federal 
courts of appeals are statistically and substantially more likely to enforce 
arbitration provisions in standardized applications and in contracts when 
males commence antidiscrimination lawsuits against defendants. 
Once more, it is important to ask: Did Congress enact FAA section 2, 
intending for numerous extrajudicial variables as well as plaintiffs’ theories 
of recovery to influence state courts’ decisions to enforce or not to enforce 
arbitration clauses in standardized applications? Did congressional mem-
bers expect a conservative or a liberal reading of FAA section 2 to influence 
federal courts’ decisions to enforce or not to enforce arbitration clauses in 
standardized or negotiated contracts? Based on a careful review of the FAA’s 
legislative history, the answer to each question is no. 
CONCLUSION 
Elsewhere, a general consensus has emerged about the U.S. Supreme 
Court and many lower federal courts that they readily ignore or marginalize 
states’ common law and statutes—those which get in the way of conclu-
sions and rulings that the Court and inferior judges want to deliver.619 The 
statistically significant findings—which appear in this Article—lend cre-
dence to that consensus. Indisputably, the overwhelming majority of state 
                                                                                                                         
619 Stephen Givens, Looking Through the Wrong End of the Telescope: The Japanese 
Judicial Response to Steel Partners, Murakami, and Horie, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1571, 1594 
(2011); see also Shawn Eisele, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.: Paving the 
Way for Cap and Trade?, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363, 382 (2008) (“The Supreme Court ... 
found ... ‘[c]ontext counts’ when it comes to statutory interpretation .... [Therefore], the 
Court did not authorize EPA to take action essentially marginalizing the PSD statute by 
removing modifications from the purview of PSD.”); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law 
and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 570–71 (2007) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Milwaukee II—which removed the federal common 
law of nuisance as a tool to address interstate water-pollution issues—may have influenced 
the marginalization of state common law.”); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: 
The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1722–30, 1742 (1989) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape using “constitutional rhetoric” and 
demonstrating that the Court marginalized a federal statute by focusing on tort rhetoric). 
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supreme courts have embraced two important common law rules: (1) a stand-
alone and standardized application form is not a contract; and (2) the terms 
and clauses in an application form may not alter,  or contradict terms and 
clauses in a totally integrated and written contract.620 
In fact, after carefully studying the state supreme courts’ rulings in the 
renowned contract law cases Mitchill v. Lath and Lucy v. Zehmer, even the 
greater majority of motivated first-year law students understand and appreci-
ate the importance of those legal principles.621 Yet, as reported and docu-
mented in this Article, we have learned that (1) federal appellate courts 
readily enforce mandatory-arbitration clauses in standardized applications 
as if the latter were binding and enforceable contracts; and (2) most federal 
courts and some state courts of appeals allow arbitration clauses in various 
types of stand-alone and standardized applications to modify or expand the 
language in subsequent, totally integrated written contracts. But even more 
unsettling, both state and federal appellate court judges consider and allow 
intentionally or unintentionally extralegal factors to influence their motion 
to compel arbitration decisions. 
The assertion is true: in the early twentieth century, some courts refused 
to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitration clauses in contracts.622 And, 
in response, Congress enacted the FAA to arrest purportedly federal and 
state courts’ universal bias against arbitration.623 Therefore, the FAA’s 
“strong bias in favor of arbitration” is not and should not be a surprise or an 
issue.624 On the other hand, the FAA was not enacted to foster an irrational 
bias in favor of mandatory arbitration and barring jurors from hearing 
plaintiffs’ statutory and common law claims. Yet, based on the statistically 
significant findings which are reported in this Article, a striking conclusion 
emerges: Most federal courts of appeals and some state appellate courts are 
irrationally biased against weighing and applying intelligently common 
law and statutory rules when deciding whether to enforce arbitration provi-
sions in completed and signed application forms. Furthermore, in motion to 
compel arbitration proceedings, appellate courts are significantly more likely 
to be irrationally biased in another significant way—they completely ignore 
the FAA’s “arising out of a written contract” test and enforce cavalierly 
arbitration clauses in applications. Once more, the latter standardized forms 
are not binding and enforceable contracts. 
                                                                                                                         
620 Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 649 (N.Y. 1928); Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 
522 (Va. 1954). 
621 Mitchill, 160 N.E. at 646; Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 522. 
622 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995). 
623 Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Review of Selected 
2009-2010 Insurance Decisions, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 971, 985–87 (2011). 
624 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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What would be a timely and effective remedy to address the motion to 
compel arbitration problems raised in this Article? Without a doubt, his-
torical and congressional evidence is clear that Congress did not enact the 
FAA to govern the enforceability of arbitration clauses in standardized ap-
plication forms.625 Therefore, Congress should enact a statute that prevents 
courts from enforcing arbitration provisions in paper and electronic appli-
cations for goods, services, and employment.626 
In recent years, attempts have been made to enact several versions of a 
proposed “Arbitration Fairness Act.”627 For example, the proffered “Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2013” read in pertinent part: “[N]o predispute arbi-
tration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an 
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dis-
pute.”628 Certainly, that proposed language is broad enough to arrest a sub-
stantial and persistent judicial problem: Irrationally biased and excessively 
pro-arbitration appellate courts’ propensity to ignore the FAA-related 
congressional intent by (1) enforcing arbitration clauses in standardized 
application; (2) marginalizing federal and state consumer protection, anti-
discrimination, and civil rights statutes, and (3) undermining states’ tradi-
tional principles of contract formation, interpretation and enforcement. 
                                                                                                                         
625 See supra notes 388–92 and accompanying text. 
626 After accessing Westlaw’s ALLCASES database and employing the query—
[(online /3 applied application) /p arbitrat!], the findings reveal: Many federal and state 
courts have addressed whether arbitration provisions in online applications are enforceable 
under the FAA. But even more disquieting, even within the same court or jurisdiction, split 
decisions can be found over the enforceability of online arbitration clauses in electronic 
applications. Compare Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172–73 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (declaring that the arbitration clause in the online application was unenforceable 
under the FAA), with Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F. Supp.2d 904, 917–18 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (enforcing the online arbitration provision in an application and requiring 
class members to enter binding arbitration). 
627 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(2) (2009); and, Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878 1st 
Session (2013). 
628 S. 878, 118th Cong. § 402(a) (1st Sess. 2013). 

